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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the “salvage” era of American linguistics (c.1910–1940) and its 
focus on the extraction of knowledges and cultural artifacts from Indigenous groups whose 
civilizations were believed in peril. Through close readings of historical archives and 
published materials, I imbricate the history of these scientific collection practices through 
the interpretive frames of Science & Technology Studies (STS), deconstructive criticism, 
and postcolonial theory. I centre the project on the career of linguist-anthropologist 
Edward Sapir, seizing upon his belief that linguistics was “more nearly perfect” than other 
human sciences—that linguistic methods were more akin to those of the natural sciences 
or formal mathematics. I employ Sapir as the chief focalizer of my work to map the 
changing topography of the language sciences in North America over these pivotal decades 
of disciplinary formation. Failure, here, offers a heuristic device to interrogate the linear 
logics of science and success which buttress that desire for perfection. Both conceptually 
and historically, the dialectics of failure and success throw into relief the vicissitudes of 
fieldwork, the uncertainty of patronage relationships, and the untenable promise of salvage 
that characterized these years. Through this approach, I present linguistics instead as a 
kairotic science—from the Greek kairos, suggesting opportunity—not perfect, but situated 
vividly in the world, bound by space, identity, and time. I examine how linguists conducted 
their collection work through the extension of a scientific network (Chapter 1), their 
construction of a scientific identity to the gradual exclusion of amateurs and the reduction 
of informant contributions (Chapter 2), and the development of an experimental system 
within the temporalities of fieldwork (Chapter 3). My dissertation hence invites a critical 
intervention within the history linguistics to re-encounter the science’s disregarded past 
and re-think its shared responsibility toward Indigenous communities in the present. 
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~ INTRODUCTION ~ 
 
“Linguistics may be said to have begun its scientific career with the comparative study and 
reconstruction of the Indo-European languages. In the course of their detailed researches 
Indo-European linguists have gradually developed a technique which is probably more 
nearly perfect than that of any other science dealing with man’s institutions.” 
- Edward Sapir, “The Status of Linguistics as a Science,” 1929  
 
Nearly Perfect 
My dissertation addresses the professional development of a science of language in North 
America roughly between 1910 and 1940. In this period, American linguistics made great 
strides to obtain autonomy and recognition as a scientific discipline: linguists established 
scholarly networks, launched publication venues, communicated expertise, and assembled 
methodologies that were predominately their own. Through such labour and invention, 
linguistics was put on the map alongside the other, more secure social sciences of the time. 
Accounts of this disciplinary formation are often told through a lineage of great men: a 
progression that begins with Franz Boas, proceeds to Edward Sapir, and ends with Leonard 
Bloomfield (or perhaps Noam Chomsky). In my retelling of this story, I register the diverse 
set of factors that made a linguistic science possible: the informants, institutions, intuitions, 
inscriptions, and other inhabitants that contributed to the incipient field of study. Above all, 
I recognize the centrality of Indigeneity in this era of American linguistics. In these decades, 
scientific collection practices in anthropology and linguistics were motivated by the 
zeitgeist of “salvage” to document Indigenous languages and cultures: collectors made 
efforts to extract practices, knowledges, artifacts, and other ephemera from Indigenous 
civilizations that they believed were fated to disappear in the wake of Western expansion. 
The arc of empirical and epistemological success for linguistics was predicated on this 
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prognostication of cultural failure. The story I tell here puts these narratives back into 
relation, knotting the rise of American linguistics to the Indigenous communities from 
whom they took linguistic data and without whom the science might not exist as it does 
today. As such, my dissertation is addressed to linguists interested in their disciplinary 
history, historians and science studies scholars attentive to the formation of a human 
science, and Indigenous groups investigating the entanglement of their languages with 
Western knowledge-taking practices. 
The scope of my project coincides with the career of linguist-anthropologist Edward 
Sapir (1884–1939), a superlative scholar and categorical humanist. Neither biography nor 
intellectual history, the dissertation employs Sapir as its chief focalizer to map the changing 
topography of the language sciences in North America over these pivotal decades of 
disciplinary formation. Sapir’s virtuosity spanned topics of language, culture, personality, 
aesthetics, and more, but his most notable contributions were to the science of linguistics: 
his scholarship and teachings shaped a uniquely Americanist linguistic tradition in the first 
half of the twentieth century. A Polish-born, Jewish emigrant, Sapir studied Germanic 
Philology in his B. A. (1904) and M. A. (1905) at Columbia University before earning a 
doctorate in Anthropology (1909) under the tutelage of Boas. The influence of Boas led him 
to study the Indigenous peoples of North America, a direction that would characterize 
much of his life’s work. Sapir produced or supervised extensive grammars, dictionaries, 
and typologies of Indigenous languages, and he helped to found the prevailing techniques 
for training, collection, and analysis within this field of study. My dissertation follows Sapir 
from his first institutional appointment as Chief Ethnologist of the Anthropological Division 
for the Geological Survey of Canada (1910–1925); to his protégé Benjamin Lee Whorf, with 
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whom he is frequently linked through the so-called “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis”; and finally to 
his last appointment at the “First Yale School” of Linguistics (1931–1939), where he 
trained a coterie of students focused on the study of Indigenous languages.  
In the chapters that follow, I seize upon Sapir’s belief, expressed in the epigraph, 
that linguistics was “more nearly perfect” than other human sciences—that their methods 
were more akin to those of the natural sciences or formal mathematics. The peculiar 
phrase, from which I derive my dissertation title, deserves brief comment. It occurred once 
elsewhere in Sapir’s oeuvre, in a vastly different context: an article on the semantics of 
“polar gradation” of comparative terms. He drew on a case from the English language: 
“Perfect” is perhaps the best example of a polar term. . . . Through the habit of 
using polar terms only to indicate some measure of falling short of their 
proper significance they may finally take on a less than polar function. Thus, 
“perfect” comes to mean to some people, and to all people in certain contexts, 
merely “very good.” This paves the way for the secondary grading of polar 
terms in a positive direction, e.g. “more perfect” and “most perfect.” Logically 
such terms might be interpreted to mean “more nearly perfect” and “most 
nearly perfect” (conditioned superlative with polar goal); actually, that is 
psychologically, they denote rather “better” and “best” in an upper tract of 
“good.” (1944/1963: 148) 
The implication drawn from Sapir’s usage, then, was that linguistics similarly belonged to 
the “upper tract” of the sciences: approaching the pole of perfection but, by degrees, failing 
to achieve it. Failure, in my work, offers a heuristic device to interrogate the linear logics of 
science and success which buttress the desire for perfection in linguistics and, I would 
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suggest, in narratives of progress that inform any scientific discipline. Bruno Latour (1993) 
observes that a key feature of Western modernity is a belief in the emancipation of 
humanity and the domination of nature through science and technology. This form of 
progress entails a separation of knowledge from power that simultaneously excludes 
“premodern” civilizations—from whom the moderns nonetheless take—and divides nature 
and culture into discrete and incommensurable domains of specialization. A history of 
science trained on failure, by contrast, complicates the clean lines of modernity and 
engages the mess of social, political, and material entanglements that science obviates so 
mastery can be (nearly) attained. 
The dissertation comprises three extended chapters that bring to the fore these 
themes of fallibility in the linguist’s pursuit of scientific mastery. Both conceptually and 
historically, the dialectics of failure and success throw into relief the vicissitudes of 
fieldwork, the uncertainty of patronage relationships, and the untenable promise of salvage 
that characterized these years of American linguistics. Through this approach, I present 
linguistics instead as a kairotic science—from the Greek kairos, suggesting opportunity—
not perfect, but situated vividly in the world, bound by space, identity, and time. I apply 
these categories of analysis, respectively, to the extension of Sapir’s network of collection 
practices from his administrative centre at the Victoria Memorial Museum in Canada; to 
Sapir’s apprentice Whorf and his efforts to construct a legible professional identity amid 
the emerging scientific culture of linguistics; and finally to the politics of temporal 
sovereignty that underwrote the descriptive work of his graduate program at Yale 
University. Below, I outline the contexts—historical and theoretical—that bear on my own 
efforts to situate these actors in the conditions that gave rise to their scientific activities. 
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❖ Historical Context: Salvage Linguistics. 
The histories of two human sciences converge in the works I address: Americanist 
anthropology and European philology.1 My study joins criticisms in Science & Technology 
Studies (STS) that consider the development of scientific disciplines through varied optics: 
through the lenses of institutions and interstices (Isaac 2012, Lenoir 1997), charisma and 
credibility (Clark 2006, Gieryn 1999), or epistemology and epideictic oratory (Knorr-
Cetina 1999, Latour 1987), to name but a few influences upon my work. Within the history 
of linguistics, I situate my work in relation to others who have assessed the growth and 
development of schools of thought (Koerner 1999; Murray 1994, 1998), the science’s 
professionalization in America (Alter 2005, Andresen 1990, Martin-Nielson 2011), the 
relationship of linguistics to anthropology (Darnell 1990, 1998, 2001), and the colonial 
legacy of the field (Errington 2008). I distinguish my project by foregrounding the co-
construction of a scientific ethos for American linguistics in relation to the politics of 
collection, placing this historiography in conversation with scholars who have likewise 
examined the entanglements of human sciences and classification practices. These studies 
span the psy-disciplines (Igo 2007, Lemov 2005), race and anthropology (Conklin 2013, 
Fabian 2010, Teslow 2014, Zimmerman 2001), genomics (Reardon 2005, TallBear 2013), 
and medicine (Anderson 2006, 2008). Comparatively less work has considered the 
                                                          
1 The term Americanist refers to a specialist in the study of “American Indians”: the phrase in itself evokes the 
problematic history of Western classifications that postcolonial and decolonial scholarship calls into question. 
Sadiah Qureshi (2011), however, recognizes the irresolution of “appropriate” alternatives: “in Britain Native 
American is usually considered the least offensive term possible, while Indian is almost never used; however, 
in the United States the term has been reappropriated in some contexts” (287). In most instances, I follow the 
contemporary usage of Indigenous or Native, but I acknowledge that the referential uncertainty of these 
terms indexes the failure of settler-colonial language and its inadequacy to define First Peoples. 
6 
 
collection practices of linguistics—with some notable exceptions (Brain 1998, Fountain 
2013, Kaplan 2013, 2017). My work asks how the science of language figures into these 
broader questions of race, culture, and difference, on the one hand, and of scientific 
authority, knowledge production, and empire on the other. 
First, some background on the development of linguistics and anthropology is 
necessary. In America, the professionalization of anthropology occurred between 1879 and 
1920, developing through multiple institutions and expanding scholarly networks. The 
Bureau of American Ethnology was founded in 1879 by John Wesley Powell, at a time when 
the study was rooted in local science societies of amateur anthropologists. From 1900 to 
1920, anthropology began to shift from the government-sponsored Bureau to museum and 
university settings, although there remained continuity and cooperation—if uneasy—
among these groups (Darnell 1998). Boas’s school at Columbia served as a model for the 
academic program. The Boasian “four fields” approach gathered under one rubric the study 
of archaeology, physical anthropology, cultural ethnology, and linguistics.2 All of Boas’s 
students, including Sapir, had some training in each subfield. The four modules were held 
to be discrete but complementary axes for the study of human diversity: they could be 
investigated “independently or in combination” (Boas 1911/1963: 137), but no element 
was fully soluble into another.3 Within this schema, linguistics held a privileged place as a 
supportive epistemology for ethnography, if not yet as an independent scientific domain: 
                                                          
2 There was continual tension among the four subfields, which diversified into competing paradigms post-
WWII (Darnell 1998: xi). 
3 Sara Eigen Figal (2008) examines how the categories of race and culture emerged in eighteenth-century 
natural histories and in the context of debates over colonialism and slavery. She connects the rise of 
hereditary and genealogical thinking about biological species with a language charged with the moral 
character of the family. Within lay and scientific discourses, the notion of racial difference came to limit or 
qualify membership in that family (i.e. the human species). George Stocking (1968) considers the extension of 
these categories in the history of anthropology from the early nineteenth century to the 1930s. 
7 
 
language was a phenomenon manifestly human and “the most plausible” means of 
classifying cultural variety (Darnell 1998: xii). In Sapir, however, the anthropological 
imperative for collection and classification met another tradition: comparative philology.  
Nineteenth-century philologists in Europe famously succeeded in reconstructing a 
“dead” language: Proto–Indo-European (PIE), the common tongue from which most 
languages of Europe are believed to descend. PIE was not attested by any written records, 
but philologists derived its sound system from internal principles of language change 
through a technique known as the “comparative method.”4 Influenced by natural histories, 
these comparativists employed branching “tree” diagrams to model the genealogy of this 
language family, or linguistic “stock,” with accumulated “sound laws” demarcating 
significant linguistic breaks in its history. These models quickly permeated public and 
scientific imaginaries, offering Europeans a means by which to envision their common 
history (Errington 2008) and scientists a useful site for interdisciplinary transfer (Alter 
1999).5 As Joseph Errington points out, however, while the circulation of these models 
offered Europeans a portrait of the vastness of human diversity and a deep history most of 
their citizens could share, their work also became a means by which linguistic difference 
could be appropriated for nationalist and imperialist narratives.6 The results were used to 
                                                          
4 The comparative method employs a systematic comparison of sound features between two or more related 
languages to derive properties of those languages’ common ancestor. 
5 Max Müller’s lecture on “Comparative Mythology” in 1858 introduced comparative philology to a broader 
English audience. 
6 Consider, as Christopher Hutton (1999) does, the propagandistic use of Indo-Germanic in Nazi Germany. 
Hutton challenges the accepted narrative that National Socialists “confused” the subjects of linguistics and 
race. Instead, he argues that linguistic thought was (and still is) central to the modeling of an ordered 
society—and that race sciences took their lead from the linguistics of the nineteenth century. His book thus 
seeks to reintegrate the work done by German linguists during the Third Reich into the broader history of 
Western linguistics, from which it has been bracketed off—and hence to destabilize the contemporary trend 
to see linguistics as ideologically neutral. 
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establish new hierarchies that placed Europe above its colonies (Hackert 2009). 
Correspondingly, in America, Daniel Brinton employed linguistic classifications to divide 
“primitive” from “civilized” cultural groups (Baker 1998, 2010).7 By contrast to this 
ranking of cultures couched in evolutionary theory, Boasian anthropology was founded on 
the principle of historical particularism—the belief that each culture’s development was 
relative to the historical experiences of that group—and its branch of linguistic inquiry was 
no different in that respect. The works of Sapir, Boas, and their colleagues sought to 
displace scientific racism and establish a positive and progressive reading of the world’s 
linguistic, cultural, and physical diversity in their stead.8 
In my work, I am interested in the extension of comparative linguistics to this 
American anthropological tradition in the early twentieth century—and its failures. Sapir, 
propelled by trust in the comparative method and confident in its potential success in 
America, similarly attempted to reconstruct a shared prehistory among Indigenous groups. 
However, where in Europe comparative philology had vast written corpora from which to 
draw, Americanists worked predominately on oral cultures. Linguists had to develop 
descriptive techniques for conducting fieldwork before venturing to make comparisons.9 
Collection and storage of linguistic data became the priority, and models of analysis that 
                                                          
7 Brinton had difficulty funding his linguistic research and later turned to anthropology, particularly of racial 
classification. As Lee Baker (2010) observes, American anthropology in the nineteenth century was less 
established than the other big social sciences of economics or psychology (117), and anthropologists made 
their work relevant through the science of race.  
8 Tracy Teslow (2014) reminds us of anthropology’s role in exhibiting racial formations to American publics. 
Though remembered now for their antiracism, Boas and the adherents to his doctrines did not think that race 
was an inherently problematic biological concept: rather, they believed a “good” racial science would 
invariably correct the bad. 
9 Indeed, one of the markers that linguists utilized to distinguish their work as science from the textual 
tradition of philology was their ability to account for the structure of oral languages, whether they be 
Indigenous or varieties of American English. 
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better suited field conditions soon predominated.10 Other external factors arose to 
complicate this knowledge production. Despite the empirical certainty that his training in 
comparative linguistics conferred on him, Sapir was continually frustrated that historical 
methods failed to engender credibility among his peers in anthropology.11 Moreover, 
practitioners interested in the scientific study of language were scattered across disparate 
departments (anthropology, literature, education) and had to meet and share their work 
under the auspices of other associations: the American Orientalist Society (1842), the 
American Philological Society (1868), or the Modern Language Association (1883).12 The 
founding of the Linguistic Society of America (LSA) in 1924 and its journal Language in 
1925 marked an important change in their situation. Linguists finally had a place of their 
own. At last, they had positioned themselves to reap the benefits of professionalization: 
salaried positions, scholarly networks, new outlets for publication, and recognition 
(however ambivalent) as a science. As Janet Martin-Nielsen (2011) reminds us, the other 
social sciences had already organized as professional scientific disciplines in America 
during the nineteenth century.13 Linguistics was still newly organized, still vying for 
epistemological and financial independence, and still working to solidify its authority in the 
                                                          
10 Janet Martin-Nielsen (2010) comments that anthropological linguistics before World War II was more 
concerned with the empirical practices of fieldwork than in theory; however, as the following chapters show, 
the interwar period was also a thriving period for the theorization of a science of language. 
11 The term engender is not used incidentally. Julia Falk (1999) recovers the presence and perspective of 
women in the founding of American linguistics, commenting on the barriers to entry they faced to become 
credible knowers in the emerging research culture. 
12 The American Philological Association faced similar straits in 1868: though European success signaled the 
possibility of a vocation in comparative philology, in America it had to negotiate an increasingly reductive 
definition of "science" (i.e. physical sciences), which excluded historical sciences (Alter 2005). 
13 Thomas Gieryn (1983) historicizes how, in the late 1940s, there was a move to integrate the “Big Five” 
social sciences—psychology, sociology, economics, anthropology, and political science—into what would 
later be the funding structure of the National Science Foundation (NSF), a debate which surfaced again in the 
1960s, that time to prevent the social sciences from forming their own foundation. Linguistics failed to 
register within either debate, only incorporated into the NSF with the establishment of the NSF Linguistics 
Program in 1975. 
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scientific and public eye. My dissertation traces the itinerant path it took to obtain these 
markers of status. 
I observe, too, how the production of scientific knowledge belongs to other contexts 
than the institutional and evokes more than the choices of maverick young men like Sapir. 
This recognition takes me out of the comfortable grooves of disciplinary history to consider 
how linguistic practices also fit into the troubled and troubling trajectories of the salvage 
paradigm. In the early half of the twentieth century, the zeitgeist of salvage guided the 
collection practices of much linguistic and anthropological work in America: researchers 
wanted to accumulate records (material, textual, archaeological) from Indigenous cultures 
that they deemed in peril of disappearing. James Clifford (1989) identifies the paradox at 
the heart of this motivation: it linked ethnic cultures symbolically to the past, valuing their 
authenticity as a product of distance from the “modern” and hence consigning these ways 
of life to loss. Despite the egalitarian leanings of these scholars, the institutional histories of 
anthropology and linguistics were nonetheless intertwined in the knowledge-gathering 
projects of settler-colonial governance. These forces were likewise eager to classify 
Indigenous peoples (racially and geographically) and collect their knowledges (cultural 
and linguistic), all while functioning to exclude, displace, or eradicate them. Salvage thus 
represents the greater context of failure that my dissertation seeks to address. The history 
of linguistics in this period formed a story of extraction on two fronts: linguists extricated 
themselves from other academic fields at the cost of extracting resources from Indigenous 
communities in the field to furnish their archives, contributing little to them in return. 
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❖ Theoretical Context: Failure.  
In her (2010) essay on “Historiography’s Contribution to Theoretical Linguistics,” Julie 
Andresen argues that the historian is “uniquely positioned” to “leverage our understanding 
of the discipline’s past in order to open a path to the discipline’s future” (444). In contrast 
to E. F. K. Koerner (1999), who believes that historiography in linguistics should act as an 
“over-arching and unifying agent” (6), Andresen calls for a kind of performative history, 
where amidst descriptions of the past we might also stage encounters that transform the 
present. By engaging what the discipline has forgotten, we may alter linguists’ orientation 
toward their methods of analysis and objects of study and encourage them to recognize the 
“partial perspective” of their work (Haraway 1988): to acknowledge that knowledge is the 
result of collective practice and thus represents the sedimented values of a research 
community (broadly conceived), some of which are known to the actors and some not. I do 
not perceive this partiality as an impediment to the study of language—as a circumstance 
to be remedied by unity—but rather, following the reflections of Julia Kristeva (1989), I 
understand the remediation of language to be a necessary component to its study, scientific 
or otherwise. It is my hope that by looking backward to its historical contingency that we 
might also find a way of moving forward—together, but not as one. 
 To this end, my dissertation foregrounds the under-arching and disunifying agent 
that lurks in the periphery of any performative act or partial perspective: failure. Failures, 
false starts, misfortunes, mistranslations, lapses in memory—these events (or non-events) 
characterize scientific projects and practices as much as their successes, if not more so. 
Failure, as a site of inquiry and analytic category, has long been operationalized within STS. 
It appears in the genre of the controversy study, where practitioners of the sociology of 
12 
 
scientific knowledge (SSK) invoked a principle of symmetry to explain why competing 
scientific theories succeeded or failed (Bloor 1976/1991). Failure of human agency was 
central to the later uptake of symmetrical thinking in actor-network-theory (ANT), which 
criticized SSK for its reduction of science to human-governed rules and extended the 
symmetry principle to non-human actors (Callon and Latour 1992). Failure also has more 
allusive functions. It reveals the unreliability, uncertainty, or bias of technoscientific 
formations (Jones-Imhotep 2017, Martin 1991, Murphy 2006). It implicates the sciences 
through their role in the construction of social, material, or epistemological normativity 
and the exclusions therefrom (Anderson 2006, Canguilhem 1989, Fausto-Sterling 2000, 
Goffman 1963). Failure gets mobilized in the production of ignorance in experimental and 
cultural settings (Pettit 2013, Proctor & Schiebinger 2008). It also serves as grounds for the 
contestation or reconfiguration of scientific and technical expertise (Epstein 1996, Serlin 
2004), or as a platform to amplify marginalized standpoints (Harding 2008). As Jack 
Halberstam (2011) writes in The Queer Art of Failure: 
The social worlds we inhabit, as so many thinkers have reminded us, are not 
inevitable, they were not always bound to turn out this way, and what’s 
more, in the process of producing this reality, many other realities, fields of 
knowledge, and ways of being have been discarded and, to use Foucault’s 
(2003) term, “disqualified.” (147) 
Failure, here, figures not as a recalcitrance toward success but its condition of possibility, 
the context of its undoing, and the space for its rethinking. Failure focuses attention on 
those for whom success forecloses, forgets, or otherwise does not fit. I therefore portray 
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the dynamics of scientific failure and success not through the linear function of progress, as 
often they are presented, but as an open field of scrutiny and play.  
The following chapters peruse the catalogue of failures that interleaved the growth 
of American linguistics, but there is one failure in particular worth addressing now. My 
attention to the development of an independent science of language in the twentieth 
century would be remiss without comment on the broader relationship of language and 
knowledge, as configured through and against this burgeoning scientific authority. As John 
Searle has put it, “Twentieth-century philosophy has been obsessed with language and 
meaning” (1995: 168). The linkage of language-knowledge has carried over into 
anthropology, history, literary criticism, psychoanalysis, and other social sciences and 
humanities, where to varying degrees language has been understood as the vehicle of 
human complexity. The “linguistic turn” has influenced STS, as well:14 Kuhn (1962) cites 
linguistic relativity as an inspiration for his concept of scientific paradigms; linguistic 
rhetoric features strongly in Shapin and Schaffer’s (1989) “literary technologies” and 
Latour’s (1987) Science in Action; metaphor organizes work by Emily Martin (1991) and 
Evelyn Fox Keller (2002); deconstructive discourse analysis informs Donna Haraway 
(1989), Paul Edwards (1996), and Lily Kay (2000). This is to name only a few. In Language 
Alone, Geoffrey Harpham (2002) observes that language forms both the centre and 
supplement at once for humanist and antihumanist discourses: “Language,” he intones, 
“says it all” (7; emphasis in original). However, more recently, emphasis has shifted away 
                                                          
14 Geoffrey Harpham (2002) identifies five such “turns” in the Western philosophical tradition: the turn to 
logical or ideal language; to ordinary or non-ideal language; to concepts refined in professional linguistics; to 
a postmodern notion of language as the essence of thought; and to an antihumanist dissolution of the subject 
within the primacy of language.  
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from language toward other complexities: material cultures, microbial life, political 
ecologies, big data. Many of the above scholars now discuss (not exclusively!) crittercams 
(Haraway 2008), “parliaments of things” (Latour 1993), climate data (Edwards 2010), and 
so on. If Wittgenstein (1953/2009) once conceived of language as an “ancient city,” as “a 
maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from 
various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular 
streets and uniform houses” (Investigations, no. 18), then perhaps, in the current 
academic-industrial complex, has this city filed for bankruptcy? Are its suburbs no longer 
in “good pleasure” (Julius Caesar, 2.1.295)? Has language—the nearly perfect tool of 
humanism and its critique—failed to live up to these grand expectations? 
 Provoked by this context, I take a moment to glance over the shoulder and consider 
how language might be otherwise conceived under the auspices of the “material turn.” 
What the critique of the linguistic turn misses is the focus on the materiality of language in 
deconstruction: from the outset, Jacques Derrida (1976) differentiates speech from the 
technology of writing, a distinction between logocentric abstraction and the palimpsestic 
materiality of texts. Meanwhile, arbiters of the new materialism have in part solidified their 
collective identity by delimiting language or defining themselves against it. For instance, 
David Serlin (2004) contrasts his study of embodied technologies with “mere” metaphor 
(26). Michelle Murphy (2006) draws attention away from the citationality of chemical 
exposures (“Repetitions accumulated” [2]) to their materialization within office buildings. 
Annemarie Mol’s (2002) argument for multiple ontologies reorients language (or “talk”) 
such that it occupies a purely referential function (objects become clustered under the 
“same name”). Or, as Lorraine Daston (2004) announces, “Without things, we would stop 
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talking” (9).15 These texts reduce the interplay of language and materiality to questions of 
reference, of naming practices. They understand language as (always) already linked to 
human subjectivity, to a focus on interiority, or to an inquiry into a self-referential system 
(i.e. social constructivism). These utterances operate parallel to linguistics in constituting 
language as “uniquely” human, alike recanting the complexities of its materiality.16 
However, language embodies complex associations and histories, taking it in directions not 
intended by the user, and not determined by its referent in the world. Language is not 
alone, as Harpham’s book title suggests, but an assemblage of human and nonhuman 
actors: language enrolls speakers, linguists, phonographs, typewriters, and databases; its 
vibrations are felt over wax, ink, paper, and air. At its most abstruse, then, my dissertation 
plays a game of cat’s cradle amid the political and philosophical entanglements (the knots 
and nots) of language and matter, exploring and exposing how its divisions have become 
reified—even within STS. I seek to problematize the ontological status attributed to 
“Language” by examining the scientific practices that materialize and domesticate it. This 
line of inquiry is especially germane in the translation of linguistic methods and models to 
Indigenous languages, where the interaction of systems of knowledge with—rather than 
as—systems of language complicate the coherence of those frames.  
 
                                                          
15 An exaggeration, to be sure, but perhaps a paradigmatic one. 
16 Claire Colebrook (2014) comments on the false dichotomy she perceives between deconstruction and new 
materialism. She recognizes the common strategy of new materialists to align deconstruction with the textual, 
but reminds us that the text, too, is a thing, in addition to marking things. Indeed, deconstruction begins with 
the “radically material concept of the trace” (135), and she speculates that its tools of analysis worked out on 
texts can be applied to those other things, as well. In particular, Colebrook highlights the ethical responsibility 
of deconstruction to declare that “any thing, matter or real is always given as real to us, with the ‘us’ also 
bound up with the processes of givenness that can never be mastered” (140; emphasis in original). In my 
work, I assess how the “givenness” of language applies to the politics of its “takenness” from Indigenous 
communities. 
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❖ Chapter Structure.  
The choice of three long chapters reflects the major archives that I visited (and revisited) 
throughout the writing process whose scope formed the enabling constraints of my work: 
the Edward Sapir Papers at the Canadian Museum of History; the Benjamin Lee Whorf 
Papers at Yale University; and the Franz Boas, Mary Haas, and Charles Voegelin Papers at 
the American Philosophical Society. The different chapter structures represent and diffract 
the archival impetus of these knowledge sites; these choices reply (and re-ply), indirectly, 
to Ann Stoler’s (2009) prompt to consider “archiving-as-process” and interrogate not only 
the archives’ contents but the principles and practices that inform their structures (20). 
Stoler suggests that researchers should take an “ethnographic” rather than an “extractive” 
approach to archival work (47). In response, each of my chapters is anchored by a 
conceptual device that brings to the fore these archival forms. I employ different 
technologies of punctuation { . . . — [ ] } to structure my encounter with the archives, 
alluding to elements of their organization through form rather than reference. The ellipsis 
is used to convey communication across points in a network that composed much of Sapir’s 
archives for the Geological Survey of Canada (Chapter 1). The dash is used to express the 
importance of identity formation that was integral to the personal and professional 
correspondence of Benjamin Lee Whorf (Chapter 2). The bracket is used to indicate the 
detailed attention to linguistic records in the archives of the First Yale School (Chapter 3). 
These marks also index the different stages of disciplinary development in linguistics on 
which my chapters concentrate: the scattered spaces of the ellipsis that anticipate 
disciplinary cohesion, the dash that forms a line between amateur and specialist, and the 
timely bracketing of the phoneme as an object of study exclusively linguistic. 
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Chapter 1: “Curating Intimate Distance: Edward Sapir, Elliptical Space, and the Geological 
Survey of Canada.” My study begins with Sapir’s first institutional appointment as Head of 
the Anthropological Division of the Geological Survey of Canada (1910–1925). At this 
juncture, linguistics had yet to gain its footing: it was a science in service, both to the 
Dominion Government and as a resource to the better-established discipline of 
anthropology. Despite Sapir’s commitment to an egalitarian, anti-racist science, his Division 
was nonetheless in service also of an imperialist project that sought to displace, contain, or 
elide the First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples upon whose lands and knowledges the 
Survey depended. It was out of these conditions of estrangement and belonging, I argue, 
that Sapir cultivated a relation of intimate distance for himself and his disciples. Intimate 
distance—to draw near but keep apart—names an institutionalized affect that animated 
the network of collection practices through which Sapir sought to reach out across the 
contact zone and apprehend linguistic data from the intuitions of Indigenous informants. 
This structure of feeling characterized his inchoate yearning for disciplinarity within 
linguistics, allayed the persistent setbacks and unexpected encounters of fieldwork, and 
sustained the fantasy of completion characteristic of “salvage” ethnology.  
 
Chapter 2: “‘A Dash of Genius’: Benjamin Lee Whorf, Scientific Belonging, and the Promise of 
Linguistics.” Sapir is often remembered as the former half of the “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,” 
although there was never a collaboration between Benjamin Lee Whorf and his mentor. 
This chapter explodes the hyphenate and tracks Mr. Whorf—a self-professed hobbyist and 
fire inspector by trade—as he emerged both as an exemplar of and exception to a 
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burgeoning disciplinarity within American linguistics. I employ the seeming paradox of the 
“amateur specialist” (Whorf was called so in in his Times obituary) to recapture a moment 
when linguistics had not yet established its professional identity and remained open to the 
contribution of amateurs. The chapter explores how the status of amateur afforded Whorf 
an unconventional perspective on the training structures, methodologies, and expected 
trajectories of a university researcher—foremost realized in his linguistic relativity 
hypothesis. Whorf, I show, sought belonging not only in the domain of the professional 
scientist, but as well in the role of scientific popularizer, envisioning for linguistics a moral 
imperative to inform and guide the public.  
 
Chapter 3: “Bracketing Time: The First Yale School, a Study of Method.” My final chapter 
expands focus to the group of linguists who studied under Sapir at Yale University, in 
particular Mary Haas, Morris Swadesh, and Charles Voegelin. From its inception upon 
Sapir’s arrival at Yale to his death almost a decade later (1931–1939), this school served as 
a nexus for research on Indigenous languages and an emerging training centre for the 
scientific study of language—much of which unraveled soon after its leader’s demise. This 
chapter puts into contrast the momentary collusions of institutional support with the 
group’s interest in preserving timeless linguistic data: Sapir’s students were eager to 
resume his work of documenting living languages and recovering dead ones. Here, I 
examine how these linguists trained their bodies and developed specialized writing 
systems to apprehend the languages of their Indigenous informants. These techniques and 
technologies for isolating and storing languages tie together colonial legacies and humanist 
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ambitions; the continued vitality of their records also suggests an opportunity to re-think 
settler frames of reference within the archives of linguistics. 
There are certain litanies we rehearse about failure until they appear to us as 
common sense: failures represent the stepping stones on the way to success; failures are 
what we discard when, finally, success is found. I argue to the contrary that failure is ever 
present: failure lingers under the surface of success, heralding its potential re-workings 
through new meanings, uses, or contexts. To this end, my dissertation considers the 
failures of salvage linguistics on three levels: the empirical failure that was the impossible 
task of assembling complete records on threatened languages, the institutional failure of 
this school of linguistics to ensure lasting support for their work, and the ethical failure of 
linguists toward the peoples they encountered in the field. In doing so, I reverse the 
polarity of Sapir’s dictum that linguistics was a nearly perfect science. Where, for Sapir, the 
usage of nearly perfect indicates a falling short of, or a promise closely but not quite 
fulfilled, through the optics of failure I understand it as a source of different possibility: a 
call to elongate the space between science and success and, therein, re-orient the history of 
linguistics. The domain of the nearly perfect represents the kairos of my project: the 
opportunity to move away from the ideal of perfection and the linear narratives of 
scientific progress that accompany it. These narratives have their origin in modernist 
fantasies that relegate Indigenous peoples to the margins at best. Along these lines, the 
goals of my writing are to reflect on the legacy of salvage linguistics and to help foster a 
non-extractive model that recognizes language’s materiality and hence the collective 
responsibility of linguistics toward Indigenous communities from whom they once took 
and now should be compelled to give back.  
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~ 1 ~ 
“. . . we will find ourselves drifting into the position of genteel spies for the Department of 
Indian Affairs. We cannot afford to be misunderstood by any Indians in Canada.” 
- Edward Sapir (to Marius Barbeau, 16 July 1920, GSC) 
 
“The proximity of ethnography leads to a recognition of distance: this is a knowledge which 
withdraws from that which one has laboured to know.” 
- Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 2000 
 
Curating Intimate Distance:  
Edward Sapir, Elliptical Space, and the Geological Survey of Canada 
 
Introduction: On Intimate Distance. 
Salvage linguistics often belonged to wider-ranging anthropological collection projects, 
especially in the early years of the twentieth century before linguistics gained its footing as 
an independent science in North America. One such example, the focus of this chapter, was 
Edward Sapir’s position as Chief Ethnologist of the Anthropological Division for the 
Geological Survey of Canada (1910–1925). Sapir is remembered as the first linguist to 
employ native speakers’ intuitions systematically to judge the adequacy of a grammar, a 
style of elicitation still in use today, and he developed this approach during his years in 
Ottawa while managing an anthropological research team and its associated museum. 
Despite Sapir’s commitment to an egalitarian, anti-racist science, this participatory 
methodology was nonetheless borne out of conditions of extraction. His Division was a 
branch of a settler-colonial venture that participated in the segregation, coercion, and 
exploitation of the First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples. In We Have Never Been Modern, 
Bruno Latour (1993) praises the “ethnologist’s detachment” (35) and extols their ability to 
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construct a single narrative that incorporates nature and culture along the same plane. In 
this formulation, Latour flattens the dynamics of knowledge-power to a measure of scale 
and overlooks the historical role of anthropology in producing and perpetuating structural 
imbalances. This chapter demonstrates through linguistics, the disciplinary attaché of 
ethnology at the time, the techniques of distantiation that linguists and ethnologists alike 
employed in service of the state. In lieu of detachment, I examine how the “intimately 
distant” routines of Sapir and his scientific network contributed to the development of 
linguistic methodologies and their implementation in the field. 
Sapir himself was “no museum man,” decided Alfred Kroeber (to Putnam, 19 
February 1908, UCB), commenting on his friend’s early departure from his first official 
position at the University of California (1907–1908). There, Sapir had conducted fieldwork 
on Yana, Indigenous peoples of northern California, as part of a state survey based in the 
university. He left to defend his dissertation at Columbia University, earning a doctorate in 
Anthropology in 1908. Like Kroeber, Sapir trained under Franz Boas in the Americanist 
anthropological tradition, mastering its four subfields: cultural ethnology, physical 
anthropology, linguistics, and archaeology. However, not all areas of anthropology found 
equal distribution within the museum space, he would learn. Linguistics was included 
predominately as an aid, or “handmaiden” (Darnell 2009: 44), to ethnography. Textual 
records and rudimentary knowledge of language were integral for ethnographic research, 
but rarely understood as an end to itself. This subordination of linguistics was a sore 
subject for Sapir. Even at his second appointment at the University of Pennsylvania and its 
attached museum (1908–1910), where “American Indian linguistics” was on the 
curriculum, he was “immediately confronted with the museum attitude that collections 
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were paramount” (Darnell 2009: 30), linguistic research secondary. To put it simply: the 
description of languages did not belong to the display culture of museum exhibits. 
Nonetheless, Sapir’s commitment to linguistics and knowledge of its methods were 
unequaled among Boasians. In Sapir, the anthropological tradition met with the tenets of 
Germanic philology; and where philology usually concerned literary languages, Sapir’s 
training under Boas inculcated in him an unceasing curiosity for the unwritten languages of 
North America. Even amidst other ethnographic work, he usually found time to puzzle out 
the details of their linguistic structure. Sapir was a “born linguist” (Boas to Kroeber, 24 May 
1906, UCB), but what was a linguist born into before there was a professional science in 
America by that name? How did linguists extend themselves through spaces, networks, and 
lands that were not their own? 
Sapir was no museum man, yet one he would remain for the next fifteen years. The 
American accepted an appointment as Chief Ethnologist of the newly created 
Anthropological Division of the Geological Survey of Canada from 1910 to 1925.17 Director 
Reginald Brock requested Sapir at Boas’s recommendation, for a position that, to the young 
Ph.D., must have seemed ideal. The scope of the Division was “pretty much what the man 
himself makes of it.” Alongside museum work, its goal was to conduct “a thorough and 
scientific investigation of the native races of Canada, their distribution, languages, cultures, 
etc., etc., and to collect and preserve records of the same.” To accomplish this task, the 
Survey both encouraged and provided generous support for fieldwork: “All expenses while 
                                                          
17 Although Sapir worked in Canada for fifteen year, this chapter is more a history of American anthropology, 
for which the Survey was but a post north of the border. Sapir trained no students during his time there and 
consequently failed to leave a legacy in the Canadian-identified anthropology that developed through 
university programs later in the century (Harrison & Darnell 2006). 
23 
 
in the field and everything necessary for the proper carrying on of the work will be 
provided by the Department.” As head of the Anthropological Division, Sapir was to help 
“organize, stimulate, encourage, and direct individual effort throughout the country” 
(Brock to Sapir, 3 June 1910, GSC). The Division was instituted with strong support from 
the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), the Royal Society of 
Canada, and “Canadians generally,” Brock opined. A special vote passed in Parliament to 
approve Sapir’s position as Chief Ethnologist (with a starting salary $2100 per annum), 
classifying full employees of the Division as civil servants. Linguistics was once again in 
service, but now to the Dominion Government in addition to the better-established 
discipline of anthropology. 
 For the first time in his academic career, Sapir had a secure position, and he was 
eager to make a name for himself in national and international contexts. Anthropology in 
Canada, up to that point a sparse collection of missionaries and amateurs, seemed a fertile 
ground for collecting data. Significant contributions could be made for a small cost, with 
smaller or one-man teams (Zaslow 1975: 289); long-range scientific objectives thus joined 
with short-term economic ones (297). However, after four years of intense productivity in 
the field and active collection work for the museum, the Division’s funding was cut short by 
wartime budgets. Anthropology, which already represented less than 1% of the overall 
funding structure for the Geological Survey, was not considered strategically important 
during the war; compared to the 9% overall cuts to the Survey by 1918, the Division faced a 
70% cutback (Vodden & Dyck 2006: 30), from which it would never recover. During Sapir’s 
time there, the Division also endured the loss of personnel due to resignation, 
reassignment, or death; it was afflicted by a persistent lack of space to hold or display the 
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collections that its staff had already assembled. Sapir’s appointment was not the boon it 
had initially appeared. 
But this story is not only about Sapir, his research team, and their collections. The 
Division, under the auspices of the Geological Survey of Canada, was not a purely scientific 
endeavour (if such a thing exists), nor did its successes and failures concern only its 
government-employed staff. Failure also served the settler government’s framing of the 
“Indian Problem” (Dyck 1991): a failure for Indigenous groups to assimilate and abandon 
their “failing” cultural practices, for which government agents acted as coercive 
mediators.18 The Survey, formed in 1842 under the guidance of William Edmund Logan to 
ascertain extricable resources, operated inextricably within these frames. In addition to 
being a training centre and base of support for scientists in Canada, it served the purpose of 
mapping resources and guiding prospectors, buoyed by a belief in industrial expansion and 
a large market for raw materials in Britain. The Geological Survey Act renewed the 
initiative in 1856, laying the foundation for the Survey’s display hall (today, the Canadian 
Museum of History). Inspired by the Great Exhibition of 1851, the display hall allowed 
Canada to contribute to such international exhibitions (Vodden & Dyck 2006: 10); 
collection for the hall began in 1862, long before the Anthropological Division was 
established, with the aim of displaying Canada’s achievements in every area of civilization 
to its peoples and the world. After 1867, the Survey became an integral organization for 
                                                          
18 Noel Dyck (1991) accounts for the material, ideological, and legal underpinnings of the “Indian Problem”: a 
belief—but really, as Dyck points out, an assertion—that the differences between Native and Euro-Canadian 
cultures must be resolved. The Indian Lands Act of 1860 cemented the administrative transfer from an 
imperial to a colonial government, from a trade relationship to one of settlement, and from a cooperative 
model to coercive tutelage (51). In this arrangement, “tutors” were tasked with saving Native peoples from 
stigma, vulnerability, and poverty, which were often the products of government regulation. The Indian Act of 
1876 consolidated this policy of assimilation and extended powers to federal agents for its enforcement (52). 
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performing reconnaissance on the land of a newly confederated country; its mandate 
expanded to include exploration and resource appraisal, becoming part of the Department 
of the Interior in 1877. In 1907, control over the Survey shifted hands to the Department of 
Mines, effecting a change in its public image and research program (Zaslow 1975: 285). 
This shift coincided with increased attention to Indigenous civilizations in order to 
demonstrate the “early history of Canada” (279). In 1910, the Survey moved to the Victoria 
Memorial Museum, cementing the union of prospecting and representation: the Museum 
was projected to display the “infinite diversity” of Canada, which now included “human 
categories” alongside flora and fauna (278). The Survey therefore stood at the conjuncture 
of science, economics, environment, and government; it embodied a commitment to the 
past, the urgency of the present, and prospects for the future of a settler nation.  
At the same time that the Survey worked to register the resources of a purportedly 
unified nation and the Museum to consolidate its cultural identity, the two initiatives 
functioned as branches of a colonialist project that sought to displace, contain, or elide the 
First Nations, Inuit, and Métis upon whose lands and knowledges that nation was based. In 
The Transit of Empire, Jodi Byrd (2011) argues that discourses of inclusion into 
multicultural liberal democracy erase Indigenous communities’ prior claims to sovereignty, 
installing them as racial minorities already incorporated into the “implicit symbolic order” 
of the state (125), rather than enduring challenges to its borders. With its purported aim to 
integrate the First Peoples into Canadian history, the Museum embodied and emplaced the 
construction of the “Indian” as internal to the empire and evidence of its cultural diversity. 
Sapir may have organized the Anthropological Division along the lines of the Americanist 
tradition, with its commitment to collaboration, facilitation, and respect for the “Native 
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point of view” (Darnell 2001: 12–20), responsive to all the tensions and ambiguity that 
entailed. However, as an extension of the Survey, the Division was nonetheless complicit in 
this colonial formation. Famously, Sapir refused for his team to act as “genteel spies for the 
Department of Indian Affairs,” yet as scientists in service to the state, they had little 
recourse but to touch on the violences of New World colonization. Making the “strange” 
familiar is a common strategy of imperial projects, Sara Ahmed (2000) observes, and 
ethnography represents the “professionalization of strangerness,” turning an “ontological 
lack” into an “epistemic privilege” (60). Ann Stoler (2009) puts it another way: “Colonial 
commissions reorganized knowledge, devising new ways of knowing while setting aside 
others” (29). The Anthropological Division, as a knowledge-taking branch of the Survey, 
was unavoidably entangled in the project of governmentality, despite the ire or 
disappointment of some of its staff or their efforts to the contrary. 
However, the relationship of knower and who is known is not a one-sided and 
hierarchical arrangement. Postcolonial studies have demonstrated how the identities of the 
colonizer and colonized are bound together in intricate and unpredictable ways. Under this 
analysis, empire is not a “monolithic system of domination” projecting authority from its 
centres of power, but instead understood as a “network of power relations” diffused across 
a multitude of intimate encounters (Kaplan 2002: 14). Stoler (2006a) understands 
intimacy as another realm of colonial power, in addition to the rationalizing projects of the 
state: “Colonial authority depended on shaping appropriate and reasoned affect (where 
one's sympathies should lie), severing some intimate bonds and establishing others” (2), 
both in its officials and its colonized. Such “domains of the intimate” frequently included 
social policy, urban planning, and medical protocol (3). But as Stoler and her fellow 
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essayists in Haunted by Empire show, there is no consensus on what constituted the 
intimate: the volume spans the intimacies implicated in juridical trials, labour histories, 
evangelical missions, intelligence testing, and more. Together, the authors explore “the 
intimate through and beyond the domestic and through and beyond the management of 
sex” (4; emphasis in original). These “affective histories” reveal a bio-politics of 
vulnerability (14), in which the intimacies of some bodies become exposed, regulated, 
drawn in, or cast aside. As I demonstrate below (in §5 especially), intimacy also ruptures 
modes of governmentality suggested in the discourses of bio-politics, revealing a two-way 
traffic between Indigenous groups and government agents, where the former’s speech, 
silence, agency, and desire affected the course of these encounters. 
 Intimacy thus appears in many forms and guises and with varied functions. My 
chapter contributes to this discussion by naming and describing an affective commitment 
emergent within the Anthropological Division during the fifteen years of Sapir’s tenure. The 
Geological Survey was such a rationalizing state project as Stoler describes, serving to 
remap and reclassify a land and its peoples from a distance; through the actions and 
sensibilities of the Division, especially, it was also an intimate project. The anthropologists 
under the Survey’s employ had to strike a balance between acting as agents of a settler 
colonial government and Boasian ethnologists; they were lodged equally in the proximities 
of fieldwork and the remoteness of bureaucracy. Sapir, in particular, had to manage the 
representational space of the Victoria Memorial Museum against the actual space of 
Canada, coordinating a skeletal research team with a network of informants and other 
government actors. It was out of these conditions of estrangement and belonging, I argue, 
that Sapir and his colleagues cultivated a relation of intimate distance to help navigate the 
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uncertainty of these spaces: intimate distance—to draw simultaneously near and apart—
names an institutional affect that animated their network of collection practices. This 
structure of feeling deflected concerns over woefully diminishing budgets, allayed the 
persistent setbacks and unexpected encounters of fieldwork, and sustained the fantasy of 
completion characteristic of “salvage” ethnology.19 It both produced and deferred 
vulnerability, embodying how the Division’s humanistic sensibilities were (s)trained by the 
experiences and ambivalent demands of service. It also characterized how Indigenous 
communities negotiated the intimacies of their bodies, languages, cultures, and homes in 
relation to these strange and distant visitors. 
 For Sapir himself, intimate distance furthermore manifested in his being a linguist 
masquerading as a “museum man”: it was a reaction to a stifling museum culture and it 
expressed an inchoate yearning for disciplinarity within linguistics. Language—itself an 
intimately distant phenomenon, at once internal and social, situated and personal—figured 
only incidentally into museum work. His team, moreover, was mostly untrained to 
ascertain linguistic data and his informants unprepared to give it. Yet from out of scenes of 
failure—including consistent obstructions, declining budgets, and fluctuating staff—Sapir 
ultimately derived some of his greatest contributions to the science of language, such as his 
comparative grammar of Na-Dene, his treatise on “Time Perspective,” his six-unit 
classification of North American linguistic stocks, and his book Language. Failure for 
                                                          
19 Raymond Williams (1977) terms “structures of feeling” to characterize social forms that “become social 
consciousness only when they are lived, actively, in real relationships, and moreover in relationships which 
are more than systematic exchanges between fixed units” (130). The expression differentiates “practical 
consciousness” from “official consciousness,” capturing the tension between lived experience and received 
interpretation. These structures are often found “at the very edge of semantic availability” and seen only later 
more materially (134). In my usage, it refers to a feeling that permeated an institution (the Anthropological 
Division) but derived from interactions (between anthropologists and Indigenous informants) rather than 
institutionalized modes of intimacy. 
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linguistics to fit into the spatial or fiscal constraints of museum work, initially a marker of 
its uncertain epistemic grounds, later proved to be the condition of possibility for its 
success. Sapir’s disenchantment with the Survey and growing differences with Boas over 
the place of linguistic research within anthropology marked this as a transitional period for 
the discipline, culminating in the establishment of the Linguistic Society of America the 
same year as Sapir’s departure from Ottawa. Linguistics was a science born of the failures I 
will chronicle below. 
. . . 
0. On Ellipsis. 
This chapter maps scenes from the extension of a network that connected the vast expanse 
of Canadian territories to the Victoria Memorial Museum, where Sapir acted as chief 
administrative node in addition to being chief anthropologist, pursuing research between 
the Museum and territories. To this end, I trace the representational practices of his field 
journals, recirculating their structure as a conceptual anchor to organize my work. An 
excerpt of which, pictured below, comes from Sapir’s notes on the Nootka, Indigenous 
peoples in British Columbia, whom he studied on behalf of the Survey in 1911 and again in 
1913. These notes comprise enumerated sections (39 in total, in the Nootka journals), 
describing various dimensions of their culture (“Notes on Technology”; “Notes on Body 
Decoration”; “Notes on Linguistics”; etc.).20 This example features a random selection of 
lexicography and demonstrates Sapir’s process of constructing knowledge of their language 
                                                          
20 Notes recollected after Sapir’s death on behest of his son (Dell Hymes introduction to the materials). The 
Nootka material contains: “Ca. 1600 leaves, 19 notebooks of ca. 100p each, 5 notebooks of ca. 200p. each, and 
ca. 750 slips of personal and place names.” 
 
30 
 
and culture. First-hand and retold experiences translated into hand-written notes were 
later retyped by Sapir or his stenographer; these typed notes were then separated by 
ellipses, cut up, reorganized, and reassembled; finally, they were written over again with 
Sapir's notes, corrections, directions, and diacritics. His journals form a bricolage, a 
palimpsest, and a hypertext. While the hypertext is a genre often linked to the 
“heterogeneous and fissured space” of computer-age informational networks (Hayles 
1999: 28), here it corresponds to the elliptical space of Sapir’s journals, a microcosm for 
the representational activities of the Victoria Memorial Museum and a trace of its 
researchers’ efforts to absorb distant cultures into their archives. 
 
Figure 1. Fragment on Nootka Language – Sapir’s Field Journal, 1913 (GSC) 
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The ellipsis typically marks a space of events within the semantic range of the 
knower that nonetheless goes unpronounced. The ellipsis exists to be filled in, whether 
implicitly by a shared situation uniting writer and reader or, in the case of Sapir’s journals, 
actively by the collection practices of his research network. The ellipsis therein functions as 
context and co-text, eliding the contingency of this knowledge production and standing, for 
his readers (which included himself), in anticipation of its eventual completion. In A 
Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) argue that texts do not 
represent the world in a parallel symmetry, but are events that take place along the same 
plane and, as such, give way to perpendicular actions. There is no better example of this 
philosophy at work than in the activities of the Anthropological Division, wherein the 
management of representational and physical spaces met, knotted, and took flight in their 
extension of an information-gathering network across the heterogeneous and fissured 
space of early twentieth-century Canada. The Division at once represented the cultural 
topography of the country and contributed to its reshaping. The term network deserves 
some comment. Latour (1993) defines the network as an object of study “more supple than 
system, more historical than structure, more empirical than complexity” (3); within his 
model of analysis, differences between cultures are flattened into variations of scale and 
made comparable in their successful recruitment of human and nonhuman actors. 
However, in structuring my chapter stylistically after Sapir’s journals, the solid lines of the 
network become instead dotted, elliptical, suggestive of the line without its assured 
definiteness. Elliptical space encompasses not only the marked or successful points of a 
network, but lingers on what is lost in between: what is absent, delayed, schematic; what is 
not yet reasoned out, not yet reducible to scale. The layers of remediation in Sapir’s journal 
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bring to mind Friedrich Kittler’s (1990) concept of the “discourse network,” which also 
serves as a model for my analysis. Kittler understands a discourse network as the “network 
of technologies and institutions that allow a given culture to select, store, and process 
relevant data” (369). In Kittler’s analysis, media largely determines the situation of 
discourse. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Kittler conceives of a series of plateaus and breaks, 
though here corresponding to the changing medial ecology at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Around 1900, for the first time, “writing ceased to be synonymous with the serial 
storage of data” (229). Storage became a process instead of coordinating different 
technologies, such as the gramophone and the typewriter. For the Anthropological Division, 
storage was likewise not a matter of discourse alone, though writing did compose a good 
deal of anthropological work, and much of the colonial archive consisted of texts about 
language (Errington 2008: 3). The practices of the Division were material as well as 
discursive, embodying an analog assemblage of notes, artifacts, infrastructures, 
technologies, and environments, all of which interacted in tandem and at odds with each 
other: imperfectly, elliptically. 
In Jacques Derrida’s (1978a) essay on “Ellipsis,” he remarks that writing signals the 
closing of the book and opening of the text. There is no true repetition: “Once the book is 
repeated, its identification with itself gathers an imperceptible difference” (295); each 
repetition exists in a context already shaped by a former iteration. My chapter reiterates 
the elliptical structure of Sapir’s journals, collating a series of events in a similar manner 
that he abstracted Nootka society, but the repetition is not an act of identification with 
Sapir or an attempt to revive his insights without altering them. Like the punctuation mark, 
ellipsis repeats but does not bind; its points hang together in common cause but offer a 
33 
 
space to think through what is not there, pairing presence and absence, pattern and noise. 
Sapir’s notes are the organizing principle of this chapter but, as the ellipsis in its 
indeterminacy suggests, it is also a jumping-off point for different directions: a point of 
arrival, a point of departure, a point of return. Ellipsis, here, amounts not to the “elisions” of 
multicultural liberal democracy (Byrd 2011: xii), which Byrd seeks to unsettle with 
“cacophonous” disruptions, but represents the limits of the colonial archive. Ellipsis 
provides a space to consider not only the archival gaze, but what is implicit and unsaid 
within the archive’s organization (Stoler 2009). Within elliptical space, meaning emerges 
from the triangulation of analyst, archive, and audience. Like Sapir’s journal, my analysis 
can be cut up and read in multiple directions, chronologically or laterally. It is structured 
rhizomatically through a series of disjointed vignettes akin to plateaus, “tentacular” 
(Haraway 2016) rather than totalizing, yet “all the more total for being fragmented” 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 6). The dotted lines (of articulation, of flight) emphasize the 
implicit and uncertain (the “…”) along with the cacophonous (the “y + z + a”). My account 
combines narrative, analysis, and documentation into a travelogue that is neither a close 
nor a distant reading, but eschews depth in favour of surface area as an analytic model. The 
chapter follows an episodic structure, a survey befitting of the subject matter. Through the 
mark of the ellipsis, intimate distance thus comes to characterize my historical analysis as 
well. The ellipse curves around its foci in a manner that suggests the negative space of what 
has failed to register in the history of linguistics. 
. . . 
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❖ Extension (into the Museum): 1910–11 
1. 1910. On Arrivals.  
The Anthropological Division was founded on 1 September 1910. Edward Sapir was its 
only agent then; he spent the fall season in Alberni, British Columbia, studying the language 
and culture of two tribes of the Nootka: Tsishya'ath and Hopach'as'ath. Each member of the 
Geological Survey was required to submit an account of their yearly activities for inclusion 
in an annual summary report.21 Sapir’s (1910 Annual Summary Report, GSC) underscored 
how anthropology had been a secondary concern of the government until that point. 
Indirectly, the success of the Survey contributed to the impetus for his Division’s creation: 
Canada, Sapir observed, was a country swiftly being settled, and settlement eradicated 
cultural materials unless they could be collected and preserved. Future Canadians, he 
opined, would be in danger of searching in vain for “authentic information” about Native 
peoples (7). The Anthropological Division had arrived to ensure this remembrance. 
Sapir framed the goals of the Division in themes endogenous to Boasian ethnology, 
likening its institutional status with that of the Bureau of American Ethnology (BAE). In a 
statement published in Science (1911), he outlined the Division’s first year of activity in an 
effort to publicize their research before an international scientific audience and entreat his 
colleagues’ cooperation with this newly founded initiative. This statement emphasized how 
the national character of institutions such as his and the BAE belied the work at hand. 
Drawing “hard and fast lines” between Canada and the U.S., Alaska, and Greenland was 
“artificial,” he insisted: the Wyandots of Oklahoma, for example, were “formerly Canadian 
                                                          
21 Under the directorship of Deputy Minister McConnell, preparation of summary reports became the 
responsibility of the department chiefs in 1914, rather than of individual members (McConnell to Sapir, 17 
October 1914, GSC). In 1917, the reports were again restructured, resulting in less detailed summaries. 
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tribes [that] moved far south well within the bounds of the United States.” In such cases, 
“trespassing” was “logically necessary” (790). For Sapir, the same dotted lines that 
perforated national borders also frayed the edges of epistemic boundaries. The Boasian 
school, as I mentioned above, relied on differential evidence from archaeology, linguistics, 
physical anthropology, and cultural ethnology. Indeed, this comparative work was essential 
to the act of remembrance in the form of historical reconstruction: “not infrequently slim 
evidence for a point of reconstructed culture-history obtained from the study of one of 
these [units of analysis] may be strengthened and even reduced to certainty by evidence 
derived from a study of one of the other” (790). However, each subfield presented its own 
challenges within the new Canadian context. For cultural ethnology, Sapir identified key 
knowledge gaps across the five “cultural areas” of Canada (Eastern Woodlands, Arctic or 
Eskimo, Plains, Plateau-Mackenzie, and West Coast). For the other three Boasian subfields, 
the dearth of material was even greater, since less had been done in those areas “with 
regard to strict scientific method” (793). Of the extant grammatical and textual collections, 
Sapir was particularly critical: “a poor phonetical groundwork and a failure to grasp the 
traits of morphology from a purely objective standpoint vitiate the value of much of this 
material” (792). Ultimately, Sapir’s aim was to introduce a new standard of systematicity 
within Canadian anthropology, premised on Boasian principles. Not only was this intention 
evident in his research plan, but the choice of scientific periodicals and museum exhibits as 
the major outlets for the Division circumvented the work of amateur ethnologists and 
collectors in Canada, whose own networks extended through private clubs and personal 
displays (Willmott 2006: 214). Sapir had arrived to establish scientific legitimacy and 
confer professional status upon the Division. 
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These arrivals signaled a shift in the history of Canadian anthropology between the 
eras of amateur and professional, museum-based work (Hancock 2006), coinciding with 
similar transformations in America. Government authority imbued the knowledge-taking 
practices of the Anthropological Division with scientific force that, along with greater 
mobility and access to resources, largely displaced the contribution of non-professionals. 
The placement of Indigenous peoples within this “regime of truth” followed a different 
route. In his final observation of the 1911 statement, Sapir rehearsed the logic of salvage: 
Now or never is the time in which to collect from the natives what is still 
available for study. In some cases a tribe has already practically given up, its 
aboriginal culture and what can be obtained is merely that which the older 
men still remember and care to impart. With the increasing material 
prosperity and industrial development of Canada[,] the demoralization or 
civilization of the Indians will be going on at an ever increasing rate. . . . What 
is lost now will never be recovered again. (793) 
While Sapir understood Indigenous absorption into North American culture as an 
inevitability, with the anticipated “disappearance” of traditional knowledge forming an 
imperative for his work, as an agent of the government he was also entangled in the power 
structures driving those processes of assimilation. Incorporation thus figured both as 
threat and result, with no imaginable alternative.  
James Clifford (1989) identifies this paradox at the core of the “salvage paradigm”: 
the promise to keep cultural knowledge “alive,” even when the knowers themselves were 
denied entrance to modern life and their ways of living consigned to loss. For ethnologists 
working within that paradigm, remoteness was a marker of authenticity: quite often, ideal 
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informants were the elderly, those of low social class, or those otherwise estimated to have 
the least contact with Europeans (Nurse 2006: 56). But distance was a quality always 
already in peril: it could not be accessed without drawing its holders into intimate contact 
with the machinery of power. The establishment of the Anthropological Division signified 
an arrival, then, but it was as much a series of repetitions: of Boasian anthropology, of the 
institutional model of the BAE, of the domination of the Dominion Government, and of a 
salvage paradigm whose scientific authority was premised upon the anticipated failure of 
Indigenous civilizations. 
. . . 
2. 1911. On the Museum. 
Le Musée nationale. The National Museum of Canada. The Canadian Museum of Man. Le 
Musée nationale de l’homme. The Canadian Museum of Civilization. Le Musée canadien des 
civilisations. The Canadian Museum of History. Le Musée canadien de l’histoire. These 
shifting signifiers speak to a multitude of contested and overlapping trajectories. They also 
proclaim the Canadian government’s attachment to the museum space as a site to narrate 
its history and orient visitors to its First Peoples for over a century. From the National 
Museum’s inception in 1910, when the display hall for the Geological Survey moved from 
Montréal to Ottawa, to the present day, where its symbolic successor, the Museum of 
History, continues its legacy and also houses the archival material evoked in this chapter, 
the museum has served at once as historical site, representational plane, and archive. 
Astride this elliptical chain of signification, there is also a physical place, a point of 
anchorage, a set of coordinates—though even the location has not remained constant. 
Reference is unstable at both ends. For the duration of Sapir’s tenure at the Anthropological 
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Division, that place was the Victoria Memorial Museum Building / l'Édifice commémoratif 
Victoria. Construction began in 1905; it was completed on 1 January 1911. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Exterior view of Victoria Memorial Museum, Parks Canada Agency / 
Agence Parcs Canada, 1987. 
The scientific activity of the Division was imbued with force not only through 
government fiat but through this emplacement. In Canada, the founding of the National 
Museum signaled a newfound commitment to public science akin to the American model, 
which Sapir and his cohort sought to emulate. American anthropology of this era often 
contributed to spaces such as public museums or World’s Fairs to ensure continued 
patronage and to reach diverse audiences. Participation in these exhibitions helped 
anthropologists to gain recognition and establish their professional identity (Parezo & 
Fowler 2007). Museums themselves served as sites to train students for fieldwork and 
instruct the future citizenry (Conklin 2013). Museum displays in particular were central 
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both to the propagation and dispute of racial essentialism in America (Teslow 2014). 
Museums were moreover depositories where anthropologists could collect, preserve, and 
display objects of curiosity and, increasingly since the mid-nineteenth century, some even 
housed peoples who performed as living exhibits (Qureshi 2011). Museums were hence 
places to titillate and entertain, to invigorate Americans’ belief in science and progress. 
They were centres of knowledge production and dissemination; they were nodes within 
broader discourses and disagreements on the subjects of race, culture, evolution, and 
difference. They were sites of colonial contact and regulation; they were sources of 
compassion and ambivalence. In short, as Susan Leigh Star and James Griesemer (1989) 
define, the museum exemplified a complex “institutional ecology”: a space for negotiating 
multiple and often competing viewpoints and activities among an array of human and 
nonhuman actors. 
Of primary importance for the official viewpoint was the establishment of “an 
interesting and instructive display in the Ethnological Hall” of the Victoria Memorial 
Museum, meant to “ensure public support” for the Survey (Brock to Sapir, 3 June 1910, 
GSC). The move to the Museum did not mean more space to operate, but more room for 
exhibition and safer storage (Zaslow 1975: 266). It became the central depository for the 
purchase and transport of new specimens. In 1911, the Division staff began unpacking and 
carefully sorting ethnological material according to cultural areas and tribes (1911 Annual 
Summary Report, GSC), materials previously collected under the leadership of George 
Dawson. To allow for an ease of cataloguing, Sapir implemented a numbering system that 
corresponded to the five cultural areas he devised. The aim of the displays, in his mind, was 
a comprehensive depiction of Indigenous life: “The ideal tribal museum exhibit is not 
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necessarily the one containing a large number of particularly beautiful specimens, but one 
in which a place is found for every aspect of native culture” (Sapir 1912: 64). In this way, 
Sapir and the Survey alike envisioned the museum as a “truth-spot.” Thomas Gieryn (2002) 
argues that scientists imbue certain places as sources of legitimate knowledge, usually at 
the expense of the truthfulness of other locations. He understands this investment in truth-
spots as a process that translates “place-saturated contingent claims,” intimately bound to 
the local, into “place-less transcendent truths” (113). To paraphrase Latour: for Canada to 
become knowable, it must become a museum. The Victoria Museum was the planned centre 
for this (re)arrangement of truth claims about the country and its peoples, with the 
material-semiotic scene of the exhibition halls the focus of its public engagement. 
The function of truth-spots takes on a different valence within the scope of the 
historical sciences, however. Not all science shares the “presumption of equivalence” that 
Gieryn describes, where credibility depends upon the standardization of research space 
and where mention of place (which he defines, in contrast to space, as a “unique spot in the 
universe”) arouses doubt over the science’s veracity (127). Indeed, within Boasian 
anthropology, place was a crucial organizational component and marker of authenticity. In 
Sapir’s initial plan of research, for instance, he valued the remote Athabascan tribes of the 
Mackenzie Valley for their supposed marginality: “A thorough investigation of these tribes 
(Chippewyan, Slaves, Yellow Knives, Dog Ribs, Hare and Loucheux) is probably the greatest 
single need of ethnological research in Canada. Among these tribes, if anywhere in the 
dominion, we may expect to find the simplest and most fundamental forms of aboriginal 
American culture, granted that there is such a thing” (Sapir 1911: 792). Distance from 
urban centres was an indicator of an intimacy with the past that more proximal tribes 
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would have lost from contact. Within the salvage configuration, traditional sites of 
knowledge were understood as places of truth that must simultaneously be disinvested 
with their capacity for truth in order to justify the Division’s collection project. The truth-
spot of the Victoria Museum depended less on place-less-ness, then, as it did on a re-
placing: of amateurs, on the one hand, and of Indigenous autonomy over cultural 
knowledge on the other. The creation of such a “mimetic place” showed how theory was 
“embodied in the geography and architecture of the research institute itself” (Gieryn, 119), 
but the theory in question, rather than stripping sites of origin of their credibility, relied on 
their lingering trace. The Victoria Memorial Museum thus changed how truth was 
spatialized in Canada, both in the immediate scene of the exhibition halls and in the 
propagation of a geography of centres and peripheries. It brought some locations closer to 
truth, others farther, a process of deterritorializing one space and reterritorializing it as 
another.  
. . . 
3. 1911. On the Team.  
Sapir could not do all this work alone. With a location set, it needed to be filled with bodies: 
of actors, spectators, and artifacts. The Anthropological Division’s second year saw the 
hiring of two more permanent staff: the archaeologist Harlan Smith, from the American 
Museum of Natural History, and assistant in anthropology Marius Barbeau, trained at 
Oxford. Together with Sapir, they represented three of the four Boasian subfields. (Francis 
Knowles was hired as the resident physical anthropologist in 1912 and received a 
permanent appointment in 1914.) The first order of business was two-fold: one, to 
encourage local support and attract temporary workers, as Sapir’s (1912) appeal in 
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Queen’s Quarterly, a specifically Canadian periodical, advocated; and two, to get the most 
out of the “rapid disintegration” of the tribes of Eastern Canada (Sapir 1912: 65), which 
occupied the staff for over a year and a half. Fieldwork during this period included: 
Iroquois and Algonquian of Ontario and Quebec (Sapir, Dr Alexander Goldenweiser of 
Columbia University); Wyandot of Lorette, QC, Windsor, ON, and Oklahoma (Barbeau); 
Micmac and Malecite of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island (Mr 
William Mechling of University of Pennsylvania and Dr Cyrus MacMillan, an English 
professor from McGill); and Inuit in the Arctic (Mr Vilhjalmur Stefansson). The Museum 
collection was already rich with specimens from the West Coast, but lacking in other areas; 
Sapir hoped to have “representative material” of them all within a few years (1912: 67). 
A staff of three was too small for research, museum preparation, and administration, 
so temporary workers—a mix of amateurs and specialists, as the above roster shows—
were hired on a rotating basis. Temporary staff were usually contracted for a field season 
or, afterwards, to complete manuscripts out of the field. Payments of salary for these 
workers, excluding research expenses, were half paid up front, the other half issued after 
research had been worked up. Renewals of contracts were ongoing and sometimes arduous 
negotiations, orchestrated between Sapir, Survey administration, and workers, and often 
vexing to all parties. Indeed, the terms of these limited contracts themselves led to 
confusion. In the case of young researchers, for example, a contract could include field 
expenses without a salary: “It is always assumed that a man is willing to go through a little 
trouble in the beginning in order to accumulate a little experience. There is, then, no 
allowance to be made for salary for your recent field work” (Sapir to Waugh, 20 February 
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1912, GSC).22 More veteran scholars needed to be reminded that they would be prohibited 
from performing scientific work for other agencies while under the Survey’s employ (Sapir 
to Radin, 17 August 1912, GSC). The truncated payment structure likewise weighed on 
Sapir himself, who was happy to recommend payment of a contract’s balance even when a 
memoir did not include “absolutely all that is still coming to us”; he was eager to clear up 
“all our indebtedness” and, at a later date, hoped to pay salaries down in full: “as I think it is 
up to us to choose people who can be depended upon to have enough scientific interest in 
their work to write up the material” (Sapir to Mechling, 27 January 1916, GSC). Tensions 
between the ideal of enacting science and the practicalities of administering it would only 
multiply and continue to beleaguer Sapir throughout his time in Ottawa. 
If Sapir had had his pick, and in some cases he did, he would have chosen a staff 
predominately of university-trained scholars who upheld similar values of “scientific 
interest.” However, the emergence of anthropology within government-funded museums in 
Canada was insufficient to install a solid boundary between professional and amateur or to 
provide a corral of ready students (Waldrum & Downe 2006: 184). In the closing of his 
article for Queen’s Quarterly, Sapir called attention to a need for university instruction in 
anthropology in Canada, claiming there was no better way for a new science to “take firm 
root” (1912: 68). Canada lacked a university program until the first department was 
founded in 1936 at University of Toronto, with hires at McGill and University of British 
Columbia beginning in the 1940s (Harrison and Darnell 2006: 4). Accordingly, many of the 
Division’s permanent and temporary staff members were imported from, or at least trained 
                                                          
22 Sapir regretted sending Waugh for one month’s field work, and would not have had he known the latter had 
no permanent employment and was under some financial duress (20 February 1912, GSC). Waugh 
appreciated Sapir’s offer of more time in the field (Waugh to Sapir, 1 March 1912, GSC). 
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in, the U.K. or the U.S. (where many studied under Boas). Although Sapir did not endorse 
the patriotism of national science, he recognized its pragmatism: “To make science a matter 
of nationality is, of course, the height of absurdity, but it is natural for a people to do its 
share of the scientific work being carried on within its own territories” (1912: 69). The 
conditions of university education in the country thus precipitated which bodies would be 
enrolled in the work of knowledge-production.  
Partly due to this dearth of trained researchers in Canada, but also owing to the 
topography of the country, “boundary-work” between professional and amateur could only 
be partial.23 The establishment of the Anthropological Division was not an abrupt 
transition of power, but as Nurse (2007) observes, it also initiated cooperation, especially 
in the domains of commerce and art. The Division’s connection to the state, Nurse adds, did 
not always serve disciplinary autonomy, nor did the new centre disrupt local interests in 
anthropology or Indigenous cultures. Not all amateur anthropologists and collectors 
warmed to Sapir, either.24 West Coast amateurs in particular received him as a foreign 
presence, preferring a “gradual and home-grown process of professionalization” over the 
Americanized brand Sapir represented (Darnell 2006: 141). On the other hand, not all 
amateurs were dismissed as poor imitations. In the same breath that Sapir urged a “higher 
standard” in North American linguistics akin to that of Germanic or Semitic linguistics, he 
complimented Father Adrien-Gabriel Morice for his grammars of the Carrier language 
                                                          
23 Thomas Gieryn (1983) refers to the process of forging a demarcated scientific field as “boundary-work”: 
“the attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock 
of knowledge, values and work organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that 
distinguishes some intellectual activities as ‘non-science’” (782). 
24 The archaeologist Charles Hill-Tout was quite “sore” over one of Sapir’s publications in Science: he “claims 
that I adopted a ‘superior’ and ‘patronizing’ attitude and that I have aroused dissatisfaction among several 
Canadian anthropologists. I presume he means himself. I had the bad taste to omit any reference to Hill-Tout 
in the paper” (Sapir to Teit, 15 March 1912, GSC). 
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(1911: 792–793). The enjambments of scientific professionalism and collaboration with 
amateurs speak to a slow rearrangement of bodies to serve the ideals of the National 
Museum, but also to a continued disjuncture. At no point did the Anthropological Division 
have a staff sufficient for the undertaking it proposed; it relied on a network of hobbyists, 
traders, adventurers, collectors, scientists, missionaries, stenographers, and government 
agents, with variegated ambitions and levels of expertise. Because Canada lacked the 
resources to study its diversity in full, the Division staff focused firstly on collection and 
secondly on publication and display (Zaslow 1975: 280), hopeful that later generations 
would resume the analysis they began. It was a utopic project, always deferring the 
conditions of its completion, with never enough hands to bring its goals into reach. 
. . . 
4. 1911. On the Typewriter.  
Within the history of American linguistics, the signature event of 1911 was the publication 
of Boas’s Handbook of American Indian Languages. The Handbook argued that any dialect 
possessed a fixed sound system, distinct from (though sometimes co-occurring with) the 
axes of cultural or physical typology. Divided into two volumes, the book featured sketches 
from 14 language families of North America north of Mexico (based on John Powell’s 1890 
classification of 58 linguistic “stocks,” which Sapir would later challenge).25 Together, these 
sketches offered a standardized approach for classifying linguistic phenomena, focusing on 
three levels of analysis: “constituent phonetic elements,” “groups of ideas expressed by 
                                                          
25 Sapir (1921/2004) provided a gloss for his use of the term linguistic stock which, as my Introduction 
indicates, drew on the biological discourse of natural history: “All languages that are known to be genetically 
related, i.e., to be divergent forms of a single prototype, may be considered as constituting a ‘linguistic stock.’ 
There is nothing final about a linguistic stock. When we set it up, we merely say, in effect, that thus far we can 
go and no further. . . . The terms dialect, language, branch, stock . . . are purely relative terms” (125–126). 
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phonetic elements,” and “methods of combining and modifying phonetic groups” 
(1911/1963: 28). Boas was less of a theoretician than Sapir, more invested in the 
practicalities of faithfully recording Indigenous languages.26 Standardization helped to 
stabilize a scientific phenomenon at a distance, bringing the remote dream of cataloguing 
the hundreds of North American languages into reach. Another event, at a different node 
along this network, was no less important to realizing that dream: Sapir’s requisition of an 
“Indian typewriter.”  
Figure 3. The Indian Typewriter (Catalogue #987.13.1, GSC) 
The typewriter was an integral instrument for the replication of standard forms: its 
keyboard was modified specifically to transcribe Indigenous languages (chiefly of West 
                                                          
26 Boas is frequently labeled “anti-theoretical” (e.g. Murray 1994: 62). Tracy Teslow (2014) argues that this 
interpretation was a posthumous dismissal by students (notably, Kroeber) in the 1940s and ‘50s, who were 
intensely interested in theory. Indeed, Boas postponed the inclusion of Sapir’s account of Takelma for the 
second volume of the Handbook not because of the contents but the form of Sapir’s analysis. As Boas told his 
pupil: “you have not adhered to the strictly analytic treatment that I wanted for the volume” (to Sapir, 31 May 
1911, GSC). I deal with the topic of standardizing transcription styles; for more on the epistemological 
differences between Sapir and Boas, see Chapter 3. 
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Coast and Athabascan languages). Sapir commissioned the device upon his return from the 
field season, whereupon his office had need of “a special typewriter so constructed as to 
make it possible to typewrite Indian texts directly from notes to dictation. This would mean 
great saving of time in preparation of manuscript for publication and would also enable 
type-setters to print such material with less chance of error” (Sapir to Brock, 21 November 
1911, GSC). The artifact in question (object “06-F100” in the Museum archives) was a 
manual typewriter, black, 25.5cm in height, 37cm in width and depth, and made of steel. It 
was produced by the Monarch Typewriter Company (the “Monarch Visible, number 3 
model”), at a quote of $57. Sapir paid fastidious attention to the design of the levers in 
particular, supplying corrections to help capture the nuances of phonetic detail: 
1. Instead of cedilla (ç) which comes on dead lever, there should be small 
hook coming below letter and turning to right instead of left (c˛). 
2. Instead of superior w which has been substituted for cap. W there should 
be a small cap. w, that is, small w somewhat larger than ordinary w but not 
as large as cap. W. As it is, there are two superior w’s provided for this 
machine, which is uneconomical. 
3. There is no difference on this machine between small v and small cap. v. 
Small cap. v should be made somewhat larger than small v yet not as large 
as cap. v. 
4. Instead of point above letter (ȯ) which has been put in as upper acute 
accent (‘) on dead lever, there should be point below letter (ụ). 
(Sapir to Brock, 2 February 1912, GSC; symbols not exact) 
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Within phonetics, related sounds could comprise disparate physical events (there were 
always minute differences between any repetition, an insight prefiguring poststructuralist 
thought), yet still fall within a range that made them linguistically the same. Sapir’s concern 
over capitalization and diacritics demonstrated fidelity to the reproduction of phonetic 
differences in the process of transcription, useful for analysis later.27 Sapir made efforts to 
ensure the typewriter and its symbols could articulate the widest possible range salient to 
Indigenous languages and, accordingly, his own perception.28 Latour (1987) underscores 
the role of inscription devices in the replication of scientific knowledge; he defines a 
machine in this context not as a singular entity but as “a machination, a stratagem, a kind of 
cunning, where borrowed forces keep one another in check so none can fly apart from the 
group” (129). The Indian typewriter performed such a role for the Anthropological 
Division: attunements of ear and eye etched into the ethnologists’ notebooks were, through 
the clack of fingers and keys, the coordination of levers and ink, made more solid and 
sedimented as knowledge.  
The typewriter not only propagated standards but was one itself.  Sapir’s 
contemporaries sought to create similar devices: “I am buying a typewriter on the 
installment plan—the same one you saw here—and have just had some new characters 
and diacritical marks added for phonetic work” (Mason to Sapir, 9 June 1914, GSC). Its 
reproducibility exemplified how a science endeavoured to recreate the conditions of its 
                                                          
27 The conventions, at the time, were to use small caps to indicate voiceless forms of consonants ordinarily 
voiced (lateral, trill, nasal continuants). In the 1920s and ‘30s, a “phonemic” mode of transcription began to 
proliferate and, for some, supplant the phonetic mode. Phonemic transcription did not include exhaustive 
details, since contrastive sounds could be predicted from the phonological rules of a dialect. It would prove to 
be another point of difference between Sapir and Boas; the latter felt phonemic forms could be inferred from 
phonetic transcription but not the reverse (cf. Anderson 1985: 205–207). I elaborate in Chapter 3. 
28 As his later student Mary Haas once reflected, regarding the old phonetic notation: “Sapir, I think, clearly 
loved every one of those apostrophes. He is very, very precise with that” (1976: 380, MHP). 
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success elsewhere. Its handiness, so to speak, was a matter of form as well as function. In 
Kittler’s (1999) analysis, mechanical writing “deprives the hand of its rank in the realm of 
the written word”: 
Therefore, when writing was withdrawn from the origin of its essence, i.e., 
from the hand, and was transferred to the machine, a transformation 
occurred[.] . . . It is no accident that the invention of the printing press 
coincides with the inception of the modern period. The word-signs become 
type, and the writing stroke disappears. The type is “set,” the set becomes 
“pressed.” The mechanism of setting and pressing and “printing” is the 
preliminary form of the typewriter. In the typewriter we find the irruption of 
the mechanism in the realm of the word. (199)29 
The typewriter also gave rise to the profession of the typist, which I explore in §12 below. 
 Canonically, the typewriter formed an inscription technology that was spatially 
fixed.30 At odds with the supposed static arrangement of keys, however, the Indian 
typewriter was not a static technology. Upon submitting his manuscript on “Abnormal 
Types of Speech in Nootka” (1915), Sapir remarked that the “paper will probably require 
making several new matrices for characters used in writing Indian words” (to Brock, 16 
January 1913, GSC).31 Typesetting for an ever-growing record of novel linguistic data had 
                                                          
29 Both Kittler’s and Latour’s arguments draw on Elizabeth Eisenstein’s (1979) account of Europe’s 
transformation through the technology of the printing press. 
30 Katharine Hayles (1999) contrasts the typewriter with digital information networks, where the word is 
produced as image, “fluid and changeable” (26). 
31 This museum memoir presented data from Sapir’s 1910 research trip to the Alberni canal, Vancouver 
Island; his informant then was the young chief Dan Watts, of the Nootka; further data was gathered in 1913–
1914 by Alex Thomas, of a different tribe in the same region. Sapir’s analysis of the Nootka language focused 
on features that marked characteristics of the person addressed or spoken of. Whereas features that 
distinguish social rank/status are linguistically widespread, in Nootka “consonantal play” indicated 
“abnormal” physical properties: e.g. unusually fat or short, physically defective, left-handed, circumcised. 
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to be a fluid practice. It gave rise to reformulation and repair: “I am arranging to have my 
Indian typewriter thoroughly overhauled, so that unclear and smudgy characters can be 
repaired” (Sapir to Boas, 12 December 1922, GSC). Interaction with its object of study thus 
transformed the science’s epistemic tools. Wiebe Bijker (1995) conceives of technologies 
as the frame upon which the interaction of multiple groups hinges. Certainty, the Indian 
typewriter was an event both in the emerging field of linguistics and in the extension of a 
discourse network on behalf of the Canadian government. In addition to embodying the 
principles of phonetic transcription, the typewriter materialized a power structure that 
favoured the Dominion: written over oral; settler over native; “modern” over “primitive.” A 
technology employed to extend reach, it also constrained range of motion, reconfiguring 
who could make assertions on behalf of language and where and how. These designs 
neither determined the device nor its use, however; it was not a tool of perfect replication, 
nor was it perfectly replicable. The typewriter was mutable. As an office tool, it changed 
many hands; as a representational platform, it was changed in turn by hands that would 
never touch it. 
. . . 
5. 1911. On Native Speakers.  
An assemblage therefore of purpose, place, person, and technology, the Anthropological 
Division was also a nexus of cultural encounters. Mary Louise Pratt (1991) defines the 
“contact zone” as a space where once geographically distal cultures “meet, clash, and 
grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such 
as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world 
today” (34). The Division’s pursuit of scientific knowledge was no exception, traversing 
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these zones and generating new ones. Kapil Raj (2007) brings an analysis of the 
intercultural contact zone into the domain of science studies; he understands the mobility 
of scientific knowledges not as a function of “emanations from a pre-existing center” (7), in 
which non-European cultures form “passive reservoirs of data” (3), but emerging instead 
through “complex processes of accommodation and negotiation” with local actors (9). His 
work attends to the importance of the field in prompting these encounters: a shift in 
localities from the “socially homogenous enclosed spaces” of the laboratory to the “open 
air” settings of map-making, linguistics, and administrative science (14).32 In 1911, the 
Anthropological Division consolidated its centre in Ottawa but it also entered the field, and 
in so doing entered into similar themes of contact that Raj outlines: the work of translation, 
calibration, and interpersonal trust, all which follow from science’s change of venue (224), 
constrained and made possible the Division’s efforts. Translation particularly concerns me 
here. Sapir was the first to employ a native speaker’s intuitions “to test the adequacy of a 
grammar” (Darnell 2009: 34), a tactic still in use today, but the native speakers in question 
were also Native, and their participation occurred within the space of the contact zone. 
 Ethnologists were sensitive to the projection of categories in their translation work. 
Boas observed how the Eurocentric categories that substantiated linguistic analysis (such 
as case, gender, tense) were frequently troubled by Indigenous languages, and he endorsed 
taking a comparativist stance in the assessment of their phonetics, vocabulary, and 
grammar (1911/1963: 28–35). Sapir’s technique for drawing out a speaker’s intuitions 
                                                          
32 On the “open air” sciences, Raj borrows from and complicates the work of Michel Callon: “Callon, who 
coined the term ‘recherche de plein air’ to designate knowledge practices that necessarily involve 
negotiations between specialists and other heterogeneous groups in their very making and certification. 
These practices, as Callon stresses, are fundamentally different from ‘field’ sciences where practitioners 
simply take the world outside the confines of the laboratory to be an inanimate space for collecting data, 
which is then centralized and processed in the secluded calm of the laboratory” (2007: 14). 
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supported this objective. A later exchange with Father Morice demonstrated how he went 
about using a speaker’s own knowledge about language as an organizing principle:33 
I find any arrangement of linguistic material that proceeds from the 
standpoint of the reader’s language irksome. As a scientific student of 
language I am always primarily interested in the native viewpoint. Hence 
alphabetical lists of elements from the standpoint of English seem to me 
rather beside the point. In a practical grammar, however, it may sometimes 
be advisable to follow the reverse method. 
(Sapir to Morice, 21 January 1918, GSC) 
Sapir was determined to maintain the standpoint of his informants, but the act of 
translation was a displacement into scientific discourse nonetheless. Within ethnology, 
Ahmed (2000) writes, “The ethnographer creates and destroys at the same time in the very 
accumulation of documents . . . the need to resolve foreignness is set against a need to 
preserve it” (59). Linguistics held an indispensable role, in that regard. The study of 
language, unlike other dimensions of ethnology such as social structure or religion, had the 
advantage that its categories remained unconscious (Boas, 59), untrammeled by folk 
rationalization. The linguist was language’s only witness. Linguists, whose work fell within 
the laboratory of the mind,34 were inured to external circumstance; their method was the 
most intimately distant, their object the least affected by exposure to the open air. The 
                                                          
33 Sapir elaborated on the differences between a practical and technical grammar: “A practical grammar has, 
of course, to proceed more slowly and carefully and to take less for granted on the part of the reader than a 
technical work intended for linguistic experts who can be trusted to take better care of themselves and who, 
moreover, need not master the endless details that are necessary for practical use” (to Morice, 21 Janaury 
1918, GSC). 
34 Or “under his hat,” as Benjamin Lee Whorf later put it. See Chapter 2. 
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solvency of linguistics as a science exceeded the violence of translation or the paradoxes of 
salvage. Or so they believed.  
 Though the aim of abstracting a linguistic pattern from physical encounters entailed 
their forgetting, the conditions that gave rise to translation were, for Sapir and his fellow 
staff, confronted on a routine basis. The mobility of science required more than the 
intuitions of N/native speakers. Paul Radin, a close friend of Sapir’s and fellow Boasian, 
started work with the Survey in 1912 to study the language and social organization of the 
Ojibwe. Radin was hired on as a fieldworker, but completed his translation work in Ottawa, 
which Sapir had to explain to administration: “It seemed advantageous, in order to have 
him get his large mass of Indian manuscript text translated without interruption, for Dr. 
Radin to work with his interpreter at some distance from Sarnia” (to Marshall, 22 April 
1912, GSC). Transporting informants to a separate research headquarters was convenient 
to isolate their language, but it was not always possible to consult them in a controlled 
environment, or to induce their cooperation when such conditions availed: “This winter I 
have the services of a half-caste lad about 15 years old and am trying to collect a little of the 
folklore. It is very difficult to induce them to speak of it, even when they are alone in my 
tent” (Jenness to Sapir, 26 December 1915, GSC). The ideal informant, indeed, required less 
coaxing: they were already fluent both in English and in their traditional language and 
could, with some effort instructing them in phonetic transcription, function as a relay for 
data collection. Regna Darnell (2009) notes: “Sapir preferred informants whose English 
was sufficient for accurate translation and who themselves had intuition for the structure 
of their native language. This ability was crucial in teaching Indians to write their language 
and record additional texts” (74). Staff recognized the importance of these interpreters, 
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naming them in publications and expressing admiration in private: “It rather frightens me 
to think of doing non-material ethnology without an English speaking interpreter” (Sapir to 
Smith, 6 July 1920, GSC). Ethnology depended upon these intermediaries, but where their 
intuitions were valued, the conditions of their labour were sometimes taken for granted. 
The Survey infrastructure upon which the Division operated was not always as 
conducive to informants as its staff were appreciative. When Sapir returned to the field in 
1913 to resume study of the Nootka, he enlisted the aid of two interpreters, Frank Williams 
and Alex Thomas:35 “I took considerable pains to get them personally interested in their old 
customs, many of which are now falling into disuse, and succeeded in teaching them to 
write their own language phonetically.” Sapir could obtain material from them “at very 
much less than field costs,” at a rate of 50 cents per standard size page, which included 
payment for “time consumed by the informant in dictating the text, time consumed by the 
interpreter in writing it down phonetically, time consumed by him in going over the text 
and putting in interlinear English translation” (Sapir to Brock, 20 March 1914, GSC).36 The 
general rates of labour in British Columbia, he noted, were far greater than in the east; the 
Division provided ruled paper and Government envelopes that required no stamp (Sapir to 
Thomas, 19 March 1914, GSC). Correspondence between Sapir and Thomas reveal that 
payment for these elicitations was continually delayed, causing dissatisfaction (Thomas to 
Sapir, 28 August 1914, GSC, among other examples). Delays could last almost two months 
(Thomas to Sapir, 21 January 1916, GSC), occasioning Sapir to write to the treasurer to 
                                                          
35 Sapir was “very eager that some of the younger Indians who can write English and who are in close touch 
with the old men that best know the old time customs should send me accounts from time to time of various 
things that I ask about” (Sapir to Thomas, 14 October 1911, GSC). 
36 Interlinear translation was itself a genre of distancing. It represented texts through up to four levels of 
progression: traditional spelling (in the original language); phonetic transcription; word-for-word 
translation; free translation (in English usually). 
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prompt payment (Sapir to Marshall, 24 January 1916, GSC). The relationship proved 
always to be an asymmetrical one. When Thomas sought to arrange a higher pay scale, 
having found an informant who “cannot part” with a whaling account (‘osimtc) except for a 
greater sum (to Sapir, 3 January 1916, GSC), Sapir refused: “arranging for an extra scale of 
payment for material like the whaling 'osimtc . . . creates a very bad precedent for other 
kinds of information”; the treasury department, moreover, would not understand why one 
type of information would cost more than another: “It would not look business-like, and 
might get them so disgusted with our work that they would refuse further support of it” (to 
Thomas, 27 January 1916, GSC). Sapir was also in a position to critique Thomas’s 
handwriting; he noted it was getting worse, perhaps due to the number of texts Thomas 
was producing, and thus providing fewer words per page, which at a rate of 50 cents Sapir 
deemed unfair (to Thomas, 18 February 1916, GSC). In “The Economics of Linguistic 
Exchanges,” Pierre Bourdieu (1977) argues that the “objectivism” of the language sciences 
relies on a relation of symbolic power between the speaker and analyst, one which brackets 
the social conditions that gave rise to the encounter. Here, we see how infrastructure 
prefigured the linguistic structure these agents hoped to ascertain, in the first place by the 
vital presence of globalized English, a legacy of imperialism, and secondly by the uneven 
economies of translation. 
. . . 
❖ Extension (into the Field): 1912–1913 
6. 1912. On Long-Distance Dependency. 
Sapir relished the chance to do fieldwork, and over the course of his tenure with the Survey 
had a handful of opportunities, large and small, for the pleasure of working en plein air. 
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More often the case, his employment as Chief Ethnologist meant he had to take a step back 
and assume a supervisory role, which he pursued with equal attention and care. In 1912, 
Sapir did some collecting himself, but for the most part remained at the Division’s 
headquarters occupied by managerial and museum work, while his staff pursued their 
research afield: Barbeau continued his study of the language and culture of the Wyandot in 
Oklahoma; Meckling on the Malecite of New Brunswick; Radin on the Ojibwe of Ontario; 
James Teit on the Tahtlan of Telegraph Creek, BC; Goldenweiser worked on the language, 
culture, and social organization of the Iroquois, while Waugh studied their technology and 
Knowles began obtaining physical data, including skeletal remains (1912 Annual Summary 
Report, GSC). Sapir was an active yet magnanimous supervisor, who believed in letting his 
agents find their own path and focused himself on relating their researches to the larger 
goals of the Division (Darnell 2009: 66), though he guarded linguistics “jealously” (69). He 
corresponded with his staff in the field often, and his letters reveal in what ways he guided 
them, particularly on matters linguistic, from afar. 
Calibrating the four subdisciplines (archaeology, physical anthropology, cultural 
ethnology, and linguistics) was one task Sapir performed in this role: differences among 
potentially overlapping specializations had to be teased apart to ensure the smooth 
operations, and mutual respect, of his team. For example, Goldenweiser’s and Waugh’s 
research converged on the subject of Iroquois medicine, so Sapir advised Goldenweiser to 
focus on the ritualistic elements and Waugh on the material (Sapir to Goldenweiser, 12 
April 1912, GSC). Sometimes these approaches diverged as well, both in manners of 
collection and varieties of data. Archaeologist Harlan Smith remarked on the dissimilarities 
between his specialty and cultural ethnology: “Barbeau is back with the fat and short hair 
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indicative of what he has been through. I envy you ethnologists the ease with which you 
can find material to work upon. You don't have to walk weary miles without finding 
anything” (Smith to Sapir, 6 November 1913, GSC). Goldenweiser confided his opinion that 
ethnology and physical anthropology did “not mix very well” (Waugh to Sapir, 10 February 
1912, GSC). To Sapir’s surprise, what constituted good linguistic evidence did not 
necessarily translate into useful ethnological material: “I must confess that I considered 
myself as having been somewhat taken in [by Mohawk texts], though even so we have a 
probably reliable mass of text material that would prove valuable for purely linguistic 
purposes” (Sapir to Goldenweiser, 11 October 1912, GSC). Having for years negotiated such 
trials of interdisciplinarity, Sapir later wrote, “Any one person knows comparatively little, 
but is almost certain to know something that hardly anyone else has heard of” (to Mason, 
29 November 1917, GSC). This was the philosophy he imbibed as Chief Ethnologist. 
Nonetheless, on the subject of linguistics, there was none who could know more 
than Sapir, and it was no secret. Linguistics training in North America was still relatively 
scarce, even among anthropologists, and operated largely within an apprenticeship model 
and through private networks of expertise. As Mason noted: “I should not be attempting 
serious linguistic work on the same scale as you or Harrington with the little training that 
you gave me and knowing nothing of Indo-European” (to Sapir, 22 September 1912, GSC). 
Ethnologists acquired limited linguistic facility, enough to record texts rather than to 
abstract grammars: “I do not think I ever will be competent enough in linguistics to write 
on I[roquois] grammar” except “in order to be able to give intelligent translations and, 
wherever necessary, analysis of the text” (Goldenweiser to Sapir, 15 April 1912, GSC). By 
contrast, Sapir’s mastery of linguistics was intimidating: “I am a little bit afraid to talk 
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linguistics with you after your last two letters on this subject, because you sit all over me 
for minor mistakes even when, as in the case of the Tanoan material I sent you, I told you 
that it consisted of stray notes thrown together in a haphazard way” (Radin to Sapir, 27 
June 1915, GSC). Yet some staff members saw it as an occasion to improve their ability on 
the subject. As Waugh noted: “I wish to avail myself of every opportunity to advance in this 
line, as I note the intimate bearing it has upon the work in hand” (to Sapir, 4 September 
1912, GSC). For such ambitions, Sapir was happy to lend his support and recommend 
readings.  
Nonetheless, he maintained a sharp distinction between the rudimentary linguistic 
work ethnologists accomplished and the more specialized philological training he 
employed:  
I am rather surprised to learn that you expect to devote yourself mainly to 
linguistics on your third trip. Do you mean to intend to undertake a 
thorough-going study from the point of view of a philologist, or that you wish 
merely to obtain enough of an insight into Iroquois grammar to enable you to 
handle your ethnological text material properly?  
(Sapir to Goldenweiser, 28 March 1912, GSC). 
It will naturally not be either necessary or possible for you to go into details 
on any grammatical point. The main stock of your linguistic data would have 
to be lexical and the grammatical data would merely be supplementary by 
way of more sharply defining the linguistic boundaries already presumably 
fixed on the basis of the phonetic peculiarities revealed in the vocabularies.    
. . . [A]nything like a thoroughgoing study of the Athabascan dialects would 
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have to be undertaken by a linguistic specialist and would require an 
extended period of time with each tribe visited. 
(Sapir to Teit, 16 January 1913, GSC) 
For many linguistic problems, only Sapir’s own ear would do: pitch accents in Athabascan, 
for instance, were material of “a rather delicate phonetic nature” that Sapir “must secure 
[him]self” (Sapir to Teit, 17 November 1920, GSC). On other subjects he showed great 
humility, but on linguistics he knew he had no equal within the Anthropological Division. 
 Beleaguered as he was in Ottawa, however, Sapir was prevented from exercising his 
fine-tuned ear on every occasion. He learned, instead, to employ his network of 
fieldworkers as extensions of his knowledge-taking apparatus. Radin, who described 
himself as a “lay-philologist” (to Sapir, 27 March 1912, GSC), became one such tool. Sapir 
coached him to distinguish the place of articulation of vowels in Ojibwe: “The second 
variety of vowels pronounced way back in the mouth may be velarized or uvularized 
vowels, i.e. vowels pronounced with resonance due to position of the back of the mouth and 
tongue approximating to the q position. Thalbitzer describes such a se[quence?] of 
uvularized vowels for Eskimo” (to Radin, 22 March 1912, GSC). Sapir’s comparative 
training granted him remarkable confidence in his own intuition,37 which he broadcast to 
his workers in the field. He urged Radin to better discriminate between “surd” and “sonant” 
(voiceless and voiced) stops and, in preparation of the final report, continued to draw out 
precise phonetic details: “If you hear arrested stops as distinct from long consonants, they 
should, of course, be separately denoted” and could, for the benefit of the printer, be 
                                                          
37 Reading through Boas’s report on Siouan in the Handbook, Sapir was alarmed by the number of misprints, 
remarking that the phonetics did not “chime” with his own; admittedly, he was “very likely” wrong, since he 
had never heard Dakota (to Radin, 7 February 1912, GSC). 
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represented by means of “superior perpendicular lines” followed by “p, t, and k” (to Radin, 
5 June 1913, GSC). This work of long-distance coaching was calibration of a different sort, 
but as Radin once put it, “sometimes even a phonetician is a bad prophet, as witness” (to 
Sapir, 22 January 1913, GSC). Sapir trusted the perceptions of some agents better than 
others, but even at a distance, he trusted his own analysis most of all.38 
 Barbeau was another example of an agent whose senses became enrolled as an 
extension of Sapir’s. Initially, his interest in the Wyandot language served only ethnological 
purposes. An episode with one of his informants, Kate Johnson, demonstrated the practice 
of shifting linguistic registers during elicitation. He had begun recording a story with her, in 
English, when upon realizing its ethnological importance “changed [his] plan and decided 
to get it directly in Wyandot” (Barbeau to Sapir, 3 November 1911, GSC). The repetition of 
such encounters induced a shift in epistemological registers, and Barbeau became more 
devoted to the study of the language itself. At first, Sapir gently discouraged his eagerness: 
I am glad to learn that you are carefully reviewing your names and texts for 
the purposes of getting more accurate linguistic analyses, and I am not 
surprised to hear that this work proceeds rather slowly. I am somewhat 
skeptical, however, of whether you ought to concentrate more on Wyandot 
linguistics than is really necessary to enable you to understand your text 
material for ethnological purposes. A thoroughgoing study of an Iroquois 
                                                          
38 Sapir described his own process: “As to writing up grammars, I may say that I consider it dangerous to rely 
on one's general knowledge, no matter how fresh it may be in one's mind. The only plan that seems to me to 
be worth a moment's consideration is to make careful collectanea under various heads, phonological and 
morphological. In this way the material boils itself down to systematic shape, and the actual writing is hardly 
more than putting facts and ideas into connected form that are already worked out for you inductively. . . . As 
for my own linguistic work, I do not intend to publish anything that I call a complete grammar except in a 
slow and pedantic manner” (to Radin, 2 April 1913, GSC). 
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language is no joke and would, in itself, require many months of 
uninterrupted labor. 
(Sapir to Barbeau, 7 May 1912, GSC) 
Barbeau persisted nonetheless, already impressed by his own progress: “Although I have 
but begun the handling of my already bulky material I have been surprised at the number 
of things I could understand after a short while, that I had not noticed before” (Barbeau to 
Sapir, 15 May 1912, GSC). Sapir was less impressed, and in his critique of Barbeau’s report 
on Wyandot phonetics, reiterated to him at length the difference between “intermediate” 
unaspirated stops and voiceless aspirated stops: “All Iroquois dialects that I have ever 
heard have these two series of stopped consonants, and it would be decidedly disturbing to 
find that Wyandot was quite different in this fundamental respect” (Sapir to Barbeau, 22 
May 1912, GSC). He suspected that the problem lay in the Barbeau’s inability to hear the 
difference, rather than its being an exceptional property of this dialect, and recommended 
he listen again and compare with Boas’s cases. A linguist’s ear needed to be sensitive to the 
production of speech sounds that were non-distinctive in their native language. 
Barbeau was frustrated: “I have for the 3rd time the other day gathered all my 
faculties and tried, with only that end in view, to detect three series of dentals instead of 
the two I have so far recorded; . . . discarded the hope of ever finding more than two series 
of dentals in Wy., both of which are aspirated as in English, one not being vocalized” (to 
Sapir, 13 June 1912, GSC). After another month of effort, he was successful in finding the 
equivalent in Wyandot of what Sapir described in Oneida and other Iroquoian dialects. The 
solution to the problem was unexpected and simple. The seeming irregularity that 
perplexed Sapir and Barbeau could be explained through language change: in Oneida, 
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words with aspiration had undergone a process of reduction at some point in the 
language’s history, wherein the dropping out of vowel resulted in alternation between 
voiced and voiceless aspirated stops. Wyandot had the same “same series of aspirated 
sounds” but "in such a way that you cannot call them that name” (Barbeau to Sapir, 16 July 
1912, GSC). Sapir approved (to Barbeau, 20 July 1912, GSC), and he began to rate Barbeau’s 
abilities more highly. 39 Sapir encouraged him to investigate Wyandot structure further, 
proclaiming it “indispensable linguistic data” (1912 Summary Report: 456), and later 
helping Barbeau to work up the material for publication as a Museum memoir (1915). 
Years afterwards, Barbeau remained a proven accessory: “I should be much obliged if you 
could test out at least one point. I have a strong suspicion that the Athabascan languages 
have pitch accent. If you could determine this point for Carrier it would be a most 
interesting and important thing for me. The difference in pitch would probably be one 
merely high and low” (Sapir to Barbeau, 16 July 1920, GSC); “There are so few people that 
can distinguish pitches adequately that it would seems a pity to lose this opportunity to get 
some independent evidence” (to Barbeau, 10 August 1920, GSC). As the Indian typewriter 
was a technology for the extension of reach, so too were Sapir’s agents thus an extension of 
his sensorium, enabling him to elicit data even in his absence, to hear through their ears, 
and to speculate on the mouths of informants whom he’d never met. The linguist’s 
subjectivity was at once “distributed” and “centred” (Mialet 2012), intimate and distant, 
but it did not operate with the predicted harmony of a closed system. These moving parts 
had to be carefully calibrated, and the spaces in between held the capacity for imperfection 
                                                          
39 “I trust that ultimately you will be able to work out the grammatical rules regarding pronominal class that 
is followed by noun-verb complexes. . . . I must say that I am very much gratified with the enthusiasm with 
which you have taken up Wyandot linguistics” (Sapir to Barbeau, 29 July 1912, GSC). 
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and surprise. At the same time, this elliptical space attenuated the intimacy of the 
encounter: it allowed Sapir to reach out across the contact zone and apprehend linguistic 
data from the intuitions of Indigenous informants, reducing them to distant tongues. 
. . . 
7. 1912. On Ticklish Data.  
The micro-transactions of power between agents and informants were contingent on a 
foundation of interpersonal trust, not always realized on both ends. Especially at the outset 
of their work, the staff met with a persistent non-recognition of their scientific authority. As 
Barbeau disclosed plaintively to Sapir early on: the elders, whom he considered the “most 
primitive of the Hyandots, from whom I expected most, have partly failed, so far, to help 
me”— taking any opportunity to “escape” (1 October 1911, GSC). Sapir’s reply indicated 
that Barbeau was learning a lesson every ethnologist did: “When you want them the most, 
then they discover that they are ‘very busy’”; instead of contributing to Western scientific 
work, they “hang around the store and gossip” (5 October 1911, GSC).40 Their informants’ 
ability to refuse cooperation worried Sapir more upon the hiring of a physical 
anthropologist, Knowles, who was to join Goldenweiser and Waugh at the Six Nations 
Reserve at Grand River. Sapir recognized the delicacy required of those encounters: 
The work of measuring Indians is naturally a somewhat more ticklish 
proceeding than ethnological or linguistic work and may need a good deal of 
explaining to Indians. I hope that you will reassure them as to the character 
of the work whenever you have the opportunity to do so. It may not be a bad 
                                                          
40 Eventually, Sapir coached his staff members to work around the rhythms of their informants: “It is 
sometimes difficult to get good interpreters on the West Coast during the Summer, when so many of the 
Indians of British Columbia are fishing or working on canneries” (Sapir to McIlwraith, 19 August 1921, GSC). 
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idea, though I should be somewhat cautious in expressing myself, to imply 
that these measurements are intended to show that the Iroquois are the 
finest type of Indian. 
(Sapir to Waugh, 9 April 1912, GSC) 
On this subject he wrote to Chief John Gibson of the Seneca people the same day, presenting 
the case for Knowles and stimulating the ticklish membrane of trust. 
Gibson had previously cooperated with Survey members in procuring specimens for 
the Museum. Neither Goldenweiser nor Waugh, who studied respectively the social 
organization and material culture of the Iroquois, had “paid attention to the Indian race 
itself,” Sapir told him. Sapir’s letter contained an appeal on behalf of Knowles for the 
collection of biometric data, urging Gibson to encourage cooperation amongst his people.41 
He was careful to distinguish this research as a scientific and not a political enterprise:42 
Please do not imagine that this work is anything like a census for the 
Department of Indian Affairs. It is simply part of the work that we are doing 
in the study of the natives of Canada. We hope by means of these 
measurements to learn more than we now know about the Indian race. At the 
same time, we shall be able to find out how the Iroquois Indians compare 
                                                          
41 Specifically, Knowles was to “get a very clear idea of the Indian type, including hair, eyes, skin color, shape 
of head, face, length of limbs, height of body, and weight” (Sapir to Gibson, 9 April 1912, GSC). 
42 The relationship of Boasian anthropology and race is a complex and thorny one. Teslow (2014) observes 
how the category disappeared from a mid-century anthropology that retreated from a positivist articulation 
of race and, reflexively, from their memory of its propagation under Boas. Physical anthropology, however, 
was committed to accounting for the variability of bodies across cultures. Boasians believed that racism was 
rooted in individual racial prejudice (15); in their view, it could be corrected by a “good” racial science, one 
which rejected “universal stages” of human development and understood race instead to be a historically 
contingent and environmentally conditioned phenomenon. Sapir was conscious of the negative connotations 
of what, to him, was a positive science of race and made efforts to maintain distance between them. See §15 
for the collision of these premises. 
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with other tribes in America. No doubt they will be found to be physically 
superior in several respects to other tribes. I should be personally thankful to 
you for any help that you could give Mr. Knowles and for whatever you can 
do to make the Indians of the Reserve understand the character of his work. 
(Sapir to Gibson, 9 April 1912, GSC) 
Gibson received the proposition congenially; was “only to[o] pleased” to assist Knowles (to 
Sapir, 19 April 1912, GSC). Sapir’s flattery, so cautiously expressed, hit its mark. What’s 
more, it suggested the intimacy of courting evidence. In the Handbook, Boas recommended 
that “intimate friendships” formed the basis of superior ethnography (1911/1963: 51), and 
the best kind what informants themselves committed to print. At the same time, the very 
bonds that enabled this work could impede the register of authenticity they hoped to 
cultivate: the “authentic” was a function of distance from the West that could, inversely, 
only be obtained through intimate contact with its agents. Often, it was ethnologists who 
patrolled these boundaries. Nurse (2006) reveals how ethnologists often took an active 
role in discerning what were “authentic” elements of Indigenous culture from those 
derived from contact; within these encounters, “effective ethnographic research required 
discrimination” (54), since even to informants the origins were unsure. It was accepted 
practice, then, to mislead (Boas 1911/1963: 50), misdirect, or in this case flatter subjects 
into yielding data that was uncontaminated by “secondary reasoning and . . . re-
interpretations” (Boas, 56). In Sapir’s words: “The aboriginal element should always be 
carefully peeled out” (to Waugh, 3 October 1911, GSC). Ethnologists strove to be respectful 
both of person and custom, as Sapir’s letter to Gibson shows, but the salvage paradigm, 
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with the authority of the Canadian government behind it, licensed them to make 
exceptions.43  
As Sapir’s letter also suggests, peeling occurred in practice and practitioner alike: 
ethnologists had to draw out ticklish data out the conditions of contact that gave rise to the 
encounter; in the same place, they felt the need to disambiguate their research interests 
from the government that authorized their work’s scientific force. Whether the latter was 
included to persuade his informant or himself remains unclear. Sapir was sincerely “taken 
aback” by Gibson’s “sudden death” on 1 November 1912 (to Goldenweiser, 6 November 
1912, GSC). Disappointed that the obituary notice made no mention of the late Chief’s 
involvement with the Survey, he made efforts to commemorate his friend, who would be 
“immortalized in the pages of our Journal” (Sapir to Goldenwesier, 12 March 1913, GSC). 
Sapir wanted to convey the authenticity of their relationship, and perhaps it was so, the 
intimacy between the two men genuine. But it was also an intimacy across contact zones 
and unavoidably a distant one. 
. . . 
8. 1913. On a Glacial Pace.  
The Canadian Arctic Expedition launched in 1913, the largest and most ambitious scientific 
undertaking in Canada to that date. It continued the work begun by Vilhjalmur Stefansson 
in 1911, who organized and led the enterprise. The Expedition was not directly under the 
auspices of the Survey, but organized under a special grant from Parliament (Sapir to 
Jenness, 18 April 1913, GSC). Stefansson had originally secured funding from two American 
                                                          
43 Barbeau, for example, went about spying on a ceremony to which he was denied access (Nurse 2006: 59). 
Leslie Dawn (2006) provides a more thorough account of how Barbeau later used his knowledge and 
authority to confirm a discourse of Indigenous disappearance. 
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institutions (the National Geographic Society, in Washington D.C., and the American 
Museum of Natural History; $22,500 from each). On his return to Ottawa, he also gained 
support from the Survey and Prime Minister Robert Borden. The latter, however, was 
concerned over issues of sovereignty within a predominately American-funded expedition 
and decided, ultimately, for Canada to fund the entire project (Jenness and Jenness 1991: 
xxx). It henceforth became the Canadian Arctic Expedition, and any new lands or resources 
discovered would belong to the Dominion Government. The internationalism of science 
proved secondary to nationalist and economic interests. Discontent arose early among the 
staff members, who objected to two clauses in their contracts regarding communication to 
and from the Expedition, insisted upon by Director Brock (xxiv).44 In addition, all notes 
were to be turned over, a condition which prompted threats of resignation. The 
disagreement passed and the crew set sail aboard the Karluk,45 with command over the 
exhibition divided between a Northern and Southern Party as a result (the former led by 
Stefannson, the latter by Rudolph Anderson). The Northern Party intended to explore new 
territory deep in the Arctic; the Southern to catalogue the flora, fauna, geography and 
peoples of the Mackenzie River delta, with two ethnologists on staff: Diamond Jenness and 
Henri Beuchat.46 Misgivings lingered toward their leadership upon departure from 
Esquimalt, Vancouver Island, on 17 June 1913. Their hopes were not all that would sink. 
                                                          
44 One, that no news could be given out except through official reports from Survey headquarters, and two, 
that all mail from Expedition members had to be forwarded through Ottawa (and presumably vetted). 
45 The Karluk “was a California-built brigantine, launched in 1884, and used initially in the Alaskan salmon 
trade. In 1892 it was bought to operate in the newly opened whaling grounds near Herschel Island 
(northwestern Canada) and made 14 voyages into the Arctic before lying idle from 1911 to 1913” (Jenness 
and Jenness 1991: xxxii). 
46 The two were to be paid the lowest salary among the scientific staff ($500); only the cook had one lower 
($480). Stefansson, in place of payment, negotiated exclusive publication and lecture rights to the material 
(xxxi). 
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 On 12 August 1913, the Karluk was firmly trapped in the ice northeast of Flaxman 
Island, off the coast of Alaska. It was “not powerful enough to force its way any farther . . . 
and this time it did not escape. Thereafter it drifted with the ice, first eastward for several 
days until it lay north of Camden Bay, then slowly westward until ultimately, in mid-
January 1914, it was crushed by the ice and sank” (xli). Nearly half the crew members 
perished, among them Beuchat, whose health was already diminished (xliii), and who died 
trying to reach land. Along with the loss of life was the loss of ethnographic equipment, as 
Jenness informed Sapir: “All my instruments and many of the ethnological books were left 
on the Karluk; the rest were at Collinson Port—in either case equally inaccessible during 
the winter” (19 October 1914, GSC). Julie Cruikshank (2005) chronicles how glaciers have 
long been the site of contact between Indigenous and European worldviews; insofar as the 
Western division between the categories of nature and culture has prevailed, she urges the 
reader to revisit local ontologies that understand the human and natural worlds as 
responsive to each other. In this episode, the Expedition was induced to respond; the 
transit of the Western knowledge-taking machine delayed. The environment was not a 
passive scene on which contact zones were set; Canada was itself an actor, at times 
yielding, at others ferocious. Indeed, as the diaries of Jenness narrate, waiting became not 
the absence of possibility but its primary spatio-temporal condition: in waiting—for game 
to hunt, for snowstorms to abate, for supplies to restock, for spare moments to elicit stories 
and other linguistic material, for dull evenings to commit all this to record—Jenness 
formed the basis of his ethnography. In this way, the rhythms of the Arctic and its peoples 
shaped the scientific research that sought to abstract knowledge from them. 
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The initial inclusion of two ethnologists within the Expedition was to study the Inuit 
peoples of the Coronation Gulf, whom Stefansson had named the “Copper Eskimo” (Jenness 
and Jenness 1991: xxxi). Their main goal was “the collection of a full ethnographic material, 
based on study and observation among the Eskimos of the Arctic region,” concentrating on 
the non-material side of culture, since their technology had already been studied (Sapir to 
Jenness, 6 March 1913, GSC). Sapir had recommended the more experienced Beuchat 
perform the linguistic work, while Jenness undertook the anthropometric collection (to 
Jenness, 19 June 1913, GSC). With the former’s passing, it fell all to Jenness, who became 
another example of ethnologist-turned-apparatus.47 However, he was greatly 
disadvantaged by the loss of equipment aboard the Karluk: 
This was a very severe handicap, more especially in dealing with the Eskimos 
of this region, who have lost many of their ancient customs under the 
influence of the whites, and with whom therefore observation alone does not 
yield very profitable results. The only alternative method is through the 
language, but unfortunately the Eskimo language is an extremely difficult 
one, both structurally and phonetically. My interpreter was only in his 16th 
year, and his knowledge of English was confined to the ordinary conversation 
current among a few white men in a very peculiar and limited environment. 
(Jenness to Sapir, 19 October 1914, GSC) 
                                                          
47 Sapir: “I had not written to you in regard to linguistic matters, as I had imagined perhaps mistakenly that 
your training and interests had not been along those lines, and I am therefore doubly pleased to find that you 
expect to pay attention to this aspect of the work. Of course, the very best sort of ethnological material that 
you can get would be texts obtained from dictation” (to Jenness, 7 May 1913, GSC). Jenness made excellent 
progress in recording texts and vocabulary: "spoken words which he has had repeatedly reproduced before 
the natives so that he could get the text letter-perfect and translated for comparison with other Eskimo 
dialects” (Sapir to Jenness, 29 July 1915, GSC). 
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Ethnology required specialized techniques, instruments, and the cooperation of informants. 
As Nurse (2006) observes, Native peoples sometimes interpreted this situation as a 
cultural exchange, a perception either abided or discouraged; to ethnologists, whose 
primary interest was cultural memory, informants were “repositories of the past” (59). 
Within the salvage paradigm, remoteness promised a greater affinity with the past and 
retention of traditional knowledge, but these expectations were routinely dashed.  
Within his diaries, Jenness was persistently troubled by the ostensible loss of 
ancestral knowledge. At other moments, he reflected on these lacunae as a mode of agency: 
The [Cape] Halkett people were laughing about it while Brick was present—
it was a popular story which Stefansson had recited to them as an example of 
one of their charms. He had asked them to tell him any more they knew, for 
he would write them down and they would always be remembered—
otherwise they would soon be forgotten. At the time they sat quiet and said 
nothing, but laughed heartily when Stef[ansson] had gone. Such is the fate I 
fancy of many an ethnologist—more often than is supposed.  
(Jenness and Jenness 1991: 122) 
In Unspoken, Cheryl Glenn (2004) analyses how Indigenous students employ silence 
tactically in the classroom to disrupt structures of power; here, as well, silence punctuates 
the rhythms of data collection, rendering them elliptical.48 The people, like the land, 
resisted assimilation into the categories of Western knowledge. The story of the Arctic 
Expedition was as much, therefore, one of the failure of scientists to inhabit the space of 
                                                          
48 Audra Simpson (2014) argues for an ethnography of “refusal” that moves anthropology away from the 
“documentary” mode and its reliance on antiquated categories of difference that derive from colonial contact. 
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Northern Canada as it was the purported failure of Indigenous peoples to adapt their 
culture to the changing times. Yet it was also a story of adaptation on both sides, and the 
disinclination of ethnologists to notice and account for this parity reflected the biased 
teleology of salvage that coloured their perception. This ideology confined First Nations, 
Inuit, and Métis to vessels of the past, displacing their shared present and imaginable 
future. In many ways, waiting still characterizes the relations between the settler state and 
Indigenous peoples; for others, waiting upon this elliptical curve has ended and they are 
idle no more. 
. . . 
9. 1913. On the Hall.  
The Museum was not static while its agents were out collecting data and specimens in the 
field, though as a repository of these materials it was, certainly, dedicated to stasis. In 1913, 
the first exhibition hall opened for the public. According to the 1913 Annual Summary 
Report, the Division of Anthropology “select[ed] such material as seemed most calculated 
to give the public a general idea of the culture of the more important tribes of Canada,” with 
the remainder carefully stored with the aim of future exhibition (Sapir et al. 1913: 358, 
GSC). These materials were all numbered and organized according to Sapir’s five cultural 
areas. However, exhibits representing only three of those areas were to be installed during 
1913 (the Eastern Woodlands, Arctic, and West Coast); materials from the Plains and 
Plateau-Mackenzie, coming into the Museum in increasing quantity, had to be stored due to 
lack of exhibition space (Sapir to Brock, 17 January 1913, GSC). The task of categorizing, 
cataloguing, and storing these materials was a substantial one: in 1912 alone, over 1500 
specimens were added to the collection, by gift or purchase; the following year, over 1300. 
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Caring for these collections posed a challenge, as well, and meant responding to another, no 
less assertive, environment: the literal ecology of the institute. Here, Sapir encountered the 
mundane materiality of salvage: “Owing to the continuous dry heat in the hall, a large 
number of specimens are bound to deteriorate,” he observed, recommending a particular 
level of moisture be maintained through two or three small tanks of water kept in a 
suspended canoe, “an out of sight moisture distributer,” replenished regularly by the 
caretaker (to Brock, 19 November 1912, GSC). To avoid further atrophy, he wanted the 
temperature in the ethnological hall as close to the freezing point as possible, leaving 
instructions for the engineer to turn off all the heating coils except one (to Brock, 8 
February 1913, GSC). Initially, museum work was hindered by the lack of a full-time 
curatorial assistant, but from 1913 to 1919 Frederick Waugh arrested his fieldwork and 
was hired on as preparator to manage and maintain the growing collection of ethnological 
specimens.49 Negotiating the needs of this space demanded continual attention, both at the 
everyday and managerial levels. 
The necessity of the Museum as a truth-spot, so clear to its scientific staff, was not 
always shared to the same degree by administration. On more than one occasion, Sapir 
appealed to the Deputy Minister of Mines on behalf of the urgent need for a second 
exhibition hall to fulfill the objectives of the Museum. Lack of space was a persistent 
complaint throughout his administrative correspondence.50 In reply to a letter from the 
Acting Deputy Minister calling for information on the Division’s activities, he emphasized 
                                                          
49 Sapir advocated on behalf of Waugh, who in his view was not merely a clerk but remained a member of the 
“scientific staff,” and whose beginning salary should be $1600 rather than $1200 (Sapir to McConnell, 17 
September 1914, GSC). Within anthropology, museum work was scientific work. 
50 Early on, Sapir once protested the lack of a “Yale lock and key” for the basement room devoted to 
ethnological work; the room was accessible to anyone, and it soon “developed into an informal coat room, 
repository of whiskey bottles, and so forth” (Sapir to Brock, 29 February 1912, GSC). 
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museum work as one of its three major undertakings, alongside field research and 
publication. The Museum had a special role in mediating knowledge claims for a broader 
public: “Of more direct appeal perhaps to the general public than our publications are the 
museum exhibits, which are planned to give in readily intelligible and palatable form some 
of the more elementary or obvious results of our researches.” He reiterated the Museum’s 
requirement of “enlarging its facilities” and claiming a second hall, though even that, he 
foresaw, was a modest proposal: “Properly speaking, the Division of Anthropology should 
have a complete floor, embracing four large exhibition halls, assigned it for its exhibitions. 
As our collections grow we will find that even the two halls now asked for will be quite 
inadequate” (to McConnell, 2 October 1914, GSC). He was not alone in these concerns. The 
principal officers of the Geological Survey branch involved with the Museum, which 
included Sapir,51 formed a committee that “drew formal attention to this condition which at 
that time threated to paralyse any effort looking toward the realization of a Museum in 
keeping with the dignity and rapid development of the Dominion.” The Museum staff had to 
share the Victoria Memorial Building with the Drafting and Topographical staffs, which 
caused “congestion” in the basement and on the second (office) floor; the third floor, the 
only one suited for “lighter laboratory work, study and storage rooms absolutely necessary 
for the requirements of the Museum,” was used instead as drafting room. The crisis of 
space already threatened “a cessation of activities”:  
                                                          
51 The other signatories were: Lawrence M Lambe, Vertebrate Paleontology; E. M. Kindle, Invertebrate 
Paleontology; J. M. Macoun, Assistant Botanist and Naturalist; Robt. A. A. Johnston, Mineralogist; Harlan I. 
Smith, Archeologist; L. D. Burling, Assistant Invertebrate Paleontologist; W. J. Wilson, Assistant Paleontologist; 
P. A. Taverner, Naturalist and Curator; Francis H. S. Knowles, Physical Anthropologist. 
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The exhibition halls four years after the occupation of the building are with 
one exception still devoid of the necessary exhibition cases, and it has been 
necessary to resort to other devices on which to place exhibits. One of these 
halls . . . has for some time been used as a freight shed and as a storage room 
for tents other field equipment as well as a lot of other materials which for 
lack of a more suitable definition may be classed as rubbish. 
(Sapir et al. to McConnell, 16 October 1914, GSC) 
The Museum was a site for mediating scientific truths, but before the staff could reach their 
intended audience, they had to persuade another public of their superior claims to its use. 
The officers couched their Memorandum in patriotic language, perhaps hoping to 
frame their appeal in terms consistent with bureaucratic interests: 
In modern times every national capital of any importance has its collections 
of objects pertaining to the various arts and sciences. They are possessions in 
which the people take national pride. . . . The great museums of London, Paris, 
Berlin, Vienna, Petrograd, Dresden, Munich, Birmingham, Calcutta, Tokio, 
Washington, New York, Chicago and a host of other cities of the world may be 
cited as instances of this kind. The ordinary visitor to the halls of any of these 
institutions views only one of the phases of their activities—the exhibition 
phase. He is probably wholly unaware of the patient and painstaking care 
often involving weeks and even years of unremitting labour before many of 
the things which he sees may be satisfactorily presented to view. 
(Sapir et al. to McConnell, 16 October 1914, GSC) 
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The Museum’s predecessors, among them John Macoun, likewise struggled to convince the 
government officials of the worth of such an institution; many politicians did not believe in 
science for its own sake, but saw it as an investment to promote the material resources of 
the country (Waiser 1989), one on which they could demand returns (55). The Museum 
was ultimately recognized by Parliament, but not in the way Sapir and his fellow scientific 
staff had hoped. The Hall of Canadian Anthropology was closed to the public from 1916 
until 1921, when the Victoria Memorial Museum became a temporary base of operations 
for the Senate after a fire destroyed the Centre Block of Parliament. The “Indian Hall” had 
been the only part of the original museum plan completed to that date, and the specimens 
curated for exhibition were “liable to deteriorate” outside their present conditions (Sapir to 
McConnell, 3 January 1918, GSC). The place of science under the patronage of the Canadian 
Government was far from static, and it was likewise liable to deteriorate during wartime 
years, as we will see. 
. . . 
❖ Retraction (the War): 1914–1918 
10.  1914. On Linguists, Fire, and Dangerous Intimacies.  
The year began with a fire. “Mr. Tavener's house burnt up yesterday” (Smith to Sapir, 15 
January 1914, GSC), and with it Sapir’s apartments there. He was away on a five-month 
research trip to Alberni, Vancouver Island, studying the Nootka, doing the work he relished. 
The fire less deterred Sapir than it did accent his growing disenchantment with Ottawa. 
Sapir chaffed under his administrative responsibilities and recognized that the Survey held 
little regard for his field of study, a concern which would become more pronounced when 
wartime budgets ravaged support for his Division. Not two weeks prior, Boas contacted 
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Sapir about the latter’s rumoured desire to leave his appointment as Chief Ethnologist for a 
position with an emphasis purely on research. For Boas, the decision was clear: “I believe 
that any step of this kind would be the mistake of your life” (Boas to Sapir, 2 January 1914, 
GSC: 1). Purity of research focus was not an option; he insisted Sapir continue to invest in 
the space of the museum, for there were no better alternatives. 
Boas’s letter provides insight into the relationship between anthropology and 
museum culture in this era, in addition to his investment in his (former) students. Museum 
work in the United States, he underscored, was far from the promised land Sapir imagined: 
“The fundamental difficulty that you would find everywhere is that all purely scientific 
work, particularly the work in which you are interested, would have to be done as a side 
issue, and that the essential interest of the museum is not exploration, but the exhibit, and 
ordinarily the popular exhibit” (1–2). A different museum role would neither relieve Sapir 
of administrative duties nor be more “sympathetic” to his work: “At present you are to a 
very great extent your own master” (2); “in any museum where you are under a curator, 
your freedom will be ever so much restricted[;] . . . no university position could give you the 
opportunities that you have at present time” (3). Certainly, Boas had his own interest in 
maintaining his pupil, so carefully placed, in Ottawa. It added to “the growing number of 
North American museums organized according to Boasian principles” (Darnell 2009: 63), 
and Boas doubted whether Sapir’s successor would maintain that course. He worried that 
the continuity of Sapir’s research would be disrupted and incline instead toward the 
popular exhibit: over four years, Sapir had “gone straight ahead according to what seemed 
to me sane and safe scientific principles, without yielding to the clamor of premature 
popularization, which is the bane of our science” (3). He recommended Sapir separate his 
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personal and professional feelings: “I should consider it a misfortune for anthropology if 
you were to give up, because the organization of your work entails a certain amount of 
work that is irksome to you” (3). He did not want Sapir chasing this dream, since “no 
position in existence” would satisfy it: “In short, unless you are in a financial position to 
free yourself entirely from the conditions of remunerative positions, you cannot get rid of a 
certain amount of work that you dislike” (4). Sapir evidently relented, his dream of a pure 
research position deferred, but his disillusionment went unabated, and the onslaught of 
cutbacks and failed ventures over the ensuing years only fanned the flames.52 
 Sapir did endeavour to find other outlets. Though the absence of a university 
training centre contributed to anthropology’s late development in Canada (Harrison and 
Darnell 2006: 4), it was not for Sapir’s lack of effort. Later in 1914, he proposed a series of 
public lectures to encourage “university publics” to take an interest in anthropological 
work (Sapir to Falconer, 19 June 1914, GSC). The heads of McGill, University of Toronto, 
and Queen’s were favourable to the idea, with Toronto’s president Robert Falconer’s being 
the most receptive (Sapir to McConnell, 13 October 1914, GSC). The series would have 
comprised the following seven lectures, with an option to combine the fourth and fifth into 
one (“Primitive Cultures”): 
1. What is Anthropology? –Dr. E. Sapir 
2. Early Man (lantern slides) – F. H. S. Knowles 
3. Primitive Industries (lantern slides) – H. I. Smith 
4. Primitive Society – C. M. Barbeau 
                                                          
52 As Sapir feared, during wartime the Deputy Minister of Mines was “very eager to eliminate everything that 
[wa]s not absolutely indispensable for the work of the Survey” (Sapir to Mechling, 8 April 1916, GSC). 
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5. Primitive Religion – C. M. Barbeau 
6. The languages of Primitive Peoples – Dr. E. Sapir 
7. The Archaeology of Canada (lantern slides) – H. I. Smith 
(Sapir to Falconer, 2 October 1914, GSC) 
Sapir was willing to lecture for no salary, but in the end, neither Toronto nor the Survey 
could fund the $150 in travel expenses (Falconer to Sapir, 9 October 1914; Sapir to 
Falconer, 14 October 1914, GSC), and the plans for the lecture series went up in smoke. 
Neither the museum nor the university system in Canada was at this moment amenable to 
the extension of Sapir’s network. 
Sapir was not alone in feeling the diminishing returns of his profession. Indeed, it 
was a sentiment shared amongst other students of Boas, including Radin: 
I just received your letter and it made me think of the fact that we 
anthropologists, i.e. the four Semites who graduated under Boas, are either 
an unusual aggregation of men or a self-centered set who insist upon giving 
in to their intellectual whims whenever the spirit prompts them. I am 
inveighing against the tyranny of modern science which insists that you do 
original research and hard work, when it is so much better for your soul and 
your mind to lie on your back and gaze into a New Mexican sky, walk into 
mountains or, still better, read history of Greek and Latin, while Lowie until 
recently wanted to write and read philosophy and Goldie wanted to read 
books like Levy-Bruehl and Durkheim. Now come you with your composing 
and delight in modern literature!  
(Radin to Sapir, 19 February 1916, GSC) 
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Radin ruminated over the remote possibility of writing an interpretive study of Winnebago 
or Ojibwe: “Whether such an undertaking would be of any permanent scientific value to the 
world I do not know, and I do not much care, but I know that it would be of permanent 
value to me and satisfy certain aesthetic cravings of mine that field-work threated for a 
time to dull.” In contrast to the restrictive demands of professionalization, Radin 
appreciated the virtuosity of a wandering mind, a sentiment which Sapir shared. Disturbed 
by World War I and distraught over his wife Florence’s illness, Sapir had turned to 
aesthetics; he dabbled in music and poetry to cathect his feelings of unbelonging and 
express his dissent toward militarism. Even after the war, this dissatisfaction remained. 
Sapir came under fire for a lecture he delivered for the Independent Labour Party in 1919, 
about which the Ottawa Journal ran the headline “A Preacher of Class War” (see Darnell 
2009: 165–167). As a Polish-born, New York intellectual and Jew, Sapir was ever an 
outsider among the political class in Ottawa; his efforts to establish ties to the university 
and nation resisted, he could only mitigate the social and intellectual isolation he felt there, 
in pursuit of the scientific life. 
. . . 
11. 1915. On Advocacy. 
Diminishing returns extended to the realm of service, as well. During his trip to Alberni, 
Sapir was shocked by the government’s neglect of the Natives’ health. The Indian Act of 
1876 established Native peoples as wards of the Canadian state, conferring upon the 
government the authority to regulate and manage their existence. Sapir appealed to 
Duncan Campbell Scott, then the Deputy Superintendent of the Department of Indian 
Affairs (DIA), to draw attention to the mediocre care of the doctor entrusted to their 
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community. Sapir held no personal grudge against this man personally, who in his 
estimation was above average, but it did “not seem to [him] that the Indians [were] getting 
anything like the requisite attention in medical matters.” Tuberculosis in particular 
afflicted this community, and Sapir judged they needed “active preventative 
superintendence” in order to curb its effects, especially on childhood mortality. Sapir was 
deeply affected by the death of the five-year-old sister of one of his informants; the doctor 
had arrived only on the fifth day after he was called, to confirm his prognosis over the 
phone that the case of tuberculosis was fatal from the beginning. The tribe rarely thought 
to summon the doctor, except in extreme cases, and due to his salary and the difficulty of 
the trip he seldom made visits.53 For Sapir, these conditions were not a matter for debate: 
“It seems to me to be a matter merely of adequate service” (to Scott, 19 March 1914, GSC). 
This episode was not the only instance of Sapir’s advocacy. Two months later, he contacted 
Scott again on behalf of the Iroquois at the Six Nations Reserve, concerning eleven treaty 
belts believed stolen from the Reserve. Following information from Dr. Frank Speck at the 
University of Pennsylvania, Sapir was convinced they were on exhibition there, under the 
private collection of George Heye, a trustee of the University Museum (Darnell 2009: 56). 
Having compared two sets of wampum belts, he was prepared to make an affidavit on their 
identity, and he hoped Scott would assist in the return of these belts to their rightful own, 
with Speck’s role to remain confidential, given his connection to the university (to Scott, 16 
May 1914, GSC). Sapir therefore took on the role as ally and advocate, a role particularly 
seen in the challenge to the Potlatch Ban he organized in 1915. 
                                                          
53 The Department of Indian Affairs increasingly obstructed efforts of Indigenous communities to form their 
own associations or circumvent the Department’s administrative control. One of these restrictions prohibited 
bands from hiring their own doctors or lawyers (Dyck 1991: 93). 
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The Potlatch Ban, which lasted from 1885 to 1951, prohibited the gift-giving 
ceremony practiced by Indigenous nations in the Pacific Northwest; the law was a means of 
administering colonial rule and disrupting non-European cultural practices, belonging to 
the legislative and moral regulation set into motion by the Indian Act.54 Nayan Shah (2006) 
underscores how judicial trials often prove to be “flashpoints” for colonial regulation of 
intimacies, where intimacy becomes a legal category in addition to a personal one.55 In this 
matter, Sapir was caught between the two registers. While he was living among the Nootka 
out west, they asked him to draft a petition against the renewed enforcement of this law, 
Sapir’s having gained the people’s trust: “you have seen all our customs performed and 
fully understand them” (Thomas to Sapir, 4 December 1914, GSC). He consulted Boas 
concerning the vigor with which the “old more or less dead letter potlatch law was being 
applied,” with the hope that, through their intervention, it could be “applied with more 
discrimination.” Sapir was planning a “semi popular bulletin” whose main purpose would 
be “making it clear to whites generally that the potlatch can not be summarily condemned 
even from the white man’s standpoint, and that at any rate the abolition of it would mean 
the inflicting of a great deal of unnecessary hardship on the Indians, and could only assist in 
a general demoralization” (Sapir to Boas, 10 February 1915, GSC). He wrote to Boas, who 
had previously condemned the ban in 1897, and to others familiar with West Coast 
ethnology (John Swanton at the Bureau of American Ethnology; Charles Hill-Tout and 
Charles Newcombe in British Columbia) who could attest to “the harm and injustice that 
                                                          
54 Potlatches were important for the redistribution of resources within tribes. The ban represented a 
challenge to Indigenous communalism, promoting liberal possessive individualism instead (Dyck 1991: 88). 
55 Under the purview of the 1876 Indian Act, for example, Natives could become enfranchised and cease to be 
"Indian" in the juridical sense (Mawani 2009: Chapter 5). The Act gave federal administration jurisdiction 
over who would count as “Indian” under the eyes of the law. 
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would be done to the Indians by a wholesale abolition of [the potlatch]” (to Newcombe, 10 
February 1915, GSC). Sapir hoped that “a mass of expert opinion on the subject would carry 
weight with the Deputy Superintendent General [Scott]” (ibid). His petitions fell on deaf 
ears; scientific expertise, ultimately, could do little to sway the government’s 
discriminatory policies. Sapir, again, found his sensibilities as ethnologist at odds with his 
allegiance as civil servant. 
. . . 
12. 1916. On Standardization and the Stenographer. 
The typewriter was not the only instrument of standardization. A report on the “Phonetic 
Transcription of Indian Languages” was published by the Smithsonian in 1916, following 
discussions that occurred at various meetings of the American Anthropological Association 
between 1913 and 1915. The report was an extension of the Handbook, providing 
directions for amateur linguists to help them contribute to data collection on endangered 
languages (Darnell 2009: 88). Boas was chair of the committee responsible for the report, 
which included Sapir, Kroeber, and Pliny Goddard. Its aim was to resolve inconsistent use 
of phonetic systems and establish a set mapping of sound to symbol in American ethnology. 
The first section described the possible vowel and consonant sounds produced by the 
speech organs through their different places and manners of articulation, recommending a 
series of characters, drawn from the Latin and Greek alphabets, to represent them. The 
second section provided an in-depth account of the system of diacritical marks and accents 
needed to supplement the transcription of American languages (for instance grave, acute, 
circumflex, or inverted circumflex accents for pitch). The object of the first section was to 
offer a “comparatively simple system of transcription adapted to the ordinary purposes of 
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recording and printing texts” (2), with the latter included more for the benefit of 
specialists, whose hope was that one day “all of the extant North American languages may 
be discussed and compared” (2). However, for the ethnologist’s task of compiling large 
volumes of texts, the more thorough mode of transcription was “expensive and often 
impracticable”:  “Such an elaborate system proves too complicated for students who are 
less thoroughly trained in phonetics and therefore less discriminating in their perceptions 
of sounds” (2). The goal here was to obtain large samples of vocabulary, from which later 
lexicographic work could be undertaken. As with the typewriter, though, efforts to replicate 
this standard were marked with differences. 
 Initially, Sapir agreed that some consensus on transcription practices was in order, 
though he was less doctrinaire about it than Boas, opting to allow a measure of space for 
the “judgement of the investigator” (to Boas, 9 December 1912, GSC). Sapir did not believe 
a universal standard was integral, so long as analyses were clear and internally consistent: 
“Phonetic symbols are not fetiches [sic]. They are merely symbols of sounds and when 
adequately explained in any set of texts or grammatical work, as they should always be, I 
do not see why there should be the least trouble in passing from one system to another” (to 
Mason, 5 March 1913, GSC). Furthermore, he considered an authoritative statement on the 
phonetics of American languages premature given the early stage of their knowledge-
gathering project and the “interdependence of theory and orthography” (Darnell 2009: 90). 
Building consensus among the committee members, therefore, proved to be a challenge in 
and of itself. Sapir was satisfied with the second draft of the report, which Boas and 
Goddard also accepted, but Kroeber found his work too meticulous: “the report as it stands 
will be probably intelligible to and usable by only three or four anthropologists in the 
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country besides yourself” (Kroeber to Sapir, 13 June 1914, GSC). Radin’s correspondence 
with Sapir around this time reveals the fault lines beginning to form between ethnologists 
and linguistic specialists: 
[Nels Nelson] tells me that Boas, Goddard and Kroeber, especially the two 
latter are kicking strongly at your phonetic report because it is too minute 
and would demand too many changes. They make me sick. They wish to be 
phoneticians and object to the one essential thing about the subject, namely 
the recording of all those peculiarities of sounds that are not of a personal 
nature. My advice would be, not to pay any attention to them, for after all 
Americanists must realize now that they should cater to those scholars who 
are inevitably going to be drawn to the subject of American phonetics and 
linguistics within the next generation, and who are not unnaturally going to 
demand the same standards, to which they are accustomed in Indo-European 
philology. Am I right? 
(Radin to Sapir, 28 July 1914, GSC) 
The report was a junction (and disjunction) in shifting and adapting standards from a text-
based philological tradition to the field, in addition to signaling the growing territoriality 
between linguists and ethnologists. Ultimately, Sapir grew tired of the disputes the 
document evoked, satisfied with his own contribution, and a third draft of the report was 
approved for publication by the other three authors (Darnell 2009: 90–91). 
Even after its approval, the report remained a volatile implement. Sapir proposed 
that the Survey make use of it as a guide for their publications, recommending copies be 
made and distributed to their anthropology mailing list at a cost of $75–100 for 750–1000 
85 
 
prints; or, per Boas’s recommendation, they might cooperate with Columbia University and 
the Bureau of American Ethnology to furnish another 2000 copies (Sapir to McInnes, 10 
October 1916, GSC). The expenditure was “not only highly advisable but necessary,” he 
insisted (Sapir to McInnes, 13 November 1916, GSC), but nonetheless, they would have to 
settle for a paltry 100 copies, which was “better than nothing” (Sapir to Boas, 5 December 
1916, GSC). The costs of extending a standard were never final, nor were its guidelines 
followed with fidelity. Given the fluid practice of calibrating speech sounds to phonetic 
script, the report was no substitute for linguistic training, and its recommendations were 
subject to ad hoc modification. Mason, in response to Sapir’s review of his work on the 
Salinan language (“you took me over my head on the first line”), expressed his dismay at 
these inconsistencies: “How in the hell do you ever expect to have a uniform system of 
orthography adopted if all the signatory formulators refuse to adopt and use half of their 
own recommendations?” (Mason to Sapir, 26 July 1916, GSC). Of course, Mason himself 
wasted no time making his own adjustments: 
With regard to my other orthographical problems, in most cases I have 
followed your advice, but have adopted some other deviations which will 
probably make you shake your fists and tear your hair. . . . The one point 
where we have departed radically from the committee’s recommendations is 
in regard to the open and close vowels. It seems foolish, in a language where 
at least 90% of the vowels are open to restrict the use of the ordinary roman 
characters to the close quality and use the greek characters for by far the 
greater number of cases merely because that is the system used in 
discussions of phonetics. We are therefore using the ordinary roman symbols 
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for the open quality, and the greek vowels, which are probably less than 5% 
of the total, for the close. 
(Mason to Sapir, 14 September 1916, GSC) 
Systematicity was the ambition that drove the committee to introduce the report, though 
the standard they sought to instill depended not on maxims alone; the directions had to be 
followed, and when new data presented a challenge or simply when it was inconvenient or 
costly to reproduce, that standard could be flouted. 
 The standard depended also on the typewriter, whose presence was a pre-condition 
to the belief that the report’s directions were reproducible. The artifact brought into reach 
the correlate goal of the standard: to render the languages of North America more familiar 
yet to maintain their strangeness. The typewriter’s materiality, I’ve mentioned, was not 
fixed within this arrangement, and neither were the hands that employed it. Along with the 
proliferation of the typewriter, Kittler (1999) reminds us, was the advent of the typist: 
where men wove the figurative tissue of the text, women wove the literal (186). While male 
ethnologists debated the finer points of orthography, it often fell to female stenographers 
to perform the act of transcription. The Anthropological Division was no exception, having 
hired on two stenographers as clerical staff in 1913: Frances Bleakney and Ariel McConnell. 
Where McConnell aided the archaeologists Smith and William Wintemberg, Bleakney was 
assigned to assist in the preparation of ethnological and linguistic material and hence 
worked closely with Sapir. Not long after the publication of the phonetic report, Sapir 
petitioned Director McInnes to promote her to the appropriate position and pay scale, in 
recognition of her many accolades (McConnell’s promotion having gone through before the 
war). Bleakney had passed first on the civil service examination (class II B), “outdistancing 
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male and female competitors by a comfortable margin”; her work transcribing texts on the 
“Indian typewriter,” with its distinct keyboard, was moreover “of a highly technical 
nature—in [his] opinion, probably the most severely technical of any undertaken by the 
Survey's clerical staff” (Sapir to McInnes, 11 October 1916, GSC).56 Bleakney was frequently 
overworked, such that Sapir had to request a stenographer from another division, “Miss” 
Holcombe, be transferred to break up the workload and assist Waugh (to McInnes, 17 July 
1917, GSC). A lack of stenographic aid continued to hamper the scientific work of the office 
during the war: with McConnell otherwise occupied with the archaeologists, Bleakney 
alone was responsible for assisting the four other permanent staff of the Division (Barbeau, 
Knowles, Waugh, and Sapir), leaving an excess backlog of office work; Sapir suggested 
another stenographer be hired under Bleakney’s  supervision, due to her position’s 
“unusually technical nature” and given that she was likely to resign from it soon (to 
McInnes, 20 November 1918, GSC). In Queer Phenomenology, Ahmed (2006) interrogates 
how the philosophical tradition relies on the writing table and the gendered division of 
work spaces invested in such platforms and then forgotten in publication; she argues 
however that, in moments of failed extension or “non-use” (49), subjects can become 
conscious of these relations and forge new understandings of objects. The Division 
                                                          
56 Full responsibilities were outlined in the Stenographic Section of the Clerical Division: 
1. Section undertakes dictation and typing of all letters, and the typing of all manuscript 
copy, required by Anthropological Division. 
2. Dictation and typing of all letters and the typing of minor manuscript copy (less than 5 
pages of typewritten manuscript—foolscap size), undertaken without Requisition. 
3. Manuscript of Memoirs and other work of similar nature accepted for copying by the Head 
Stenographer on presentation of a Requisition signed by the author and countersigned by his 
Chief of Division. 
4. All requests for stenographic assistance must be made to Head Stenographer. 
5. HS will provide a Stenographer or Clerk, on presentation of Authorized Requisition, for 
work done in office requiring clerical assistance. 
(Sapir to Brock, 27 July 1914, GSC) 
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experienced such a failure of extension during this period of wartime cutbacks, and 
through its disorientation other relations come into view. The typewriter emerged as a tool 
both for the reproduction of a standard as for reproducing a gendered division of office 
work, but from the failure of these expected operations grew a recognition of the 
stenographer’s important work, upon which the Division relied. The labour of these 
stenographers, whose diligent hands are omitted from histories of linguistics in favour of 
the phonetician’s deft ears, were nonetheless instrumental in bringing their objectives 
closer to fruition. 
. . . 
13. 1916. On the Transit of Time Perspective.  
From the beginning of his time with the Survey, Sapir was occupied with comparative 
schemes. He early on presented new data on the linguistic relationship between Kwakiutl 
and Nootka (1910 Annual Summary Report, GSC), but the effort of reconstructing an 
unattested language akin to Proto–Indo-European was beyond the scope of one man, even 
one as talented as Sapir. In the nineteenth century, comparative philology succeeded in 
part because Indo-European already possessed vast corpora of written records. In North 
America, the task of linguistic reconstruction required first the migration of orature into 
analyzable text—a consolidated effort on the part of this network of scholars, fieldworkers, 
informants, and stenographers, with their tools and standards—which would take years. 
Sapir was invested in the extension of comparative linguistics to American languages, and 
he shared his eagerness to reconstruct a distant prehistory of Indigenous peoples with his 
fellow ethnologists, but the latter were not always amenable to these linguistic methods. 
Sapir observed that, where Boas’s interests in ethnology were predominately historical, his 
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interest in linguistics was the opposite: “merely descriptive or ‘psychological,’ hardly at all 
historical or reconstructive” (to Radin, 3 March 1913, GSC). Between 1913 and 1920, 
comparative work consumed Sapir’s attention (Darnell 2009: 108), culminating in his 
sketch of the proto-language “Na-Dene” (1915), his instructional essay on “Time 
Perspective” (1916), and his reduction of North American language families to six super-
stocks in “A Bird’s Eye View of American Languages North of Mexico” (1921).57 The 
wartime slump, coupled with the loss of the Victoria Memorial Museum Building to 
Parliament, delayed the lateral movements of the Division’s collection and display 
activities; these conditions also encouraged Sapir’s attention to drift to the linguistic 
material gathered, resuming his speculations and taking lines of flight into the deep past. 
In addition to the five geographic areas he instituted, Sapir wanted to develop a 
relative chronology based on linguistic, cultural, and archaeological evidence for the transit 
of the First Peoples of North America. Buoyed by Kroeber’s announcement of two large 
language families in California (Dixon & Kroeber 1913), and its becoming “daily clear that 
there is an Uto-Aztecan unity as sure as Indo-Germanic,”58 Sapir tasked his colleagues to 
prove more relationships between “so-called independent linguistic stocks” (to Radin, 3 
March 1913, GSC); he called for a reduction of Powell’s taxonomy or, as he once called it, 
the “slaughter of linguistic families” (to Radin, 18 July 1913, GSC). Powell’s classification of 
58 stocks was insufficient for the work of linguistic reconstruction, but it had its supporters 
among Boasians and at the Bureau of American Ethnology (Darnell 2009: 115). Sapir was 
                                                          
57 “A Bird’s Eye View” was a one-page summary based on the talk he delivered at the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science in 1920. A full version appeared in Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929a). 
58 Sapir’s “reconstruction of Proto–Uto-Aztecan . . . in 1913 was the first systematic application of Indo-
European methods to a North American language family” (Darnell 2009: 112). 
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sensible to this resistance, recognizing that Boas opposed the establishment of “larger 
linguistic groups of a genetic character” and preferred, in accordance with Powell, to 
believe in an “almost unlimited number of distinct stocks” (to Radin, 10 June 1913, GSC). 
Sapir postulated that more Indigenous languages were related than he could ever credibly 
demonstrate: “Language is conservative, of course, but conservatism is only a matter of 
degree, not an absolute fact” (to Radin, 10 June 1913, GSC). However, knowing the burden 
of proof was on their end, Sapir proceeded carefully in his hypotheses and advised his 
collaborators to be similarly circumspect.59 When Radin, who was studying the languages 
of Mexico, presented evidence of a relationship between Otomi and Mixtec-Zapotec based 
solely on comparative vocabularies, Sapir urged him to look further, exploring their 
morphological characteristics as well: “While remotely related languages may have 
diverged very considerably in morphological respects, still, if they are related at all, 
fundamental points of comparison can generally be found”; Sapir himself was “reluctant to 
embark on lexical comparisons before [he had] justified this procedure to [him]self by 
ascertaining the presence of such fundamental morphological similarities, even if they are 
rather vague in character”(to Radin, 18 July 1913, GSC). Sapir’s own research on the 
possible linguistic affiliation among Athabascan, Haida, and Tlingit, thence considered 
independent stocks, followed from these principles. His (1915) article introducing “Na-
                                                          
59 For example, Sapir was cautious about introducing his evidence that the languages spoken by the Yurok 
and Wishosk [Wiyot], in California, were related to the distant Algonquian: “I have found some astonishing 
points of contact, lexically and morphologically, between these, particularly Wishosk, and another well known 
linguistic stock, which I shall not mention at present because I am certain to be laughed at for my pains. . . . 
Suffice it to say that I am either on the wildest goose chase I have ever indulged in, or else about to land 
something decidedly revolutionary” (to Speck, 18 July 1913, GSC). He confided more in Radin, in a letter sent 
off the same day: “Please treat this information as strictly confidential, as, should it turn out that I have been 
hasty, I will present a rather sorry picture” (to Radin, 18 July 1913, GSC). The hypothesis would put him into 
conflict with his contemporary Truman Michelson, a comparativist at the Bureau of American Ethnology. 
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Dene” presented detailed evidence of their likely genetic relationship based on systematic 
comparisons of their morphology, vocabulary, and phonology.60 
The realization of the Na-Dene proto-language was not a momentary insight, but the 
work of years. As with other ventures, Sapir employed his fieldworkers as extensions of his 
apparatus and drew on published material from his network of scholars (for example 
Boas’s work on Athabascan, for which the latter would disapprove). The process of 
gathering evidence began with early efforts to classify Athabascan tribes for the Survey: 
“my primary idea was to base this classification on linguistic evidence as deduced from 
fairly extensive vocabularies and test grammatical questions, and on information obtained 
by direct enquiry as to the exact tribal boundaries of the various groups of Indians you 
might come in contact with or hear about” (Sapir to Teit, 21 December 1912, GSC). The 
potential affiliation, however, remained on Sapir’s mind: “I have been rummaging around 
of late in one or two problems of linguistic relationships. You already know that I have 
pretty substantial evidence to show that Athabascan, Haida, and Tlingit are genetically 
related” (Sapir to Speck, 18 July 1913, GSC). During his 1914 fieldwork, Sapir found a 
moment to investigate the matter for himself, putting his fine-tuned ear to work where his 
proxies had failed him: “I was very proud to learn that Tlingit proves as you [Radin] say to 
have a well-marked development of tones, as in the hour or so that I spent with Shortridge 
I succeeded in determining this matter as a problem to be worked out. It seems astonishing 
                                                          
60 Sapir tried to preserve the Native point-of-view with this name: “The name that I have chosen for the stock, 
Na-dene, may be justified by reference to no. 51 of the comparative vocabulary.  ‘Dene,’ in various dialectic 
forms, is a wide-spread Athabaskan term for ‘person, people’; the element *-ne (*-n, *-ŋ) which forms part of 
it is an old stem for ‘person, people’ which, as suffix or prefix, is frequently used in Athabaskan in that sense. 
It is cognate with H[aida] na ‘to dwell; house’ and T[lingit] na ‘people.’ The  compound term ‘Na-dene’ thus 
designates by means of native stems the speakers of the three languages concerned, besides continuing the 
use of the old term Dene for the Athabaskan branch of the stock” (1915: 558). 
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that Swanton could ever have missed it. . . . It is somewhat irritating to find that so much of 
our linguistic work has to be done over again all the time” (to Radin, 28 November 1914, 
GSC). Confident in the features of these languages, Sapir more readily asserted a potential 
genealogy of the Na-Dene family: 
Tlingit and Athabascan are related in far more than general morphological 
respects, as I shall show in a rather elaborate paper that I am now preparing. 
It seems clear to me now that Haida, though undoubtedly related to both 
Tlingit and Athabascan, stands rather on a side, having developed special 
peculiarities of its own. In spite of this, however, I believe that it comes rather 
nearer the original phonetic system characteristic of the mother tongue of the 
three groups than either Tlingit or Athabascan.  
(Sapir to Radin, 28 November 1914, GSC) 
Linguistic reconstruction thus served as a tool to read the movements of people across time 
and space, here suggesting the historical divergence of Na-Dene language groups. These 
techniques were yet rarefied within a North American ethnological context—indeed, their 
veracity was mistrusted by anthropologists like Boas who lacked training in Indo-European 
methods, and so Sapir decided to commit these principles of historical reconstruction to 
print in his paper on “Time Perspective” in 1916.61  
                                                          
61 Ironically, the science of language dedicated to the tracing of movement confronted its own crisis of 
translation. Sapir complained of the “slovenly manner” of the French reprint of “Time Perspective”: it was 
“perfectly clear to me as I read along that violence was being done by the translator to the genius of the 
French language and, more important than this, that the meaning of the original version had in many 
instances been completely missed” (Sapir to McConnell, 19 July 1917, GSC). However, it was impossible 
within their budget to hire a permanent translating staff (McConnell to Sapir, 2 August 1917, GSC). 
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Reconstruction was not limited to the purview of linguistics but was a mode of 
inquiry that incorporated an array of differential evidence. In “Time Perspective,” Sapir 
sought to codify its variegated forms in addition to eking out a place for linguistic 
reconstruction as an indispensable tool of historical science.62 Here, Sapir rejected the 
inclination within “folk psychology” to treat Indigenous peoples as a blank canvass on 
which to project generalized statements about human nature, or to see them as “less 
encumbered by secondary or untypical developments” (1), merely because they lacked the 
written documentation of their Western counterparts. The question, for anthropologists, 
became how to derive a relative chronology from the jumble of historical information they 
assembled; an absolute chronology, with certain dates, was unlikely, given the constraints 
of the material (3). For them, it was therefore a problem of translating a “two-dimensional 
photographic picture of reality into the three-dimensional picture which lies back of it” (2). 
Was it even “possible to read time perspective into the flat surface of American culture?” In 
Sapir’s view, the history of Native cultures should not be envisioned as static in the way the 
metaphor of the photograph suggested; it was comparable, rather, to a “long-exposure star 
chart,” where “immensities of space are indeed reduced to a flat, but in which the extent 
and direction of movement of nearer bodies, the planets, are betrayed by short lines” (8). 
The “nearer bodies,” in this case, manifested in the different methodologies invoked to 
draw these lines.  
                                                          
62 Sapir forwarded a draft to Clark Wissler, Curator of Anthropology at the American Museum of Natural 
History, to get a sense of its reception: “I am particularly impressed with the linguistic part of your paper 
which seems to me the strongest and most important contribution. . . . Personally, I should very much like to 
see linguistic studies demonstrate their usefulness in the solution of more general problems. As it stands now, 
it is extremely difficult to convince an outsider that linguistic work leads to anything outside of its own 
special problems” (Wissler to Sapir, 9 February 1916, GSC). 
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Sapir gathered evidence into two categories: the direct, which overtly suggested 
temporal relations, and the indirect, from which temporal sequence might be inferred (5). 
Direct included documentary evidence from the past 400 years of contact, Native testimony 
through tribal history regarding the relative sequence of events, or stratified archaeological 
relics (strictly speaking inferential, but reliable enough to be considered direct, he noted). 
Indirect evidence was drawn from the other three subfields of Boasian analysis—physical 
anthropology, cultural ethnology, and linguistics—as well as geographic distribution, and 
each was accompanied by Sapir’s cautions. Physical evidence, for example via skeletal 
remains, could evoke population density and, with corollary proof, suggest the length of 
stay in a given region. Ethnological evidence depended on the notion of “cultural seriation”: 
simpler cultural elements that belonged to several tribes were often interpreted as having 
a greater age than the more complex (for example, a simple carved totem versus more 
elaborate poles). Additionally, the number of associations accumulated around cultural 
elements could also help determine their relative age (for example, the more entrenched an 
association, likely the older the cultural element in question). Attention to geographic 
distribution traced the diffusion of cultural elements with more accuracy, but geographic 
contiguity itself (for instance, the five cultural areas of Canada) was descriptive and not 
necessarily historical in character. Finally, linguistic evidence could help to date cultural 
elements through comparative grammar and vocabulary, especially place names, and the 
geography of linguistic stocks. Sapir contended that language was less susceptible to the 
looping effects that influenced ethnological data, since language was a “more unified” 
complex than culture, lacking the “disturbing force of rationalization” which “distorts” the 
latter (52). Since language change occurred at a slower pace than cultural and was less 
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likely to enter into the “field of consciousness,” it proved to be the more reliable: language 
was the “most perfectly self-contained” human system (53). Reflecting later on the 
outcomes of historical science, Sapir wrote:  “whereas in natural sciences, . . . the value of 
phenomena lies in that they lead to general concepts or ‘laws’, in the historical sciences 
‘laws’ have whatever value they possess because they proceed from phenomena.” 
Historical science dealt with “more or less arbitrarily selected subject matter” so the 
“causal nexus of things can not be rigidly followed out” (to Lowie, 23 July 1917, GSC). In 
“Time Perspective,” Sapir presented a kaleidoscopic approach for determining these laws, 
but linguistic reconstruction, in his mind, was the methodology best equipped to mitigate 
circumstantial factors and bring close these distant movements. Linguistics was a historical 
science in its discovery of the “laws” of language change, but its methods were more akin to 
those of the natural sciences. 
Despite the care and clarity through which he presented his thoughts, Sapir’s dream 
of popularizing historical linguistic methods was deeply unpopular among some of his 
colleagues. Radin had proved to be a trusted confidante and sounding board on this subject, 
but that trust would reach its limits when Radin’s overzealous efforts would compromise 
Sapir’s campaign and ultimately provoke his ire. From the outset, Sapir had to check his 
friend’s enthusiasm; the latter had early on held the belief that the languages of Mexico 
were all related, which would have been “the most epoch-making generalization yet made 
in American linguistics” if it could be proved true (Sapir to Radin, 28 November 1914, GSC). 
Sapir had his doubts and presented contrary evidence on the matter, but Radin was yet 
determined to make his mark: “As you surmised, I take the greatest pride in my 
introduction and the speculative-historical method used. While I fully realize the danger 
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inherent in such a method, I think that when developed in connection with certain concrete 
data as I have done, it is likely to be more suggestive and of greater value than general 
theoretical discussions a la Goldenweiser and Lowie” (Radin to Sapir, 23 December 1914, 
GSC). In 1919, Radin published a paper that proposed all Indigenous languages of North 
America were related through twelve linguistic stocks, a premature declaration based on 
dodgy evidence that endangered Sapir’s assiduous work (but probably led to his 
clarification of six super-stocks in 1921).63  
This misstep coincided with a period of growing dissent between Sapir and Boas on 
the subject of genetic relationships and the place of linguistic reconstruction therein. Not 
long before Radin’s controversial publication, Sapir was previewing his evidence for the 
relationship between Tsimshian and Chinook, two Indigenous languages of the Pacific 
Northwest (to Boas, 19 July 1918, GSC). The presentation fell on deaf ears, for Boas was 
immediately resistant to the hypothesis, believing a diffusionist interpretation just as likely 
as the “assumption of genetic differentiation,” in which they descended from the same 
stock (to Sapir, 22 July 1918, GSC).64 Sapir aired his frustrations in a letter to Boas: 
Linguistic differentiation takes place in time, not in space, and there is no end 
of opportunity for all kinds of very special dialectic developments. . . . I must 
confess that I have always had a feeling that you entirely overdo 
psychological peculiarities in different languages as presenting insuperable 
obstacles to genetic theories, and that, on the other hand, you are not 
                                                          
63 For more on the “Radian fiasco,” see Darnell (2009: 118–121). 
64 For more on the difference between diffusionist and genetic approaches, see Darnell (2001: 51–61). In 
essence, Boas’s training in geography placed an emphasis on spatial distribution (with such mechanisms as 
diffusion and migration) in order to reconstruct temporal lines, whereas Sapir’s philological training was the 
inverse, preferring to establish genetic relationships through the suggestion of time depth. 
97 
 
specially impressed by the reality of the differentiating processes, phonetic 
and grammatical, that have so greatly operated in linguistic history all over 
the world. 
(Sapir to Boas, 26 July 1918, GSC) 
The disagreement reached its apogee when Boas singled out Sapir, Kroeber, Dixon, and 
“particularly Radin” in an article for American Anthropologist (1920), expressing his 
renewed skepticism toward linguistic reconstruction. About that article, Sapir reflected: 
“his whole approach is so different from mine and from that of the vast majority of 
linguistic students that the attempt to argue about the theoretical basis can only result in 
mutual irritation. . . . His wholesale use of the idea of diffusion must also strike anyone that 
has had real experience with the brass tacks of linguistic history as rather absurd” (to 
Lowie, 15 February 1921, GSC). Sapir continued to speculate upon historical linguistics. Of 
note was his dizzying dream of finding comparisons between Na-Dene and Indo-Chinese: 
“evidence accumulates so fast that it is hard to sit down and give an idea” (Sapir to Kroeber, 
21 October 1921, ALK). However, with the battleground so thorny, and his allies’ 
contribution so unreliable, it became a dream he kept to himself, out of reach of those he 
worried would misapprehend it. 
  . . . 
14. 1918. On Economies of Authenticity. 
With their wartime budget meted out so frugally and the display hall still absorbed by 
legislature, the Anthropological Division had to economize, in various ways, to endure 
these privations. At first, there was an economy of space: the floor adjacent to the Museum 
drafting room had to be partitioned into offices, which cut into storage facilities (Sapir to 
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McConnell, 25 January 1915, GSC). These conditions only worsened over time: “We are 
getting terribly cramped for room in our anthropological hall, which, owing to the [Centre 
Block] fire, now includes exhibition space, offices, and storage both for our own 
department and for one or two others” (Sapir to Speck, 23 November 1916, GSC). 
Following this constriction was a litany of unfilled requisitions: among them, five sections 
of bookcases (“badly needed”), one paper cutter (“badly needed”), a telephone in the Hall 
of Canadian Anthropology (“badly needed”), two steel filing cabinets, one steel cabinet with 
six draws for filing photographs, needed as soon as possible (Sapir to McInnes, 10 
November 1916, GSC). The stringent allowance of paper was particularly significant, 
requiring the Division to find other venues to promote their work. Sapir reached out to 
Clark Wissler, at the American Museum of Natural History, to print their anthropological 
research: “The war has cut right and left into all expenditures of a non-economic nature” 
(Sapir to Wissler, 25 January 1918, GSC). Sapir had secured consent from the Deputy 
Minister to transfer publication of scientific manuscripts to other institutions, provided the 
Survey received proper credit. The reply was negative: “I fear we are not much better off, 
for the cost of printing has risen more than fifty percent which alone cuts down our output 
very materially” (Wissler to Sapir, 28 January 1918, GSC). Anthropology everywhere was 
made to retrench. 
 Museum activities did not come to a complete halt in Ottawa. Besides truncated 
collection work, the staff provided a special exhibit on Indigenous handicrafts for the 
Central Canadian Exhibition (1917 Annual Summary Report, GSC), an annual fair which 
began in 1888. This project inspired Sapir to associate the Division with a more lucrative, 
and hence impactful, branch of the government. Late in 1917, he proposed to Duncan 
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Campbell Scott that the Department of Indian Affairs might encourage Native industries 
within Canada, putting an emphasis on their disappearing handicrafts. The endeavour 
would dovetail with the interests of anthropological research, maintaining a line of 
traditional knowledge among younger generations: progressive contact with European 
culture diminished interest in “what is relatively crude or barbaric in their culture, but also 
for what is of distinct merit and worthy of preservation,” Sapir asserted. He conceived that 
schools could be run under the direction of elderly men and women from the tribes: 
“nothing would tickle an old basket maker more than to receive an impression that an 
order had gone out from Government headquarters to some school in the neighborhood to 
the effect that she was to teach the girls of her own tribe the details of an art that she loves 
and knows so well.” It would be a practical endeavour and “heartening from a moral 
standpoint,” which he hoped Scott would not dismiss as “mere sentimentality,” and also 
contribute to a “distinctively Canadian industrial growth.” There was already a large 
market for these wares, and Sapir saw no reason why handicrafts could not be “rescued” 
from the “category of mere tourists’ curios and raised to that of industrially and 
aesthetically desirable objects” (to Scott, 20 December, 1917, GSC). Smith had already 
taken an interest in the pedagogical and commercial aspects of anthropological work.  
In their comparison of U.S. and Canadian commodity culture, Kathy M’Closkey and 
Kevin Manuel (2006) examine efforts to commercialize Indigenous handicrafts across the 
twentieth century, arguing that this work of inclusion precipitated efforts to assimilate 
First Peoples into a nationalist project. They locate such “commercial othering” (227)65 
                                                          
65 What Sarah Ahmed (2000) calls “stranger fetishism”: “consumer culture is one site in which becoming 
other is offered to Western subjects through the commodity form ('stranger fetishism'). Such commodities 
are assumed to contain the difference of stranger culture” (125; emphasis in original). 
100 
 
within Canada’s emerging tourism industry which began after the First World War and 
flourished mid-century. Certainly, Sapir’s proposal anticipated these ventures, but 
economies had always been crucial to the work of the Anthropological Division. In addition 
to paid informants, their research depended on a circuit of production and exchange of 
cultural artifacts. Chief Gibson’s initial attachment to the Survey had been the collection of 
Iroquois cultural specimens: he had found “a real one piece pine canoe” for one or two 
people, painted red, and a hundred-year-old canoe with a crack at the bottom that could be 
fixed (Gibson to Sapir, 18 September 1911, GSC), for which Sapir was happy to remunerate. 
Out of these transactions, authenticity soon became subject to the laws of supply and 
demand: “it is very hard to get the old relics but we bought some old ones and some made 
by order new” (Gibson to Sapir, 26 September 1911, GSC). The Division was satisfied to 
commission what it could not find, within an economy that transmuted the new into the 
old. Sapir sought to acquire other such new old-fashioned wares: for example, “an old-type 
Nootka canoe” for $30.00 (to McConnell, 18 December 1914, GSC), which was preferable to 
new canoes that had undesirable modern features such as nails and oarlocks. As objects of 
science, these specimens held “no commercial value” (Sapir to Speck, 23 July 1913, GSC),66 
yet their circulation relied nonetheless upon an assignation of a price forgotten except on 
the accountant’s ledger. The salvage paradigm depended on the attribution of authenticity 
through intimate relations with the distant past. However, where intimacy failed, economy 
filled the breach. 
 Discussion of the handicrafts initiative intensified in 1918. Scott forwarded Sapir a 
letter from Thomas Deasy, an Indian Agent in British Columbia, who wanted to take charge 
                                                          
66 This statement was made in the context of delivering artifacts across customs. 
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of the business, provided it received the DIA’s support: “If the Department decides to assist 
Indians to manufacture basketry, totem poles, leather and fur work, and provides them 
means of continuing work in winter months, I would be pleased to have charge of this 
work.” Deasy advised that a large city like Vancouver or Toronto would make an ideal site. 
The business itself required an investment of $5000, which would cover 500 baskets, 200 
pieces of black slate carvings, and the purchase of Reverend G.H. Haley’s collection of 
“curios”—all of which would be sold at a profit, Deasy assured. He compared the prospects 
of such an industry to the situation in Alaska, which benefited from similar merchandising, 
especially during the summer months from tourism along the Pacific Coast. Deasy openly 
endorsed their exploitative model, citing how dealers in Alaska paid the Haida little for 
totem poles and basketry but made significant revenue. He concluded: “A store, of the kind 
proposed, would also be a ‘museum’” (Deasy to Scott [cc: Sapir], 4 May 1918, GSC). Sapir 
disagreed, perceiving that Deasy was more invested in the “disposition of private 
collections” than in the “encouragement of native industries”: “I should not imagine, 
however, judging from the general tone of his letter, that he would be as good a man for the 
general management of this work as Mr. Teit” (to Scott, 18 May 1918, GSC). The latter of 
whom was a more “suitable and energetic man” (Sapir to Teit, 21 March 1918, GSC), 
knowledgeable about handicrafts and popular with the local population. The handicrafts 
venture appeared to flounder, taken up again only in 1927 when Barbeau co-conducted 
another exhibit (M’Closkey & Manuel, 231). Sapir’s efforts to combine science and industry 
approached realization, but the two never met.67 Scientific integrity proved to have too 
poor of an exchange rate. 
                                                          
67 In the meantime, Smith spearheaded a less ambitious project of creating prints based on Indigenous design: 
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. . . 
❖ Retraction (the Denouement): 1919–1924 
15. 1920. On Genteel Spies. 
Economy was not the only factor torqueing the work of the Division. Throughout his 
appointment in Ottawa, Sapir had to negotiate his scientific identity within the margins of 
civil service, leveraging a belief in the purity of scientific research against the realities of 
being employed as a state scientist. The providence of the Geological Survey both enabled 
and constrained what he could and could not say: he had to be reminded, for instance, that 
“public addresses by officers of the Department” should meet the approval of the Minister 
of Mines first (McInnes to Sapir, 21 March 1918, GSC). While attached to the Dominion 
Government, Sapir was also put into contact with a culture stranger than any he would 
encounter in the field: bureaucracy. The dissonance resounded most powerfully in 1920, 
when a scientific monograph that Barbeau had prepared on the Hurons of Lorette, Quebec, 
was pulled into House politics, precipitating a crisis in the Division members’ status as civil 
servants and their self-perception as scientists. 
This controversy encompassed not what was said, but how it was repeated. On 23 
June 1920, in a debate over assimilationist policy in the House of Commons, Barbeau’s 
report was quoted out of context in support of an argument for “compulsory 
                                                          
Smith tried to prove that we could help pay the Canadian war debt by commercially utilizing 
prehistoric Indian designs. As a result of much discussion and voluminous correspondence 
he has prepared an album of prehistoric Canadian designs which is intended to serve as an 
artistic and industrial stimulus to Canadian designers and manufacturers. This album will 
probably be the first publication of our anthropological series to break our long silence. 
(Sapir to Mechling, 15 July 1919, GSC) 
The work was later published as a Museum Bulletin entitled “An Album of Prehistoric Canadian Art” (Smith 
1923), after wartime restrictions had abated. In Sapir’s preface, he spoke to the potential of this collection for 
“invigorating” Western art, which had “so frequently been degraded to lifeless clichés” (lii). Scientists were to 
blame, he intimated, for neglecting the industrial potential of this art in favour of its scientific virtues. 
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enfranchisement.” Sapir heard from Teit that “this evidence had been quoted in the House 
as typical of Indian reserves in general” when it applied strictly to the situation in Lorette. 
Though Sapir could only find one passage cited in the official transcripts, and it did “not go 
as far as [he] had thought,” the impression it “undoubtedly” created “could not but be 
prejudicial to the Indians.” 68 He continued: “I understand from Teit that there were other, 
more misleading references to your report, but he has not been able to find them for me as 
yet. Under the circumstances I do not think that I shall make a formal protest to either the 
Director of the Geological Survey or Mr. Scott himself” (Sapir to Barbeau, 16 July 1920, 
GSC). Even though Sapir declined to lodge an official complaint, the consequences of this 
breach of trust reverberated in unofficial circuits: 
All the same I wish once more to make it perfectly clear that there are to be 
no communications touching Indian affairs sent to the Department of Indian 
Affairs without the consent of the proper authorities within the Geological 
Survey, nor is any money to be accepted from the Department of Indian 
Affairs except with the express permission of these same authorities. I hate to 
                                                          
68 Sapir attached a copy of the transcript for Barbeau. John Harold is the speaker: 
‘Although in most respects the Lorette half-breeds have been Europeanized, the fact that 
they do not enjoy the rights and duties of citizenship in many cases dwarfs their moral sense and 
feeling of responsibility. An undue prolongation of such tutelage leads to mendacity and other vices. 
Many of the best Lorette people, besides, chafe under the restrictions and humiliation resulting from 
their being officially treated as “savages.” 
 Those gifted with initiative, who want to start in business, find themselves hampered by 
their legal status. As long as a Huron lives exclusively on the reserve he has no existence in the eyes 
of banking and business concerns; for he is exactly in the position of persons under age. The bank 
manager, Notaire Cyrille Renaud, said to us: “Although they may be reliable and have money or 
property, they are unexistent when they live on the reserve.” 
 According to many statements, real property on the reserve is reduced to about one-third of 
less of its normal value, if compared with property situated in the immediate vicinity. As on the 
reserve, the owner may sell only to another member of the band, and as there is very little demand 
for more property, the price of purchase is very low.’ 
(Barbeau qtd. in House of Commons Debate, 23 June 1920 [Sapir to Barbeau, 16 July 1920, GSC]) 
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make this rule explicit, but I am afraid that if we do not follow it very literally, 
we will find ourselves drifting into the position of genteel spies for the 
Department of Indian Affairs. We cannot afford to be misunderstood by any 
Indians in Canada. 
(Sapir to Barbeau, 16 July 1920, GSC) 
The threat of perceived collusion, or indeed the actual occurrence of it, shook Sapir’s faith 
in the office; he was straining against the seams of civility.69 The same department whose 
alliance he’d solicited had turned against him. Sapir’s hope of disentangling scientific 
research from the political structure upon which it depended, a balancing act requiring 
careful spacing, had abruptly collapsed. 
. . . 
16. 1921. On the Book Language 
Sapir was not an ardent proponent of standardization. He acquired knowledge of 
linguistics and anthropology within an apprenticeship model and, as we’ve seen, 
communicated his expertise through similarly private networks, leaving open a space for 
his pupils to strike out their own path. Kroeber chastised him for this very attitude: “The 
decadence of linguistics is largely your own fault. You’re an individualist and haven’t built 
up a school. Do something general in character” (to Sapir, 4 November 1917, GSC). Amidst 
                                                          
69 Despite misgivings between their departments and other philosophical disagreements, Scott and Sapir 
maintained a civil correspondence, each belonging to the belletristic milieu of the gentleman-scholar: on 
various occasions, Sapir passed manuscripts of his poetry to Scott, which he read with pleasure (Scott to 
Sapir, 15 April 1918; 7 May 1919; 12 January 1922, GSC). Sapir also commented on an early production of the 
Carroll Aikins play The God of Gods, at Scott’s behest; Sapir complimented the play for its literary merits, but 
was highly critical of its haphazard presentation of Indigeneity: “the proper thing to do is not to trim the play 
to a supposed Indian background but to throw all cultural realism ruthlessly to the winds. Mr. Aikins will not 
succeed, without much thankless labor, in making his play Indian; if he tries too hard, he will spoil his 
conception. What he should do is to remove every word and reference that points to a specific primitive 
background” (Sapir to Scott, 22 January 1922, GSC). 
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the growing disparity between himself and other Boasians on subjects linguistic, Sapir 
perhaps began to recognize the truth of Kroeber’s assertion and the value of a disciplinary 
base, even while he remained committed to an interdisciplinary synthesis that 
characterized much of his work, at this and later stages of his career. He reflected on the 
importance of having fieldworkers trained specifically in linguistics: 
Secondly, you are quite right not to want to burden the ethnologists with 
linguistic work on the side, except, of course, where they work in out of the 
way places from which data are sparse. The majority of men not specially 
trained in language do poorly at this kind of work. Almost invariably the 
really essential things are missed. A good linguist can find out more, along 
certain lines, in five hours’ honest work than the average ethnologist in six 
months of weary questioning. 
(Sapir to Wissler, 3 October 1920, GSC)70 
Without belabouring the cliché: a good linguist was hard to find. Sapir set out to rectify this 
dearth and disseminate the methods of analysis he had cultivated and purveyed through 
                                                          
70 The earlier part of this paragraph elucidates Sapir’s view on the role of fieldwork within linguistics: 
My own experience in such matters is that an overhauling at first hand of work done by 
others is apt to be unexpectedly profitable. (I have only had a few hours all told at Haida, for 
instance, but you would be surprised to know how much of fundamental importance to Na-
dene was revealed in those hours. There is, after all, no substitute for direct impressions in 
linguistics. It is like art. In both fields one may talk a deal around the subject and, failing 
direct contact with the source, go far afield.) However, such rapid field reconnaissance 
would not entail too intensive work at many points. It would give point of view, perspective, 
vantage point from which to evaluate what is already more or less adequately recorded [on 
Polynesian linguistics]. 
(Sapir to Wissler, 3 October 1920, GSC) 
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private networks, culminating in the publication of Language in 1921.71 It would serve as a 
crucial “boundary object,”72 negotiating the place of linguistics in relation to anthropology. 
The book belonged to a series of works that emerged over the 1920s to codify the 
principles of Boasian anthropology: “Language was immediately recognized as a Boasian 
paradigm statement, with its definition of language as a variable human resource inherent 
in the scope of anthropology, the training of anthropologists, and the commitment to 
record texts” (Darnell 2009: 96). However, Sapir’s focus was on introducing linguistics as a 
distinct tool of analysis, irrespective of its value to the other modules of Boasian analysis. 
He wanted the book “to serve as a stimulus for the more fundamental study of a neglected 
field” (iv). He presented the subject matter both for students of the discipline and for a 
general audience, an “outside public” who might otherwise dismiss language as an 
unscientific topic (iii). As a general audience book, it represented the culmination of his 
time in Ottawa as well as the vehicle of his escape from the diminishing returns of that post, 
a popular work that would make him appealing to the American university system as an 
instructor as well as a researcher (Darnell 2009: 105). To this end, he limited the use of 
technical terminology, omitted diacritics, and drew examples mainly from English, 
occasionally supplemented by other Indo-European and Indigenous languages. Throughout 
the book, Sapir resumed the argument introduced in “Time Perspective”: namely, that the 
value of language as an object of study depended “chiefly on the unconscious and 
unrationalized nature of linguistic structure” (iii). It was this criteria which distinguished 
                                                          
71 Darnell (2009: 96–106) provides a superior account of the book’s composition and immediate reception. 
72 Star and Griesemer (1989) define boundary objects as “both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the 
constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across 
site” (393). My use of the term emphasizes their ability to satisfy the needs of multiple groups. 
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the study of language as a field of inquiry, rendering it more primary than other 
methodologies within anthropology: “It is doubtful if any other cultural asset of man, be it 
the art of drilling for fire or of chipping stone, may lay claim to a greater age. I am inclined 
to believe that [language] antedated even the lowliest developments of material culture, 
that these developments, in fact, were not strictly possible until language, the tool of 
significant expression, had itself taken shape” (17). Speech required society (1), he 
maintained, yet linguistic systems themselves were recalcitrant to external force: 
“Language is probably the most self-contained, the most massively resistant of all social 
phenomena. It is easier to kill it off than to disintegrate its individual form” (170). In the 
same gesture, therefore, that his book realized the Boasian paradigm, Sapir began to 
demarcate the independence of linguistics therefrom. 
Language proceeded in Sapir’s programmatic style. It commenced with a review of 
ideas on the nature of language, stressing that speech is an acquired, non-instinctive, and 
social phenomenon, in contradistinction to theories which place its origin strictly in the 
physiological realm (akin to the development of walking), or somehow arising from 
guttural (interjections) or imitative (onomatopoeic) forms, both of which he argued are 
conventionalized despite appearances to the contrary. From there, the chapters unfolded 
from a discussion of the smallest unit of language (the individual speech sound) to the 
progressively larger (sound systems, the structure of words, the typology of disparate 
languages). With these basic principles of linguistics established, the latter chapters 
expounded on topics from historical linguistics: drift (the locus classicus of this concept), 
the discovery of phonetic laws, and the various mechanisms by which languages influence 
one another. The final chapters mapped out a field of potential correspondences between 
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language and other areas of human life, making similar cuts around language, race, and 
culture that Boas made in his introduction to the Handbook in 1911. Bookending this text 
were Sapir’s reflections on language and thought, his first ruminations over what would 
become the basis of linguistic relativity for his protégé Whorf. Sapir conceived of language 
as a “pre-rational . . . prepared road or groove” for thought (10–11), though the two were 
not “co-terminous” (10); at once an object of scientific and aesthetic interest, for Sapir 
language thus embodied the “collective art” of a culture (180), whose shared experiences 
became sedimented in grammatical processes over time. Although Sapir was agnostic to 
any theory of psychology at this moment (Darnell 2009: 99), his speculations on language 
and mind seemed to court psychology as another disciplinary fit and certainly prefigured 
his later work on language, culture, and personality. 
Sapir’s book was equal parts empirical and speculative. The concept of linguistic 
drift was perhaps his most conjectural and, for the purposes of my reading, also the most 
evocative. In its articulation he indirectly assailed the geographic focus of Boas’s 
diffusionist approach to language change:  
But language is not merely something that is spread out in space, as it were—
a series of reflections in individual minds of one and the same timeless 
picture. Language moves down time in a current of its own making. It has a 
drift. If there were no breaking up of a language into dialects, if each language 
continued as a firm, self-contained unity, it would still be constantly moving 
away from any assignable norm, developing new features unceasingly and 
gradually transforming itself into a language so different from its starting 
point as to be in effect a new language. New dialects arise not because of the 
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mere fact of individual variation but because two or more groups of 
individuals have become sufficiently disconnected to drift apart, or 
independently, instead of together. (123) 
So it was for language change—the secret work of “psychic undercurrents” transpiring 
over generations (151)—and so, on another and more immediate scale, might it be said of 
scientific change. The communities of practice that represented the four pillars of the 
Boasian synthesis would likewise split off and grow disconnected over time. Thomas 
Gieryn (1999) uses the image of a map to account for how epistemic authority is decided; 
he presents this development in agonistic terms, as a matter of conflict and resolution, with 
skirmishes occurring along the outermost borders of a stable centre: “The cultural space of 
science is a vessel of authority, but what it holds inside can only be known after the contest 
ends, when trust and credibility have been located here and not there. . . . The spaces in and 
around the edges of science are perpetually contested terrain” (15).73 When Sapir wrote 
Language, it was within the context of such epistemic boundary-work—an effort to put 
linguistics on the map, as it were. However, the arrival of Language did not index a climate 
of contest—few, then or now, challenged Sapir’s incredible facility with language—but one 
of drift. 74 For the science of language, the interior of this vessel was more akin to a sieve: 
boundaries were established less through the solid lines of fallings-out than in the falling-
through-the-cracks between dotted lines, in the elliptical space of a crumbling truth-spot, 
in the wake of drifting linguists. 
                                                          
73 Gieryn (1999) emphasizes that the location of “contests of credibility,” vital for guarding the boundaries of 
science, is less the vaunted space of the laboratory or the austere corridors of the ivory tower; rather, 
“authority is decided downstream” (27), in “courtrooms, boardrooms, and living rooms.” A crucial component 
of the epistemic authority of the sciences is thus its uptake, and at stake are the privileges of a confluence of 
power and knowledge that make such claims to authority possible. 
74 Few but not all: Pliny Goddard (1920) notably disputed Sapir’s Na-Dene hypothesis. 
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. . . 
17. 1922. On the Museum and Its Publics. 
Efforts for the Anthropological Division to establish a university curriculum ended in 1914 
and never resumed during Sapir’s time there. Other outreach programs persisted in the 
meantime, including participation in private clubs and associations such as the Ontario 
Historical Society (Sapir to Goldenweiser, 1 March 1913, GSC) and the Logan Club, which 
helped “to make the scientific activities of the Survey better appreciated by the local public” 
(Sapir to McConnell, 24 July 1917, GSC). These venues grew in importance with publication 
halted and the display hall occupied by Parliament, such that in 1920 the Division 
organized their own Anthropology Club of Ottawa, with Sapir as President and Smith and 
Secretary (Sapir to Scott, 16 February 1920, GSC). Even with the War concluded, austerity 
measures continued to strangle the activities of the Museum: 
I do not think I am exaggerating if I say that the Museum is less of an actual 
thing now than in the fall of 1910 when I joined the Survey. While Mr. Brock 
was Director everything was done to make the museum staff feel that it was 
getting somewhere, but since his departure things have been going from bad 
to worse. The war is a convenient excuse, no doubt, but those who know the 
works from the inside understand perfectly well that it is not likely that 
things would be very much better for us if there had never been a war. 
(Sapir to Lighthall, 10 April 1920, GSC) 
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In addition to the paucity of research, publication, and display, there were no new 
permanent hires. 75 The Division was having difficulties keeping their extant staff in 
“proper status” (Sapir to McIlwraith, 13 July 1921, GSC), and it was becoming clear that the 
Division would never recapture the optimism and productivity of its first four years of 
work. 76 
The situation had worsened such that staff formed a Museum Committee, with Sapir 
as chair, to petition the Minister’s office to obtain full control over the Victoria Memorial 
Museum Building and become a separate branch of the Department of Mines, coordinate 
with the Survey but with a separate budget. Sapir beseeched William Lighthall, a Canadian 
historian and member of the Royal Society of Canada,  to put forward a resolution to the 
Royal Society for their support, asking in plaintive tones: “Please remember always that we 
really have all the makings of a first class museum. . . . What we are suffering from is an 
acute case of wet blanket. Can you help remove the wet blanket?” (to Lighthall, 10 April 
1920, GSC). The Royal Society agreed to ratify the proposal for the establishment of an 
independent Canadian National Museum and presented the resolution to the proper 
authorities. In 1921, the Victoria Memorial Museum indeed became a separate division, 
with William McInnes put in charge (1921 Annual Summary Report, GSC). This 
restructuring made the Museum and Survey, on paper, separate entities—but they still 
                                                          
75 On publication, Sapir reported: “This failure to continue the Anthropological Series of memoirs and 
bulletins that was well under way before the war is due not to lack of material but to the present policy of 
rigid economy in publication expenditures. This policy, if continued in its present form, threatens to render all 
but useless the work of the Division of Anthropology except insofar as the department allows its 
anthropological manuscripts to be published by other institutions” (1921 Annual Summary Report: 21). 
76 Conditions were equally poor south of the border: “Conditions here are not by any means encouraging. 
Thus [sic?] Museum is rather restricting than expanding, and I fear that even as good a man as Lowie is not 
going to stay there. My department has been cut down to myself alone and the New School for Social Research 
is dropping more and more theoretical subjects. I think the outlook is not at all good at the present time." 
(Boas to Sapir, 28 September 1920, GSC). 
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shared much the same staff and facilities and, most importantly, a bottom line (Zaslow 
1975: 354). The new Director of the Geological Survey, W.H. Collins, was a geologist and 
did not consider the Museum integral to the Survey’s budget, leaving it ultimately “strained 
for funds” under his management (357).77 There was, nonetheless, a return to form. Smith, 
Wintemberg, Barbeau, and Waugh resumed fieldwork that summer, and Sapir occupied the 
majority of the year with linguistic research (1921 Annual Summary Report).  
 By 1921, Parliament had also departed from the Museum, and the building was once 
again the home of the Anthropological Division, excepting one hall now belonging to the 
National Gallery. A lack of suitable cases remained an impediment to establishing a 
permanent ethnological exhibition, but visitors were not impeded and returned in great 
numbers. A public lecture series was set in motion, with one series for adults and another 
for children. The series was supported by the Publicity Bureau of the Department of Trade 
and Commerce, which provided the operator and suitable film (1921 Annual Summary 
Report). A clipping from the Ottawa Citizen on 7 March 1921 indicated the success of 
public education program (Darnell 2009: 84). The series expanded in 1922, with lectures 
on various scientific topics in natural history, anthropology, and paleontology, including: 
hunting dinosaurs; asbestos or fire-proof cotton; animal life of the Pacific Coast islands; 
water power or white coal; Indians of the plains (taught by Jenness); modes of crossing 
Canada; the glacial age; pioneer days of British Columbia (by Barbeau); our Selkirk 
mountains and their precious metals; “Down the Mackenzie River to Their Oil Fields”; 
Northern Ontario’s natural resources; “My Summer in the Norway of Canada” (Smith); and 
boring deep wells for valuable minerals. The Museum was receiving visitors (and 
                                                          
77 Collins conceded, retrospectively, that the two entities should have been autonomous of each other. 
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appreciation) from around the world, McInnes reported, giving new purpose to the 
accumulation of collections: the educational value of the institution became a measure of 
“the cultural standing and progressive spirit of the country” (1922 Annual Summary 
Report, GSC). Linguistics still had little place in the display culture of the Museum or this 
new series of talks, and Sapir, though participating in some lectures, continued to work up 
linguistic material for publication in international journals, returning to form, as it were, 
elsewhere. 
. . . 
18. 1924. On Corporeality. 
In contrast to the textual work of philology, the task of fieldwork exposed bodies to the 
vicissitudes of uncertain spaces. The physical and psychological toll was a cause for 
concern and also a badge of pride. Half in jest, Sapir once worried that his friend Radin had 
“become a prey to [his] scientific zeal by getting [him]self murdered in some out-of-the-
way corner” (to Radin, 7 December 1912, GSC). Research environments were active 
agents—often tricksters, as §8 showed—in the work of the Anthropological Division, and 
they affected some agents more than others. Knowles, for one, had “another nervous 
breakdown” and needed to take a leave of absence (Sapir to Mechling, 15 July 1919, GSC); 
the following year, he tendered his resignation to the Geological Survey, per the advice of a 
nerve specialist he was seeing in Dublin, who “advise[d] [him] not to return to Canada on 
account of the severity of the climate and the fact that [he] ha[d] been so constantly in bad 
health there. . . . in Canada there would be the possibility of recurrence” (qtd. in McInnes to 
Sapir, 1 June 1920, GSC). There were few men qualified to take up Knowles’s position, most 
of whom were already employed at American institutions (Sapir to McInnes, 2 June 1920, 
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GSC), and so the Division lost its physical anthropologist. In 1924, Sapir’s prophecy was 
fulfilled. The Division lost another member when Waugh suddenly disappeared.78  
 
Figure 4. Waugh Missing (Sapir to Waugh, 15 November 1924, GSC) 
                                                          
78 His last written words: “P.S. Please send me about 4 more notebooks, the kind that open at the side” 
(Waugh to Sapir, 18 July 1924, GSC). 
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In the fall of that year, Sapir sent a telegraph to Waugh, inquiring with concern after 
the abrupt end of his colleague’s correspondence (9 October 1924, GSC). With no reply still, 
an investigation began. The initial hypothesis was that Waugh had arrived ill at the 
Caughnawaga [Kahnawake] Reserve outside Montréal, in the outlying parts, without 
officials being aware of it (Memorandum on Disappearance of Mr. F. W. Waugh, 5 
November 1924, GSC). Jenness and Richard Waugh, his son, left for Montréal to meet with 
the RCMP soon after; they found evidence that Waugh had indeed left for Kahnawake on 
September 20th with the intention of purchasing specimens, his suitcase and pack-bag 
having been taken from the Check-Room of Bonaventure Station in Montréal. As the notice 
for information circulated by the RCMP indicated, Waugh had perhaps tried to cross the 
Lachine Railway Bridge on his return and, presumably, there met his end. His whereabouts 
remained forever unknown; the man disappeared without a trace. However, his 
ethnological notes, photographs, and specimens from that summer spent with the 
Montagnais [Innu] on Sept-Îles, Quebec, were forwarded to Ottawa shortly before his 
disappearance (1925 Annual Summary Report, GSC). The man had yielded to corporeality, 
but his contribution to scientific research survived him. 
This chain of events recalls Rebecca Herzig’s (2005) formulation in Suffering for 
Science. Here, she describes the valorization of volitional suffering among scientific 
practitioners arising in late nineteenth-century America: researchers who submitted 
themselves to conditions of privation, asceticism, and self-experimentation for an 
“imagined, undying body of science” (7). It was a paradoxical mixture of power and 
vulnerability that followed along racialized, gendered, and economic lines, with only 
certain (white, masculine, educated) bodies valued for their suffering; the same hardships 
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endured by local informants, for example, demonstrated “native robustness” but served no 
higher purpose (80). In the case of the Anthropological Division, suffering made no such 
discernments; it was distributed evenly through the extremities of the Division’s network 
of personal and professional contacts. After Beuchat’s death when the Karluk sank, Sapir 
discovered that he had been entailing part of his salary for his ill mother; since Beuchat 
perished in service to the Survey, Sapir assumed that the full amount ($1500) would be 
paid out to her, and he rallied for the woman to receive a pension, as it was the duty of the 
Dominion Government, he believed, to provide for dependents of those lost in the pursuit 
of “scientific services” (to McConnell, 22 September 1914; 10 November 1914, GSC). Later, 
Sapir also hoped to commute the sentences of two Inuit men condemned to death and 
another to ten years in prison. He wrote to Jenness how these sentences were “rather 
unfair and absurd” and beseeched him to intervene: “inasmuch as you know more about 
the Eskimos and their practical psychology than anyone else in Ottawa, it would probably 
be a very advisable thing for you to write a pretty strong letter of protest to Department of 
Justice” (to Jenness, 25 October 1923, GSC). Jenness, however, saw no ground for a 
reprieve: “I am not at all sure in my own mind that the sentence ought not to be carried out. 
True, one of the prisoners is a young man; true also that the Copper Eskimos have only 
recently come within the jurisdiction of civilized laws. The fact remains, nevertheless, that 
murder has always been more or less rampant among them, for trivial causes, and means 
must be found to stop it” (to Sapir, 1 November 1923, GSC). For Sapir personally, the death 
of Florence Sapir, his wife, had the deepest impact. She had long ailed since arriving in 
Ottawa and, in 1923 and 1924, had twice to drain a lung abscess; infection set in the final 
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time, and a week afterwards she died (Darnell 2009: 135).79 Sapir had kept his personal 
and professional lives separate—“I think few of us realized how long she had been ill or 
knew that she had suffered so much” (Smith to Sapir, 24 April 1924, GSC)—but these were 
feelings he could not defer: “it will probably take some time before I can do scientific work 
with anything like relish” (Sapir to Boas, 19 May 1924, GSC). Sapir had capitulated much to 
this space, for the sake of an undying body of science, but it was the passing of nearer 
bodies that affected him the most intimately. 
. . . 
Conclusion. 1925. On Departures. 
Sapir left Ottawa on 23 September 1925, having accepted a position as Associate Professor 
of Anthropology at the University of Chicago. His departure was also a return: to the United 
States, to the academy, to the dream of research. For fifteen years, he had extended himself 
through the space assigned to him—Canada and the Geological Survey—but the setting did 
not fit. Sapir was replaced by Jenness as Chief Ethnologist for the Survey’s Anthropological 
Division, whose focus was on making the Museum appeal nationally, not globally; because 
Sapir left no students and ergo no legacy behind in Canadian Anthropology (Darnell 2009: 
191), the extension of the Boas’s paradigm was, as he predicted, discontinued. The same 
year saw Sapir’s increasing involvement in the newly founded Linguistic Society of 
America; there, he needed no longer to justify the primary assumptions of his field but 
found common ground with those who shared his scientific identity (for more, see Chapter 
2), enjoying the pleasures of disciplinarity. One of his final acts at the Museum, he 
published “Sound Patterns in Language” (1925) in the LSA’s journal Language, one of the 
                                                          
79 Darnell (2009: 132–137) provides a fuller account of Florence’s illnesses through their varying stages. 
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first articulations of the phoneme in North America, securing an object of study exclusively 
linguistic (for more, see Chapter 3). This newfound liberty was not independence—Sapir 
was still a part of Anthropology at Chicago and later cross-appointed in both Anthropology 
and Linguistics at Yale—but an autonomy founded on intimate distance: Sapir remained 
involved with anthropology but increasingly identified as a linguist in his career. 
Within this affective history set out in elliptical space, intimate distance manifested 
at different levels within the information-gathering network emplaced in the Victoria 
Memorial Museum: it traversed personal, institutional, professional, and epistemological 
grounds, negotiating the space between informants and ethnologists, between government 
agents and administration, between linguistics and anthropology, and more. Intimate 
distance was a way of managing what was in and out of reach, and in that way, it is perhaps 
a characteristic of any network. For the Anthropological Division, a relation of intimate 
distance negotiated the fears, setbacks, and contradictions that piled up alongside the data 
and artifacts brought in by this network of collectors, integral for balancing the 
compassionate and humanistic principles of Boasian anthropology inside the increasingly 
dehumanizing bureaucracy of the Survey. It helped Sapir and his colleagues to reach out 
into a space that was not theirs and, when they retracted their network from these lands, to 
defer the conditions of vulnerability that the salvage imperative continued to enact on the 
Indigenous informants from whom they extracted resources under the name of science. In 
the following chapters, I explore how intimate distance resurfaced in Sapir’s controversial 
disciple, the “amateur specialist” Benjamin Lee Whorf (Chapter 2), and in the epistemic 
tool that helped distinguish linguistics from anthropology, the phoneme (Chapter 3). 
. . . 
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~ 2 ~ 
“However steadfast one’s commitment to truth, there is no avoiding the noise.” 
—Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 2011 
 
“Once in a blue moon a man comes along—was not only a pioneer in linguistics. He was a 
pioneer as a human being—the most notorious of con men—an amateur specialist—
eminently worth rereading and pondering in these poststructuralist times—the nonsense 
that he unwittingly helped to foster is completely out of control—largely self-made, and with 
a dash of genius—for exercise, he enjoyed walking—often to be misunderstood and his 
theories denigrated on the basis of superficial readings—wrong, all wrong!—it is so easy for 
individuals or organizations of a somewhat crackpot nature . . . with all sorts of contexts 
added . . . do not know where it goes or how it is used . . .”80 
 
A Dash of Genius:  
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Scientific Belonging, and the Promise of Linguistics 
 
Introduction: Whorf—and the Noise. 
Edward Sapir arrived at Yale University in 1931 and promptly established his school of 
linguistics. There, he attracted new and former students—many from his intervening years 
at Chicago (1925–1931)—and, with their help, resumed the project of salvage linguistics. 
Together, they developed important concepts, practices, and training regimens for the 
science of language in America (see Chapter 3). Among his students, none was so quizzical 
as Benjamin Lee Whorf. A fire insurance inspector and talented amateur linguist, Whorf 
would, in the span of his short career (c.1928–1941), make his way to the centre of 
Americanist linguistics and become one of its most memorable—or most notorious—
                                                          
80 The epigraph—a composite of quotations about Whorf and his legacy (the last by the man himself)—
announces his uncertain position in the history of linguistics. Chase (1956: v); Lakoff (1987: 330); Deutscher 
(2010: 21); New York Times obituary (1941); Schultz (1990: 5); Pullum (1991: 161); Sapir to Kroeber (30 
April 1930); Carroll (1956: 22); Lee (1996: 14); Pinker (1994: 57); Whorf to Fassett (24 May 1940, BWP). 
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members. Whorf belonged to the tail-end of a long tradition of amateur contributions to 
linguistics and anthropology, but he is remembered today as either a maverick 
individualist or an abject failure. Rather than use the “dash of genius” to remark on Whorf’s 
exceptionalism, I employ the dash and Whorf to signal the dividing line that formed 
between amateur and specialist in linguistics during his lifetime. Where Chapter 1 showed 
how Sapir relied on a vast network of quasi-professionals to fulfill the knowledge-taking 
aims of the Geological Survey of Canada, this chapter considers through Whorf how that 
elliptical space solidified into a genealogical line of university researchers: linguists. Here, I 
analyze how the scientific identity of the “linguist” was institutionalized and became 
increasingly the possession of a white, male, middle-class, university-educated worker. 
This process of professionalization gradually excluded amateurs, on the one hand, and 
created circumscribed roles for Indigenous informants on the other.81 Whorf’s intellectual 
journey—as both a central and peripheral member of the institutions where these inchoate 
identity categories were worked out—reveals a calibration of the linguist’s subject position 
and also its limits. 
More than likely, if you have heard of Whorf at all, it has been as the second half of 
the so-called “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,” though there was never a collaboration between 
Whorf and his mentor, as such.82 The hypothesis suggests that the structure of the language 
we speak in some way influences the way we think or perceive—that we are guided, in our 
                                                          
81 My thinking is influenced by Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2015) who, in the context of Australian Aboriginal 
racial politics, argues that ethno-national identity categories are white possessions premised on the 
dispossession of Indigenous lands. I maintain that the American linguist’s scientific identity followed a similar 
route through the capture of Indigenous languages. 
82 Harry Hoijer appears to have coined the hyphenate at his presentation for the conference on Language in 
Culture, University of Chicago, March 23–27, 1953. Though contemporaries Ernst Carrier, Leo Weisgerber, 
and John Trier reached similar conclusions about language and thought in Europe, Hoijer contends that Sapir 
and Whorf took on special significance for their interest in American Indian linguistics (1954b: 93). 
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perception or recollection, by the routes that are most familiar to us through language. The 
history of this idea, broadly conceived, extends back at least to the seventeenth century, 
with efforts to employ linguistic difference to characterize and delineate modes of 
reasoning endemic to the major national languages of Europe (Leavitt 2010), as well as to 
eighteenth-century German thinkers Johann Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt (Koerner 
1992). Variations upon the concept, stressing lexical categories such as colour terms, arose 
in nineteenth-century philology and ethnology. For instance, William Gladstone, a classicist, 
was struck by Homer’s systematic description of a “wine-dark” sea and in turn drew 
conclusions about the limits of Ancient Greek colour perception (Deutscher 2010); later, 
Hugo Magnus developed an evolutionary sequence for the development of human vision 
based on analogous results (Schöntag & Schäfer-Prieß 2007). Despite a longstanding 
intellectual lineage, in the twentieth century the theory became anchored to Sapir and 
Whorf.83 Since then, it has proven to be one of the most enduring or virulent topics in 
linguistics, depending on one’s perspective: tested and debated (Hoijer 1954), reviewed 
and reconceived (Lakoff 1987, Slobin 1996, Lucy 1997, Gentner & Goldin-Meadow 2003), 
debunked (Pullum 1991; Pinker 1994, 2007), retested (Boroditsky 2001, Gilbert et al. 
2008), rebunked (Casasanto 2008), and redebunked (McWhorter 2014).  
 The attribution to Sapir and Whorf derives from a series of writings over the better 
part of four decades (Sapir 1921, 1924, 1927, 1929b, 1931; Whorf 1937, 1939, 1940a, 
1940b, 1941a, 1941b), including posthumous collections of Whorf’s published works and 
                                                          
83 On occasion, the hyphenate is expanded to include Dorothy Lee, a student of Kroeber and Lowie’s in 
California, who also worked on the subjects of language and worldview (Murray 1998: 24–25). 
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unpublished fragments and manuscripts (1952, 1956).84 Sapir’s devotion to the idea was 
secondary: though he encouraged Whorf, in his own works Sapir grew more interested in 
culture and personality, and employed the relationship of language and experience as a 
means to that end. Whorf, by contrast, was deeply invested in the concept. He came to an 
early instantiation of linguistic relativity (what he called “oligosynthesis”) independently, 
before he ever met Sapir, while studying the morphology of the Uto-Aztecan languages 
Nahuatl and Piman (1928a, 1928b, BWP). 85 He made efforts to pitch the idea to funding 
agencies and veteran scholars, to circulate it in letters and at conferences. Though he never 
articulated the hypothesis in full, fragments of his thought process appear scattered across 
these formal and informal settings. 86 It was not until over a decade after his death that 
these stray thoughts coalesced in an edited collection, assembled by friend and colleague 
Harry Hoijer.87 The Collected Papers on Metalinguistics (1952) republished three of his 
most widely distributed articles and became the basis for the 1953 conference on 
“Language in Culture.” Supported in part by a grant from the Ford Foundation, the 
conference served as a nexus of interdisciplinary exchange between anthropologists, 
psychologists, linguistics, and philosophers.88 The conference proceedings were published 
in reduced form the following year (Hoijer 1954a). These proceedings show that Whorf’s 
                                                          
84 I cite the majority of Whorf’s published works from John B. Carroll’s (1956) edited collection, but, for the 
purposes of clarity, I reference their original year of publication.  
85 He was no doubt influenced by his mentor’s work before then, as his (1939/1956) paper in Sapir’s 
memorial volume indicates. 
86 Penny Lee’s (1996) study remains the most thorough extrapolation of Whorf’s ideas. 
87 John B. Carroll, once a research assistant of Whorf’s, centralized his mentor’s published and privately 
circulated works in a second collection (1956). He framed it as the book Whorf had “hoped to write” had he 
lived (Carroll 1956: 23). Whorf had in mind “a text of moderate length on language and linguistics [to serve] 
as an intellectual tool with special reference to science and technology” (to Miller, 13 November 1940, BWP). 
88 Jamie Cohen-Cole (2014) draws attention to the vogue of interdisciplinarity in the research culture of Cold 
War America, as well as to the role of funding agencies such as the Ford Foundation in encouraging these 
platforms. 
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ideas met with immediate qualification and scrutiny. From the outset of “the Whorfian 
vogue” (Murray 1994: 190–197), his peers, successors, and competitors were eager to 
narrow, contain, select, restrict, and diminish his suggestions—and they debated, more 
often than not, what he actually said. As they do now. 
Why has controversy lingered for nearly a century over the incomplete hypothesis 
of a minor linguist? Why has this selection of Whorf’s research occluded our memory of his 
translation work, his archaeology, or his accomplishments as a descriptive phonologist? 
And what of Sapir, whose contribution to American linguistics was far greater, who yet gets 
relegated to an afterthought in this configuration?89 Why has Whorf generated so much 
noise—with so little to communicate? A glance at some responses to his legacy elucidates 
these questions. Recent criticisms of the Whorfian hypothesis are usually twofold: on the 
one hand, refusals of the strong form (“linguistic determinism”) as impossible and the 
weaker form as “banal” (Devitt & Sterelny 1987: 178); and, on the other, challenges to 
Whorf’s evidence, for instance claiming that he misrepresented Hopi conceptions of time 
and propagated a myth about “Eskimo” words for snow.90 The latter especially are often 
accompanied by ad hominem attacks, centred on Whorf’s “amateur” status: Geoffrey 
Pullum, for one, calls him a “weekend language-fancier” (1991: 163); and John McWhorter 
remarks that Whorf was a “fire inspector by day” and not an authentic “card-carrying 
                                                          
89 Murray (1994: 175–176) speculates why Sapir’s legacy retreated so swiftly after his death: his scattered 
students, the inability to standardize his “genius,” the neo-Bloomfieldian turn against historical linguistics, 
and the international expansion after World War II turning attention away from North American languages. 
90 Both claims are arguably the result of misinterpretations. Whorf himself described the tense-aspect system 
of Hopi at length in another work (1936a). Concerning the “Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax,” Chicoki and Kilarski 
(2010) evaluate the literature on it, past and present, and show that the prominence of this minor example 
represents the transmission of a misconception by writers whose own interest in the language was 
“instrumental and opportunistic” (371), rather than based on a studied reading of the original texts. 
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linguist” (2014: xii).91 McWhorter (2008) even assails Whorf’s personal charisma to reduce 
his contributions: “Whorf was also a mesmerizing speaker, and a looker to boot” (141).92  
 
Figure 5. B.L.W., P.Y.T. (Obituary Clippings, 1944, BWP) 
These invectives against Whorf himself suggest how the controversy has crossed over, in 
his critics’ minds, from the domain of “bad science” to that perhaps of pseudoscience. As 
Michael Gordin (2012) distinguishes, bad science can be recognized and dismissed for 
                                                          
91 Whorf was indeed a member of the Linguistic Society of America and other professional associations 
throughout his life; whether they carried cards or not, or do so now, I am not sure. 
92 William Clark (2006) traces how particular forms of charisma, tied to disinterested academic labour and 
imbricated through such technologies as seminar papers, doctoral dissertations, and library catalogues, came 
to prominence alongside the emergence of the research university in the nineteenth century. 
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being “substandard,” but the epithet of pseudoscience designates something more 
menacing: a challenge to “the authority of science, science’s access to resources, or some 
other broader social trend” (2)—or, to put it differently, the threat of failure. For Whorf’s 
detractors, it appears not only necessary to dismantle the hypothesis empirically (a subject 
of debate, at least) but also to disparage Whorf, as though his presence within the field was 
in itself objectionable and a threat. Whatever the reason, the message is clear: Benjamin 
Lee Whorf, you do not belong. 
 Rather than dwell on the truth conditions of linguistic relativity (or the lack 
thereof), a circular debate which resurfaces periodically almost by rote, in this chapter I 
seek to diffract the semiotics of Whorfianism and engage the manifold ways we might 
otherwise remember a figure such as Whorf: as a prodigy, a failure, a genius, an amateur, as 
the whipping boy of cultural relativism—or as all these personages at once. As Steven 
Shapin (2010) argues, the character of the knower often contributes to the credibility or 
truthfulness of their knowledge claims. Here, I will show Whorf as a historical actor and as 
a chimerical figure within the collective memory of the early development of the language 
sciences who, perhaps because of his categorical volatility, also features as a recurring 
threat to the cultural and epistemic authority the discipline has since accrued and now 
guards.93 As part of my broader endeavour to explode the Sapir-Whorf hyphenate and 
explore the research culture surrounding it, I focus on Whorf’s emergence as a practitioner 
of linguistics in the 1920s and ‘30s, amid the discipline’s incipient professionalization as a 
                                                          
93 It is the threat, conceivably, of historical memory at all for any field swayed by the attractions of scientific 
presentism. As Julia Falk (2003: 140) observes, the most insistent upon the autonomy of linguistics were the 
least likely to engage in historicism; by this token, historiography functions as a destabilizing vector to that 
closure. 
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human science in North America, inaugurated by the 1924 founding of the Linguistic 
Society of America (LSA). As a practitioner of linguistics, Whorf kept his own intimate 
distance: where for Sapir the relation evoked working through a scientific network from 
his headquarters in Ottawa, for Whorf it meant proportioning himself—his values, 
interests, and commitments—within the confines of an emerging academic discipline. How 
did Whorf negotiate his scholarly life against his full-time employment as a fire insurance 
inspector? What about linguistics captured his imagination? Did his unusual trajectory 
challenge expectations for a scientist at the time? Were his ambitions so different? Could 
they enable us to think about the different publics (institutional as well as “lay” audiences) 
available to early-twentieth-century linguistics?  
At the same time that I pose these questions endogenous to Whorf’s archive, I also 
employ him as a figure to rehearse and rethink the interests of my own fields of study. 
Literature in STS and in the historiography of linguistics has offered ways of disrupting the 
singularity of the genius, tracing the roots and routes of their knowledge claims and 
revealing the networks which fostered the conditions for their aptitudes to thrive. These 
approaches challenge the hagiographic function of “Whig” histories that set scientific 
geniuses apart and draw them into strict lineages. The scientific “persona,” in particular, 
has emerged as a category for mediating the individual and the social, in contrast to the 
lionization that occurs in many biographical genres: the persona instead represents “a 
cultural identity that simultaneously shapes the individual in body and mind and creates a 
collective with a shared and recognizable physiology” (Daston & Sibum 2003: 2). To put 
Whorf in contrast with Sapir or the other academics at the First Yale School, I employ the 
category of persona to think through the tensions of Whorf’s personal eccentricities and his 
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desire to belong to a greater scientific culture. Two personae appeared out of Whorf’s life: 
one, the “amateur specialist,” a title he never claimed; another, the public intellectual, an 
identity he never obtained. This chapter divides into two sections that follow Whorf’s 
various attempts to assume a legible persona within disciplinary frameworks and the 
public sphere, mapping these efforts respectively onto the categories of the scientific self 
and the scientific popularizer. 
Where discussions of the scientific genius are often success stories—whose 
protagonists’ achievements are characterized by triumphs of intellect, rhetoric, or 
charisma, and whose tribulations resolve into fixed or stable identities—the categories of 
scientific self and popularizer also lend themselves to narratives of inconclusiveness, 
irresolution, multiplicity, and failure (e.g. Galison 1987, Secord 2000). I situate my analysis 
in this latter camp, foregrounding the noise, the friction, and the failures that inhere in 
Whorf’s contingent and almost tragicomic efforts to construct an authentic scientific 
identity.94 Through the heuristic of failure, I interrogate and deconstruct the logics of 
science and success that undergird such concepts as genius, expertise, and disciplinarity. 
The volatility of Whorf and of his legacy, I will argue, show how failure is a constitutive—
rather than temporary or detrimental—condition of scientific knowledge-making, as it was 
for Sapir in Ottawa. This condition is particularly salient when the character of that science 
is still in formation and yet to be decided: before success delimits what is emergent, 
schematic, and indeterminate about it. 
                                                          
94 An instructive example is Jan Golinski’s (2011) articulation of British chemist Humphry Davy’s 
“experimental self.” Davy’s own subjectivity was the topic of enduring scrutiny, both in the experiments with 
nitrous oxide he performed on his own body and later in his efforts to translate those personal sensations 
into credible scientific evidence. Through Davy, Golinski observes how credibility relied on established 
witnessing practices and how creative individuality was fostered by disciplinary matrixes. The failure to 
adhere to either meant that one would, like Davy, often be left to flounder. 
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To this end, I employ the em dash as a conceptual device to guide my study. The 
hyphen has long served as a point of anchorage for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. As a tool, 
the hyphen has the potential to join “opposites in a metonymic tension” that yet maintains 
the separate identity of each part (Hayles 1999: 114). While the dash, an elongated hyphen, 
functions similarly—to emphasize—but to set apart—as it does in a list of successful and 
successive “geniuses,” the dash also invites transgression, digression, and suspension of the 
status quo. Here, it serves to widen the space between Sapir and Whorf, opening up the 
claustrophobic debates surrounding them to examine instead the conditions of the latter’s 
ambivalent search for belonging. Following loosely from Thomas Rickert’s (2013) 
conceptualization of the “ambient,” I understand belonging in similar terms, as that which 
recedes from identity, but which nevertheless supplements it. By shifting attention to 
belonging over identity as a category of analysis, I employ Whorf as a sound level meter to 
gauge the ambient noise out of which he and his linguistic relativity principle emerged: the 
social, intellectual, and affective waves that shaped and constrained his words, thoughts, 
and actions. Belonging captures the intimate desires that animated Whorf’s quest for 
recognition in the scientific and public spheres—desires that remained, in part due to his 
own partitioning, at a distance. Rather than follow the route most familiar and deposit 
Whorf in a hyphenated relationship to Sapir, or to strike him through with a dash entirely, I 
de/re-arrange those lines into a web, pulling out four cords—Whorf as hobbyist, bricoleur, 
unifier, and luminary—to provide a sense of where and how he sought to belong. While I do 
this work to retrieve a more complex portrayal of Whorf, I observe nonetheless how the 
categories of identity through which he tried to re-invent himself remained consistent with 
the project of salvage and the belongings that it limited. 
129 
 
❖ Whorf—an Amateur Specialist. 
Named so in his Times obituary, Benjamin Lee Whorf was memorialized as “an amateur 
specialist”—an enigma, an anomaly, a contradiction in terms. That he was something of an 
oddity, even to his contemporaries, was no secret. His linguistic ability was long the subject 
of commentary and curiosity: as Kroeber remarked, with regard to his ability to perceive 
patterns in language, Whorf had “imagination, . . . and a genuine insight and a touch of 
genius” (Hoijer 1954a: 231). His career, moreover, did not follow the expected trajectory of 
a university researcher like Sapir. Whorf was a full-time fire insurance inspector with a 
bachelor’s in chemical engineering, through whose own dogged persistence and self-
discipline made his way into the inner circle of Americanist linguistics. A self-professed 
hobbyist (Whorf to Boas, 9 April 1928, BWP), Whorf was yet unlike the nineteenth-century 
adventurers, citizen scientists, or “amateur rationalists” (Darnell 2001: 9) who contributed 
data for armchair analysts.95 From about 1928, when he undertook his first research 
excursion to study the Uto-Aztecan language Nahuatl, through his later appointment in 
1936 as Honorary Fellow in Anthropology at Yale, to his sudden rise in notoriety a year 
before his death in 1941, Whorf occupied a median point between scientist and amateur at 
a time when these categories were in flux and heavily debated. During Whorf’s lifetime, 
American anthropology underwent a process of professionalization under the direction of 
Franz Boas, migrating from the auspices of the Bureau of American Ethnology (established 
1879) to the university system between 1900 and 1920 (Darnell 2001); linguistics, often 
the disciplinary attaché of cultural ethnology within the Boasian paradigm, followed suit 
shortly afterwards, in part due to the contributions of Sapir and his school at Yale. 
                                                          
95 For a more probing analysis of “armchair” anthropology, see Efram Sera-Shriar (2014). 
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However, the fields of anthropology and linguistics at this time were still open to the 
contribution of amateurs.96 There was as yet an insufficient number of university-trained 
candidates to undertake the vast project of salvage linguistics and ethnology in America, 
and amateurs like Whorf were often independently wealthy, held enthusiasm for the work, 
and received comparable training to their academic peers under an apprenticeship model 
with the masters of the field.97 
Whorf hence remains a useful figure for gauging the promise of linguistics at this 
juncture and, I will show, his amateur status also bears on what Lorraine Daston and Peter 
Galison (2007) have termed the “scientific self.” Arising in the nineteenth century alongside 
the advent of research universities, the scientific self denotes a co-construction of 
disciplinarity and subjectivity, moulding practices of observation to uphold the tenets of 
objectivity.98 Daston and Galison (2007) reject broad technological or ideological 
transformations as the cause for the widespread application of different modes of 
objectivity; instead, they view the training of subjectivity, both within disciplinary 
structures and popular imaginaries about the scientist, as an indispensable component of 
these rise and falls. My next chapter examines how American linguistics began to ossify its 
standards of training and practice, a disciplinary process which did and did not fit Daston 
and Galison’s model of objectivity. Here, I examine how Whorf’s subjectivity—as a “self-
made” linguist (Sapir to Kroeber, 30 April 1936, BWP)—represented an aporia within such 
                                                          
96 Wendy Leeds-Hurwitz (2004) provides a stimulating account of a similar figure, Jaime de Angulo, a Spanish 
physician who became an “interested individual” (5) active within American anthropological and linguistic 
circles particularly between 1920 and 1933. 
97 Indeed, before the establishment of professional academic anthropology in the nineteenth century, 
practitioners were typically self-taught and self-identified (Darnell 1998a: 12). 
98 Daston and Galison present three dominant eras of objectivity (truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, 
trained judgement) and three scientific selves to match them (the sage, the worker, the expert). 
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developments. How did he negotiate the different interests of his academic career and his 
regular employment? This section brings into focus the vicissitudes of balancing profession 
and calling, highlighting the positionality of the amateur specialist against the rapidly 
solidifying professional identity of the “linguistic self.” Whorf’s subjectivity was not 
delimited by the requirements of objectivity alone, but encompassed the leisureliness of 
the hobbyist and the playfulness of the bricoleur—traits which dashed the austerity of 
objectivity through his whimsical operations. Below, I trace Whorf’s intersection with the 
newly professionalized discipline and its training structures and, in so doing, shift focus 
from a notion of the self as an achievable end, or direction of torque, to that of scientific 
belonging, a term which more aptly captures the latticework of desires, longing for 
community, and cross-identifications that marked Whorf’s crossing through linguistics.  
 
a. The Linguist in Training—the Hobbyist in Transit. 
From the beginning of his scholarly ambitions, Whorf owed much to an array of supporters: 
Herbert Spinden and Alfred Tozzer, both anthropologists, for their early assistance and 
connections (1927–1928); the Indigenous informants and Mexican locals who enabled his 
initial research trips (1930); and Sapir’s Linguistic Group for accepting him as a colleague 
and friend, despite an ostensive absence of qualifications. However, his Times obituary cast 
his career in a different light: 
Here is another instance of the amateur, who, by focusing his spare energies 
on some subject of fascination to him, rose above the humdrum of a daily 
chore, opened his eyes to new horizons and took pride in making a deposit in 
the growing fund of human understanding. (29 July 1941) 
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It presented his course of study as a kind of intellectual bootstrapping, a celebration of the 
hobbyist. Whorf’s own (early) description of his training in linguistics reinforced this 
narrative, to an extent. His university had not offered courses in philology, but as he 
professed in a statement of his studies on Semitic languages: “many people have shown a 
desire to study and work in two entirely independent fields,” that the “stress laid on 
original research at ‘Tech’ [M.I.T.] has stimulated me in the other field,” and “of linguistics, I 
have taught myself” (to Torrey, 30 January 1928, BWP).99 In a letter to Edgar Sturtevant, 
organizer of the Linguistic Institutes at Yale, he underscored: “my self-training has been 
rigid . . . and my work carefully handled and up to a good standard” (20 July 1928, BWP). 
What was it about linguistics that inspired this confidence? His unpublished manuscripts 
reveal that this was not the first of his forays into other sciences. His early writings 
spanned the subjects of zoology, physics, and evolutionary biology, as well as topics on 
science and religion. 100 Linguistics was only the most receptive. Were his talents, then, 
more suited to the study of language? Or was the discipline of linguistics itself, only 
recently becoming professionalized, more porous and open to the contributions of 
adventurers, collectors, university scientists, missionaries, government agents—and 
hobbyists? Were its methods, not yet standardized, more flexible?  
The appellative of “amateur” need not carry negative connotations; for Whorf, it did 
not.101 Rather, the status of amateur was a source of negotiation and possibility. Ever-
                                                          
99 Whorf came across the subject of philology in high school, studying Latin and becoming impressed by its 
inflectional system (30 January 1928, BWP). He was also struck by how different Semitic languages were 
from others he encountered (French, German), and he resumed study of Hebrew at the Hartford Theological 
Seminary. 
100 “Why I Have Discarded Evolution” (1925, BWP) was sent to biologist Thomas Hunt Morgan, who read 
eight or nine pages of it before chewing him out. 
101 The category of “amateur” was porous and applied to an array of actors doing social science in this era. 
Whorf was unlike the public intellectuals that Russell Jacoby (1987) chronicles, often “coffee house 
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industrious, Whorf began his linguistic studies before he came into contact with the Yale 
school. On his own initiative, he embarked on a series of modest research projects to study 
the language and civilization of Ancient Aztec and later Maya, relying on locally accessible 
manuscripts and reproductions to craft translations of hieroglyphics. Most of these efforts 
took place in Hartford, Connecticut, where Whorf was employed as a fire insurance 
inspector, but he found opportunities to advance his studies elsewhere: “He worked not 
only in the Watkinson Library, but also at any library he could profitably visit on his 
numerous business trips away from Hartford” (Carroll 1956:10). In the meantime, Whorf 
conferred with Spinden, at the Peabody Museum, and Tozzer, an anthropologist at Harvard; 
these two were early supporters of Whorf’s research and would later recommend him for a 
Social Science Research Council (SSRC) grant. They brought his work to the attention of 
Boas (Spinden to Whorf, 6 January 1928, BWP), encouraging him to present a paper on 
Aztec linguistics and Toltec history at the International Congress of Americanists in New 
York City, in 1928. It was through this network of contacts, institutions, and scholarly 
associations that Whorf became increasingly immersed in the conversations of the field. 
The same year, he began networking at the first summer Linguistic Institute (LI), though he 
could only manage to attend public meetings during a leave from work (Whorf to 
Sturtevant, 20 July 1928, BWP). The “exigencies of employment” continued to interfere 
with his ambitions, rendering it impossible for him to stay in New Haven that year or the 
next (to Sturtevant, 8 July 1929, BWP). Nonetheless, throughout his later research trips and 
his temporary academic appointment at Yale, Whorf maintained his full-time position as 
                                                          
intellectuals” writing in “little magazines” oriented toward social issues, or the female social scientists 
prohibited from academic employment due to anti-nepotism rules who nonetheless forged research careers 
(e.g. Eleanor Gibson). 
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fire prevention inspector, endeavouring to work his scholarly career around it. The 
amateur specialist at once belonged to the academic community and poured beyond the 
edges of it.  
The summer Institutes were crucial sites where the training regimens for the 
“linguistic self” were developed and debated by central figures in the field—and, though 
Whorf only skirted across them, the early LIs were also important to assess how he 
navigated these disciplinary currents. For a description of the first two Institutes that took 
place at Yale University (1928–1929), I draw on Martin Joos’s (1986) characterization of 
them, in his madcap and often anecdotal Notes on the Development of the Linguistic 
Society of America.102 The LSA founded the LIs upon deeming educational opportunities 
inadequate to support the association’s two major aims: the “spreading of knowledge of 
linguistics, and the recruiting and training of linguistic scholars” (Hill 1964: 1). This 
mission statement stood in contrast to the lay opinion that a society of linguists must have 
wanted to “improve” language somehow (e.g. through spelling-reform or devising an 
international auxiliary language). At the time, the “notion of investigating a language 
without trying to change it . . . was never contemplated seriously by well-educated 
knowledgeable persons” (Joos, 17). Here, I am interested in how this endeavour was 
intertwined with the research culture that reinforced it. The two Yale Institutes were 
supported in large part by a subvention from the Carnegie Corporation. Lasting six to eight 
weeks, along with the December Annual Meetings the LIs helped to frame the academic 
                                                          
102 The editors stress the circumstantial nature of the evidence of this text, in their Foreword: “This document 
is not a history of the Linguistic Society of America and should not be read as one. It is a set of notes and 
observations on the early career of the Society, made from Martin Joos’s always very special and sometimes 
highly personal stance. Several informed readers of the unpublished document have spotted what they 
consider to be serious factual errors. But this is not a history; it is only source-materials for one.” 
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year. At the first LI there were 39 courses offered in total, by 24 instructors and with 45 
registrants, ranging in topic from field methods in linguistic anthropology to comparative 
Germanic philology. The classes themselves ran often at a ratio of two students to one 
professor—or, at the second, at a ratio of one-to-one.103 Roland Kent, Secretary of the LSA 
at the time, considered the narrow difference between instructors and students “a failure” 
(Kent qtd. in Joos, 28). Still, he lauded the unofficial meeting spaces the LIs encouraged: 
“Not the least valuable of the activities of the Institute was the gathering of small informal 
groups to discuss linguistic problems quite apart from the times and places of the 
scheduled courses; and in these, from time to time, virtually every one participated” (Kent 
qtd. in Joos, 28). It was in these informal settings that the scientific culture of American 
linguistics began to take shape. 
Joos offers an artful description of the atmosphere and social structure of the first 
such gathering, worth quoting at length for its richness of detail: 
We pause to remind readers that [Kent’s] Report was written during the long 
since forgotten Prohibition period and was for the eyes of not simply our 
own Linguistic Society members and their associates but also for stiffly 
starched members of the Yale Corporation. Any printed allusion however 
discreet or veiled, to the accessibility of ‘drink’ within or near the sacred 
precincts could spoil the chances for a 1929 Institute in New Haven. Actually, 
the hard drinkers were a vanishingly small minority, and ‘drugs’ were foreign 
to the scene. Not cannabis indica but nicotiana tobacum was lavishly 
                                                          
103 At the second LI, the ratio was one to one (26 instructors and an equal number of registrants). Joos 
imagines that speculation on the stock market before the Crash and the “unbearably stodgy” New Haven 
summer contributed to the second LI’s diminished attendance (29). 
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employed to saturate the air with its incense of good fellowship wherever 
those ‘small informal groups’ held their all-hours gatherings, notably just 
after the break-up of every Public Lecture Discussion period and serving to 
continue the discussion without restraint and within face-to-face groups; 
non-smokers were few, and many of ‘the girls’ had become smokers simply 
in self-defense. The per-capita ingestion of the forbidden ethanol, suitably 
flavored and discussed along with linguistic topics, in close sequence or 
simultaneously, in the course of any one gathering of the sort in which 
‘virtually every one participated’ was what probably would now be called 
‘two drinks’—nothing to worry a spouse or a parent. The footnote to the 
Bloch Obituary, Language 43.6 (1967), belongs to a quite different sort of 
milieu, Chicago’s Near North Side, which corresponded fairly well to 
Greenwich Village in lower Manhattan, that haunt of sin. New Haven was 
different. Did none of the Faculty ever visit spots where one went for ‘serious 
drinking’ such as were numerous within a few minutes' walk from Harkness 
Recitation Hall? Not many, surely, because they were noisy and crowded and 
too dimly lighted for phonetic discussions accompanied by suitable diagrams 
and demonstrations. (28) 
To put it in other words: these were good linguists, law-abiding citizens, eager to court the 
favour of their university patrons and—like any good linguist—they had oral fixations. 
Their regimens for training the body fit within the broader regulations on the body-politic. 
Joos goes on to add: “That 1928 Institute inaugurated nearly the whole inner form 
and a good many of the traditional details for the Society’s warm seasons generally” (28). 
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Amidst the din and the thick miasma of a New Haven speakeasy, then, emerged an 
“interstitial academy,” as Joel Isaac (2012) has defined: an informal cluster of clubs, 
seminars, and subcultures operating alongside but apart from traditional departments. 
Isaac identifies the research practices and pedagogies at the interstices of the academy as 
integral to the cohesion and authority of “normal science.” The barriers to entering any 
such academy are never distributed evenly, and these sessions were no exception. Despite 
support from Yale and the Carnegie Corporation, the organizer, Sturtevant, had to assume a 
fair deal of the financial burden and hidden labour of the early LIs, before they moved to 
the City College of New York in 1930: the first LIs were thus founded on the “tacit 
assumption that only a man with Family Money could assume the burdens of a Yale 
Professor’s social duties” (Joos, 27). Moreover, we notice the makings of a homosocial 
atmosphere in the “incense of good fellowship” Joos demarcates, where female attendees—
“the girls”—had to intrude within a male-coded arena of these informal gatherings and no 
doubt risk magnified social stigma attached to the indiscreet libations.104 Frederick 
Newmeyer (1996) and Julia Falk (1999) each discusses how the move toward 
professionalization in linguistics was gendered, in effect pushing out women, whose 
backgrounds were in less technical fields such as language instruction. Indeed, women, 
who had numbered nearly a third of the membership of the first LI, occupied significantly 
fewer places in the second (Joos, 32). This interstitial academy, at the same time that it 
generated cohesion and consolidated a training centre, also enabled gatekeeping at the 
threshold of scientific belonging along lines of class and gender. 
                                                          
104 Peiss (1986) examines the expansion and commercialization of leisure at the turn of the century through 
the eyes of young working-class women, who gained access to social clubs and other male-coded spaces. 
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At first, Whorf’s circumstance posed a challenge for him to obtain the forms of 
(cultural) capital necessary to undertake academic inquiry—to join the club, as it were. His 
diaries from this period reveal how he travelled to the LIs in the morning and returned 
home at night, at least once stopping at Waltnut Beach—“water good, but low tide” (23 July 
1939, BWP)—so he could not partake completely in this interstitial academy nor the New 
Haven nightlife. His SSRC application offers another example. It was originally not for the 
Grant-in-Aid he later received, but for a year-long research fellowship. He once confided 
that he was worried about competing against “men with PhD degrees” (to Mason, 6 
December 1928, BWP). The bulk of his research, Whorf mentioned in the application, 
would have to be undertaken during a five-to-six weeks leave granted by his employer, 
pointing out—with what now we might call naïveté—that he must take care of his 
dependents, foremost (1928 SSRC Application, BWP). 105 The response was a setback. The 
SSRC secretary informed Whorf that he must dedicate himself “full time to the project at 
hand” (17 December 1928, BWP), but recommended he apply for the shorter-term grant 
instead. The part-time commitments of the amateur specialist limited his access to 
scholarly resources. 
However, where the “exigencies of employment” stifled certain opportunities early 
on, toward the end of his career Whorf’s independent employment became an advantage. 
His steady position at the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, close to Yale, made him an 
”ideal homebody” to operate as a hub for letter-writing among Sapir’s students, when their 
mentor’s health began to fail (Darnell 1997: 557). In a circular letter sent out to the 
members of the Committee on a Society for American Indian Linguistics (Boas & Sapir to 
                                                          
105 Whorf did receive the leave, upon accepting the Grant-in-Aid. 
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Whorf et al., 8 February 1937, BWP), asking about the future of the field, Whorf was the 
only one not to acknowledge the bleak job prospects and fleeting institutional support as a 
predominate concern, focusing instead on matters of publication (for instance, on 
preserving raw data vs. analysed material) and fieldwork (standardizing orthography). 
Once a source of trepidation, he now appeared to exult in being the only plain “mister” 
among doctors in Sapir’s school at Yale (c.1938, BWP).106 The security of his employment 
inured him to the disappointing job market afflicting the other members of the Yale group, 
many of whom had salaries tied to external sources, like the Institute of Human Relations, 
which reverted back to the university upon Sapir’s death (Darnell 1998b: 367). Despite 
offers of more permanent appointments late in his life, Whorf “consistently refused them, 
saying that his business situation afforded him a more comfortable living and a freer 
opportunity to develop his intellectual interests in his own way” (Carroll 1956: 5). His 
position as amateur specialist was far from a source of derision; it was, in the least, double-
edged. In times of financial straits, Whorf’s amateur status afforded him economic 
freedom—it was an advantage rather than a liability. 
This positionality also provided him a different orientation toward the work itself. 
Because Whorf did not derive his chief source of income from teaching and research, like 
his colleagues, it gave his mind—and pen—leeway to wander. Besides the nonlinear 
reasoning that yielded his linguistic relativity principle, which I will pursue below, he also 
published and presented at many non-academic venues. At the Hartford Theosophical 
Association, for instance, he gave a public talk entitled “The Magic of Language” (27 Oct 
                                                          
106 Another mister—Ephraim Cross, who had attended the first LI— contacted Whorf in an attempt to recruit 
him as an ally to challenge the “democratization” of the society (Cross to Whorf, 31 January 1939, BWP). 
Whorf surmised there was no problem at all. 
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1940, BWP), which concerned what he called the “transcendental word magic” of Egypt 
and India. Likewise, his ruminations on metaphysics appeared in the journal Main Currents 
in Modern Thought, where he espoused his desire for a diverse “brotherhood of thought” 
(Whorf 1941c: 15), based on a relativist understanding of language. Unlike the 
disinterested professional Max Weber argued for in “Science as a Vocation” (1919), a 
scientist free from utilitarian demands and partisan politics, Whorf was more akin to the 
Victorian “man of science” before him (White 2003), eager to expound on subjects general 
and particular, publishing equally on specialist and spiritualist topics. Whorf had 
professional aspirations, to be sure, but science remained for him a hobby, something done 
at his leisure. In this way, he prefigures Michael Lynch’s (2009) response to Weber in 
“Science as a Vacation.” Lynch argues that scholarship requires “a vacation from more 
common modes of engagement”: “the academic vocation demands more than mental 
detachment or disinterest[;] it requires institutional distance and temporal leisure from 
political and economic arenas, with their pressing demands for useful or acceptable 
answers” (106). Lynch stresses how this leisure time should be a “temporary refuge that 
affords the opportunity to see, or do, something different” (114), but for Whorf, perhaps, 
that longing for elsewhere was the persistent condition of his scholarly life.  
 Linguistics was, for him, a source of enchantment and amusement—it suggested 
that which lay beyond the commonplace; it was freeing and fun. This attitude emerged in 
his impassioned appeal to Irving Pescoe, at M.I.T., over the education of his fellow “Tech 
boys.” They, like him, might have “vague dreams” of building bridges or becoming 
policemen: “Yet the very fact of having this constructional kind of career-image may 
indicate a mind interested in structure and design above the ordinary, and fitted to make 
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an exceptional man” (16 April 1939, BWP). Whorf wanted these boys exposed to the social 
sciences and humanities, so the “more sophisticated kind of magic” he associated with the 
search for underlying truths would not “evaporate” with “the increasing detachment of the 
maturing, economically pressed man.” Over the twentieth century, Shapin (2010) observes, 
“modern scientists” became distinct from “priests”: “Their expertises [were] not fungible—
either one of technical expertise into another form or technical expertise into moral 
authority” (391). Nonetheless, what made linguistics a worthwhile transaction for Whorf—
worthy of investing his own time, energy, and financial resources—was, indeed, the 
science’s fungibility: the potential for an interest in language and structure to be 
transposable to other domains of life. Whorf’s pursuit of this emancipatory ideal, however, 
belied the conditions that constrained who might otherwise obtain it. The gendering of 
many of the above expressions—man of science, brotherhood of thought, fellow Tech 
boys—was not innocent or incidental. Nor was the deeply gendered body imagined to 
possess the curiosity and alacrity Whorf described;107 nor the homosocial culture of the 
early Linguistic Institutes. Those who could buy into the ideal Whorf endorsed were those 
who could afford the economic and social costs. 
 Simultaneously a foundational and outlying member of the linguistics community, 
the amateur specialist—equal parts homebody, travelling businessman, scholar, and 
hobbyist—strew an unlikely trail across the developing boundaries of a science in its 
formative years, belonging to each of these categories yet reducible to no single one. The 
image below, a hotel card etched with Whorf’s translation work, gathered together these 
                                                          
107 Elizabeth Grosz (1994) analyzes how the ideal of the disembodied and unencumbered mind is constructed 
on the basis of male corporeality and proposes a turn to the experiences of women for alternative models. 
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incongruous parts. Whorf was indeed a “card-carrying linguist,” but of a different sort than 
McWhorter imagined.108 
 
Figure 6. Carte Hôtel (Unpublished Documents, c.1929, BWP) 
In her riveting study of the “Cartes Postales” genre in turn-of-the-century Paris, Noami 
Schor (1992) makes reference to the “plaisir de la carte”: “Part visual (these cards are very 
beautiful), part cognitive (these cards contain a great deal of information), the plaisir de la 
carte is in large part nostalgic . . . a fragment of past Parisian life” (237). By contrast, the 
hotel card was visually blunt and utilitarian. The tag —“ABSOLUTELY FIREPROOF”—was a 
source, perhaps, of some mirth for Whorf: a chuckle for the fire safety inspector, his day job 
                                                          
108 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (2010) identifies notetaking as an important site for examining the 
“redimensionalization” of data and not simply a neutral container for its transportation. 
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and hobby converging at a congenial moment. If Whorf felt attachment to the card beyond 
as a repository for scrap notes, it would be as a keepsake, likely taken in transit from his 
first field site. The card showed how Whorf taught himself to be a linguist—but it also 
revealed some ways in which he was already trained. The material surface and the written 
text were intimately bound: the hotel, as a location, was a refuge or liminal space for the 
business class—it located Whorf in the social coordinates of American, male, and middle-
class. The card encapsulated the trafficking of his mind and body, his career and curiosity, 
the hobbyist and the professional. It also suggested who might have fallen by the 
wayside—those who could not have been an amateur or a specialist. Leisure time, vacation 
days, access to resources and social connections, mobility—all these forces which 
converged to make Whorf’s unlikely career possible—were privileges of the class to which 
he belonged and this card marked. Because he possessed the class mobility—literally—to 
cross the boundaries of amateur and specialist, Whorf was able to satisfy his longing to 
belong to a scientific community. Belonging as a category of analysis thus accommodates 
those, like Whorf, who lacked an easy identification with science and success—but it also 
suggests the barriers for entry of those who were denied the opportunity to belong at all.  
 
b. An Engineer—among Bricoleurs. 
Whorf’s identification with linguistics was always partial: he absorbed its methodologies 
but maintained an independence from its institutional structures. His ambivalence toward 
disciplinarity brings to mind Paul Feyerabend’s (1993) commentary on science education: 
“An essential part of the training that makes facts appear consists in the attempt to inhibit 
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intuitions that might lead to a blurring of boundaries” (11).109 In order to make its object of 
study tenable to scientific inquiry and amenable to academic curricula, linguistics has had 
to split language into more manageable parts, bracketing off elements that are less tenable 
to its tools of analysis. Linguists are not engineers, using their expertise to devise new 
languages.110 They are bricoleurs—or more accurately bricollecteurs, given the scope of 
Americanist work—working within the enabling constraints of their “experimental 
systems” (Rheinberger 1997), reshuffling data and playing with evidence to devise new 
understandings of language.111 During Whorf’s lifetime, semantics—the branch of linguistic 
inquiry concerned with meaning—was one such boundary: semantic categories lacked the 
methodological rigour of phonetic or grammatical analysis, so they were largely set aside. 
In the previous section, I considered how Whorf subtended the expected trajectory of a 
social scientist, recalling a time of amateur contributions to linguistics and anthropology. 
Here, I examine how the perspective of a chemical engineer among bricoleurs enabled him 
to make lateral movements across systems—and speculate how such movements have 
contributed to his contentious reputation today.112 Whorf saw possibilities not only within 
the limits of an experimental system—he was as an accomplished descriptive linguist—but 
                                                          
109 Feyerabend recommends an unspooling of disciplinarity, an anarchic model revolving around experiment 
and play: as in the case of childhood development, “the initial playful activity is an essential prerequisite of 
the final act of understanding. . . . The process itself is not guided by a well-defined programme, for it contains 
the conditions for the realization of all possible programmes” (17). 
110 Contemporaneous initiatives like the International Auxiliary Language Association and Esperanto 
movement complicate this statement. 
111 I treat Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s idea of the “experimental system,” along with and in relation to the 
neologism of bricollecteur, with closer attention in the next chapter.  
112 Derrida (1978b) remarks on the slippage between these categories: “The engineer, whom Lévi-Strauss 
opposes to the bricoleur, should be the one to construct the totality of his language, syntax, and lexicon. In 
this sense the engineer is a myth. A subject who would supposedly be the absolute origin of his own discourse 
and would supposedly construct it 'out of nothing’ . . . The notion of the engineer who had supposedly broken 
with all forms of bricolage is therefore a theological idea; and since Lévi-Strauss tells us elsewhere that 
bricolage is mythopoetic, the odds are that the engineer is a myth produced by the bricoleur” (360). 
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also astride them: through his theory of linguistic relativity, he built on connections 
between linguistics and psychology and blurred the boundaries between the study of 
grammar and meaning. Whorf was not “against method,” as Feyerabend would commend, 
but he did smudge it. In this section, I address the confluence and dissonance between 
Whorf’s subjectivity and the ideals of objectivity structuring the science of language, 
showing how Whorf’s status as the amateur specialist—a boundary subject, a desiring 
subject—enabled him to occupy the “linguistic” self and stretch its contours to their limits.  
Within their configuration of objectivity, Daston and Galison emphasize the eye, or 
visual culture, as its locus, and emphasize how its image is materialized through the genre 
of the scientific atlas and routinized in the training practices and habits of scientists. While 
Whorf’s contemporaries in linguistics employed atlases themselves—indeed, one of the 
first actions of the LSA was to assemble a Dialect Atlas of North American English, after 
similar projects took place in Europe113—the primary mode of their visual expression was 
phonetic transcription, which had yet to become sufficiently standardized.114 As the above 
description suggests, linguists learned to employ a differently embodied way of knowing, 
relying more on the ear than the eye, and it is this aural objectivity that I want to stress 
(and revisit in the next chapter): to be a good linguist, you had to listen. Linguists, and 
phonologists foremost, trained their ears in a manner similar to the epistemic virtues of 
“trained judgement” that Daston and Galison describe. The phonologist was an active 
interpreter who learned to abstract from the acoustic signal of speakers an underlying 
                                                          
113 The venture culminated with diminished scope in the first volume of the Linguistic Atlas of New England 
(Kurath et al. 1939). 
114 As I showed in Chapter 1, standardizing a phonetic alphabet for North American languages was a topic of 
debate among Sapir, Boas, Kroeber, and Goddard. Chapter 3 demonstrates how standardization continued to 
occupy George Trager and Bernard Bloch for much of the late 1930s. 
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phonemic inventory of their dialect. Linguists, like the experts Daston and Galison describe, 
had specialized training that enabled them to employ their own bodies as experimental 
apparatuses to apprehend patterns of sound; only they could cut through the noise to 
apprehend the signal, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter. 
Whorf’s passage from visual observation to aural apprehension characterized his 
entrance into the evidentiary framework of American linguistics. His early works on 
language demonstrated a strong visual emphasis: his interest in Semitic languages, for 
example, which he would have seen written but sparsely heard; or his study of 
hieroglyphics, in which he was the first to posit the term grapheme to describe and explain 
the visual likeness of Aztec and Maya hieroglyphics (1931). This emphasis would give way, 
over the course of his career in linguistics, to the study of sound systems or, much later, to 
the more abstract semantic category of “cryptotype” (discussed below). His shift from 
visual to aural evidence followed the transition within American linguistics itself from an 
interest in written to oral cultures.115 A concentration on recording and archiving 
Indigenous languages set the American school apart from the philological tradition, which 
was based on the examination of literary evidence and, as such, focused on “high” culture. 
Unlike the languages of Europe, which already possessed rich corpora of written records, 
Indigenous languages belonged to predominately oral cultures and posed a different set of 
challenges to linguistic methodologies. The task of obtaining data to conduct linguistic 
research in the Americas also began to overlap with the conditions of doing field science. 
Questions arose over how to standardize transcription practices across this varied terrain; 
                                                          
115 In the latter half of the 1930s, linguists reoriented themselves again toward the textual, developing writing 
systems to mitigate the conditions of fieldwork and better capture the phoneme. See Chapter 3. 
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new technologies, such as the phonograph (Brady 1999), complicated accepted practices 
that permitted linguists to employ their own bodies as instruments to apprehend phonetic 
data. The amateur specialist intersected with these important debates within the history of 
American linguistics over what model of objectivity—and hence what linguistic self—
would best befit this situation. The different stages of Whorf’s relativity hypothesis mark 
his degree of boundedness—or belonged-ness—to these methodological constraints. 
Whorf’s initial interest in philological work was to uncover the origins of human 
speech. He believed that the structure of the Semitic language family held the secret to the 
“possible original common basis for all languages" (to William Rich, 1928, BWP). While 
studying the morphology of Ancient Hebrew, he claimed to have discovered a “new 
scientific frontier” that would “throw light on the human mind” (to Schapiro, 6 December 
1927, BWP): a set of relationships that united hundreds of Hebrew root words which, until 
then, had been considered unrelated.116 He named this relationship “binary grouping” 
(“The Inner Nature of the Hebrew Language,” n.d., BWP): a “binary group” is “a group of 
Semitic roots . . . having in common a certain sequence of two consonants, containing all the 
roots with this sequence in one language, and having these roots with but few exceptions 
allocated to a few certain kinds of meaning” (8). In Ancient Hebrew, Whorf found 180 such 
groupings, which he believed to be the building blocks of meaning in Semitic languages—
and, potentially, all Western languages.  
Whorf recognized from the outset, however, that the scholarly and scientific world 
was “not ready” to receive such a contribution from “an unknown amateur” (to William 
Rich, 1924, BWP). In the intervening years before his SSRC-funded fieldwork, he had also 
                                                          
116 Today, this is often called root-and-pattern, or nonconcatenative, morphology. 
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begun to study the Uto-Aztecan languages of Mexico, having learned of a collection of 
grammars and texts at Watkinson Library in 1926; in these, Whorf noticed a similar 
morphological phenomenon as in Ancient Hebrew. Through his work on Uto-Aztecan 
languages, he refined this theorem of binary grouping into the principle of “oligosynthesis,” 
meaning “built out of a few parts”: 
a name for that type of language structure in which all or nearly all the 
vocabulary may be reduced to a very small number of roots or significant 
elements, irrespective of whether those roots or elements are to be regarded 
as original, standing anterior to the language as we know it, or as never 
having had an independent existence, theirs being an implicit existence as 
parts in words that may have always been undissociated wholes. (“Notes on 
the Oligosynthetic Comparison of Nahuatl and Piman,” 1928, BWP) 
Whorf believed that these Indigenous languages would help him reveal “the primitive 
underlying basis of all speech”—hence “laying the foundations of a new science” and 
establishing his “authority in the field unshakeably” (to William Rich, 1927, BWP). In one of 
his first encounters with a Boasian anthropologist Paul Radin, however, Whorf’s notion 
that these Indigenous cultures were “primitive” was promptly disabused (to William Rich, 
1928, BWP). Whorf’s ambitions—to find a common link among the languages of the world 
but also to establish his reputation as an expert—led him to linger at the threshold 
between hobbyist and academic, and to try to meet the moral and epistemic commitments 
of this scholarly discipline.  
Nonetheless, in his early works, Whorf continued to amalgamate disciplinary 
frameworks, drawing correlations between linguistic structures and those of chemical 
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engineering that were more familiar to him. Of Aztec, he described oligosynthesis in what 
amounted to a periodic table of meaning: 35 elementary units that he claimed represented 
“a map or plan of an actual realm of ideas.” He expanded on this analogy between linguistic 
and chemical elements elsewhere: 
The isolation and study of roots and their manner of combining opens a 
certain new psychological field in which we can study the realm of ideas, 
hitherto an uncharted mystery . . . Almost as the chemist in his laboratory 
decomposes the substances of nature into their basic elements and observes 
the laws by which these few elements combine to yield this manifold variety 
of substances.” (to Morley, 24 January 1928, BWP) 
While Whorf did not imagine linguistic elements to have the same ontological substance of 
chemical elements, they possessed enough similarities to be put them into productive 
tension: “oligosynthetic languages seem almost like laboratories in which we might learn to 
analyze ideas almost in the manner of a chemist” (“Investigations in Aztec Linguistics,” 
1928, BWP). As Lily Kay (2000) defines, the “chimera” serves to neutralize the opposition 
between ontology and analogy (318): her definition underscores how knowledge about the 
world is subject to an interchange between nature and culture rather than the distilment of 
one from the other. 
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Figure 7. Chem(er)ical Equation (Whorf 1940b/1956: 223)117 
Whorf’s interest in the communicability of abstract relations anticipated the structural 
objectivity of the Vienna Circle, whom he would later engage directly (see §2d). As Daston 
and Galison (2007) characterize it, structural objectivity indicated a “longing for a common 
world, and one that can be communicated, not just experienced” (301). Where the virtues 
of structural objectivity seek to flatten differences between the sciences through a common 
language of logic, the amateur specialist drew strength from their chimerical potential and 
delighted in their surprising percolations when straining one disciplinary logic through 
another. Never fully enrolled in the project of disciplinarity, Whorf was less confined by its 
constraining logics. Belonging to a greater scientific community—where disciplines as 
varied as chemistry and linguistics could produce unexpected cross-pollinations—was a 
recurring motif in Whorf’s opus. 
As his career matured, access to more linguistic data and the allure of mastery 
within the field prompted Whorf to draw sharper boundaries around his object of study. 
Whorf’s descriptive work on Indigenous languages was shaped by his informal training 
                                                          
117 “I relish an occasional chemical simile” (1941/1956: 236), Whorf would later declare. 
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with Sapir in the early 1930s, and the quality of his grammars was recognized both by 
Sapir and Boas. He published in the major journals of American linguistics and 
anthropology: for example, a comparative grammar of Uto-Aztecan in American 
Anthropologist (1935) and a grammatical analysis of Hopi verbs in Language (1938). The 
empirical certainty that linguistics offered figured strongly in Whorf’s discourse.118 His 
command of linguistic methods solidifying, Whorf also began making broader and bolder 
claims about his ability to find linkages between structure and meaning in the Indigenous 
languages he studied. In Maya, he observed, “the whole vocabulary is pervaded with 
relations between phonetic form and ideational content” (1930, BWP). In his report on 
Hopi, he likewise observed that “systemic symbolism” was typical (1936a/1956: 56); 
morphological aspect in Hopi verbs, for example, was an “illustration of how language 
produces an organization of experience” (55). Whorf’s theory promised a mode of analysis 
that could discern the essential atoms of meaning from oligosynthetic languages, but he did 
not envision those atoms as a constant pattern, an unchanging tableau between world and 
linguistic system as structural objectivity would later entail. He described the development 
of Hopi—following the influence of Sapir’s “thought-grooves” (1921/2004: 180)—as a 
process of sedimentation: “this Uto-Aztecan dialect has moulded, worn, and rubbed it into 
its present shape” (“The Hopi Language,” 1935: 55, BWP). Languages inducted and ossified 
knowledge about the world in slow time over generations. In this way, they resembled 
experimental systems themselves. Language, Whorf believed, enacted in a “cruder but also 
                                                          
118 He expressed his desire, for instance, to “light up the darkness, the thick darkness of the language, and 
thereby much of the thought, the culture, and the outlook upon life of a given community”; linguistics was the 
“glass” through which “true shapes” would appear, which had “hitherto been . . . the inscrutable blank of 
invisible and bodiless thought” (1936c/1956: 73). Through linguistic empiricism, Whorf perhaps re-staged 
the racialized semiotics of the “discourse of extinction” (Brantlinger 2003). 
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in a broader and more versatile way the same thing science does” (1936a: 55). Linguistics, 
as the science of language, operated as a tool—the master signifier or Rosetta Stone—to 
draw these systems together and make them commensurable. For Whorf, language was 
also “the great symbolism from which other symbolisms take their cue” (“On Psychology,” 
n.d./1956: 42), and linguistics gave form—as well as normativity—to these intangibles, 
where the dominant psy-disciplines could not.119 
Mastery over linguistics thus offered Whorf a means to fulfill an early fantasy of his, 
of retrieving a kind of Tower of Babel—a quest for “the universal language, to which the 
various specific languages give entrance” (to English, 12 July 1927, BWP). Through the 
science of language, Whorf found a sufficiently communicable means to make claims about 
interiority with the clarity of an observable science. His desire for a universalism, however, 
was complicated in his efforts to apply his principle of oligosynthesis to more familiar 
languages. He developed a theory of “crypotypes” to supplement his analysis and extend it 
to less morphologically complex Indo-European languages where the interchange between 
morphology and semantics was less overt. A cryptotype was a hidden “complex” of 
relationships that operated as an invisible “central exchange” for meaning within a 
language—for instance, the category of gender in English, which undergirded the nominal 
system of the language but was not present grammatically except in the alternation of 
pronouns. The concept of the cryptotype revealed a "submerged, subtle, and elusive 
meaning, corresponding to no actual word, yet shown by linguistic analysis to be 
                                                          
119 Whorf was especially critical of contemporary psychology and turned to “linguistic psychology” instead to 
connect experience with interiority (Whorf to Sapir, 13 June 1932, BWP). Behaviorism was uninterested in 
“human intangibles,” he observed, such as matters of the “mind and soul” (“On Psychology,” 1956: 41). 
Psychoanalysis, by contrast, dealt with mental life, but only works within the sphere of “the abnormal and the 
deranged”—and Whorf argued the abnormal was increasingly not “the key to the normal,” and 
psychoanalysis’s interest in intangibles “show[ed] almost a contempt for the external world” (42). 
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functionally important in the grammar” (1936c: 70). In essence, it was an extension of the 
phonemic principle—the patterned regularity of a sound system whose signal only 
linguists are trained to discern—toward a system of meaning. Through the cryptotype, 
Whorf wanted to examine the “linguistic side of silent thinking, thinking without speaking” 
(66; emphasis in original). It is here, perhaps, that we might detect the scandal of Whorf’s 
empiricism: his commitment to observable truth was complicated by the requirement, 
indeed the necessity, of invisible cryptotypes to complete his analysis. Whorf anticipated 
the application of phonological methods for deriving abstract systems of relations to 
semantic categories—before there was an evidential framework ready to receive those 
calculations. Ultimately, the limits and play that had made his hypothesis productive in the 
first place gave way to his desire for greater generality, the longing to share in a common 
world—but also to be the singular genius who brokered it.  
Whorf’s ambitions therefore strained these emerging models of objectivity, and his 
colleagues and contemporaries often debated where to place him in relation to their ideals 
of method and mastery. Within these variegated responses, one common thread appeared 
that all would likely have agreed on—that Whorf possessed a brilliant but unruly mind. 
Sapir remarked, “He is sometimes inclined to get off the central problem and indulge in 
marginal speculations but that merely shows the originality and adventuresome quality of 
his mind” (to Kroeber, 30 April 1936, AKP). Amid the 1954 Language in Culture conference, 
Kroeber too pondered whether it was possible to integrate Whorf’s metaphysical 
“forecasts” into the discipline’s evidential regime: “Perhaps they are true insights. Perhaps 
they are true insights that can be verified. Perhaps they are true insights that can never be 
verified. Perhaps they are just verbal aberrations. I personally have always found them 
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very interesting and very stimulating, but I do think they will be hard to prove” (Hoijer 
1954a: 232). More conservatively, Stanley Newman asserted a need to diminish the 
“intuitive aspect” of Whorf's approach (232). By contrast, Charles Hockett endorsed 
Whorf’s unwieldy curiosity, understanding the merits of his observations as representative 
of a deeper anthropological legacy: 
Whorf sat in New York for many, many hours and worked with a native 
speaker of Hopi [Ernest Naquayouma], who was a native of Hopi culture. 
Whorf talked with him in English, got Hopi words, got Hopi texts, asked all 
sorts of questions about the meanings of these words, asked how to say this, 
that, and the other. He was presumably aiming toward a linguistic 
description of the Hopi language, but he got all sorts of other reactions from 
his informant. This underscores the point I was trying to make earlier—that 
linguists and ethnologists actually go through many of the same operations, 
ask the same kind of questions, and watch for the same subtle clues on the 
part of their informants. (230; my emphasis) 
Hockett lauded Whorf’s deductions because they were not derived purely from a linguistic 
system. In his way, Whorf was a superb listener, attentive not only to his informants but 
also, as I will show here and in the following section, to different audiences, academic as 
well as lay. He listened to other fields, other ways of thinking, and sought to apprehend and 
absorb an array of concepts into his own work. Fungibility was characteristic of Whorf’s 
attitude toward the mixture of scientific expertise and personal development, but it also 
typified the commensurability he imbued the forms of knowledge within and between 
those realms of expertise. Whorf’s promiscuous epistemologies, replete with transient and 
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transposable connections, characterized his way of thinking and formed the basis of his 
theory of linguistic relativity. 
 These intuitive leaps also led to what many consider the biggest gaffe of Whorf’s 
career. In the memorial volume for Edward Sapir, Whorf cited an encounter with “empty 
gasoline drums” at his fire insurance inspection job as the initial spark of inspiration for his 
linguistic relativity principle (1939/1956: 135). In this example—infamous to some, 
bathetic to others—Whorf instructed his reader in one way that language might inform 
experience: the connotations of the word empty, in this case, belied the danger of the 
hazardous gas inside. In a prescient moment, given the example’s notoriety now, Whorf 
thought to offer a clarification:  
I have thought of possibly adding a brief statement or a footnote saying that I 
do not wish to imply that language is the sole or even the leading factor in the 
types of behavior mentioned, such as production of fire-causing carelessness 
through misunderstandings induced by language . . . It didn’t seem to me at 
first that this should be necessary if the reader uses ordinary common sense, 
but then one can never tell.  
(Whorf to Leslie Spier, 23 November 1939, BWP) 
Indeed, a disclaimer may have helped: in Whorf’s absence, the meaning of the gasoline 
drum example moved beyond the realm of common sense to that of caricature. Ridiculed 
by some today as an instance of Whorf’s exaggeration of language’s influence, I understand 
this failure to convey the intended meaning as emblematic of Whorf’s insider-outsider 
perspective. Here and elsewhere, Whorf drew on his everyday experience and background 
in chemical engineering and blended it with the evidential framework he found in 
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linguistics. He freely employed the genre of taxonomic classification in his fire insurance 
career (“A Suggested Classification of Insurance,” n.d., BWP) and, by the same token, 
extended concepts from fire safety inspection into his theory of linguistic relativity (the gas 
drum). The reception of the latter example demonstrates the jeopardy of not—or no 
longer—belonging to a set of established witnessing practices. Its capacity for 
miscommunication represents the gamble of any claim to knowledge—or to a scientific 
identity—whose risks a disciplinary matrix serves to contain. It is the inverse parable of 
the gasoline drum: the fear that a vessel thought full and secure would be suddenly 
emptied and incoherent. Whorf longed for the ethos of a scientific identity but not its 
boundedness—the nascent linguistic self was overwhelmed by other directions of torque, 
the amateur specialist imploding the “concave and convex” relationship of objectivity and 
subjectivity (Daston and Galison 2007: 197).  
Whorf thus appears as a figure akin to Icarus (to Sapir’s Daedalus), whose apparatus 
dissolved as he endeavoured to reach that radiant light of completion. In his quest for a 
system of knowledge that offered such transcendent vision, however, contradictions built 
up. As Donna Haraway (1988) cautions, no scientific system can offer perfect sight. The 
promise of linguistics, for Whorf, figured as this illuminatory realm of success, a space of 
belonging that would elevate him above the ordinary. Where there is light, there must be 
shade. As evinced by his attitude toward the expertise of informants in one of his final 
publications, however, that promise would prove emancipatory only for the few who could 
master it. In one of his last publications, Whorf described paid informants as the 
experimental “animals” of linguistics: “They are apparatus, not teachers” (1940b: 231). His 
theories only gained wing as a function of a structural imbalance between him and his 
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informants, one that squelched Indigenous self-determination over their own language. At 
the moment he was thus entombed by success, Whorf limited the scope of his egalitarian 
principles in order to patrol the boundaries of scientific expertise, to which he himself held 
a tenuous claim. The not-yet-disciplined field of linguistics had indulged his fungible, 
associative—noisy—thinking, giving him a platform to perform the role of a scientist but 
also to maintain the perspective of a generalist, seeing patterns everywhere. His position 
outside the academy offered him an indeterminate space in which to fail and try again—but 
he lacked the resolve to extend these advantages to informants who, like him, participated 
in scientific work exterior to the university. 
Whorf—through his irregular training, independent employment, and imaginative 
insights—was no hero of objectivity. If retrospective accounts are to be believed, he may 
even have been a villain, a splinter on the tree of knowledge. In a sense, my analysis 
resumes the popular interpretation that Whorf was not a good linguist: he resisted, or had 
yet to acquire, the boundedness of a strict “scientific self”—but because for him there 
wasn’t one. During his lifetime, linguistics debated the terms and conditions of what 
constituted a credible knower: financial resources, academic affiliation, training 
procedures, and subjectivity were each remoulded and reconfigured. For Whorf, the 
promise of linguistics lay not in its contracting research culture, but in the open-endedness 
that allowed an amateur specialist to thrive in the first place. In this way, Whorf’s fate 
within the popular imaginary mirrors the transition of linguistics from inchoate discipline 
to professional science, a transformation necessarily accompanied by a closure over who 
could and could not belong—of whose genius would, from then on, be dashed.  
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❖ Whorf—A Failed Genius. 
In the previous sections, I considered how Whorf the “amateur specialist” cut across and 
through disciplinary matrixes. Exploring the contours of this seeming paradox, I examined 
how Whorf figured as both exemplar of and exception to a burgeoning disciplinarity—his 
identification with linguistics simultaneously full and empty. Here, I follow Whorf as he 
sought belonging not only in the domain of the professional scientist, but as well in the role 
of public intellectual, envisioning for himself and other linguists a moral responsibility to 
inform and guide the American public. Whorf was not only a practitioner but a scientific 
popularizer—and may even “be credited with being the first popularizer of modern 
linguistic science” (Carroll 1956: 28). Whereas Sapir’s more popular works courted 
potential audiences for linguistic expertise in the other and better-established social 
sciences, notably psychology and sociology, Whorf made a concerted effort to bring their 
scholarship “to the notice of a wide public as well as linguists, anthropologists, and 
psychologists” (27). Like his contemporaries Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, who tried 
to make cultural complexity palatable for a broad American audience (Benedict 1934, 
Mead 1928), Whorf was eager to mobilize the moral imperative of Americanist 
anthropology and linguistics as a salve for the melting pot of modernity.120 In his 
publications for the M.I.T. Review in particular, Whorf endorsed a relativistic stance that 
celebrated the differences between languages and the worldviews they appeared to 
structure—differences which were not irreducible, but made commensurable through the 
work of linguists. The notion that each language embodies a unique cultural perspective 
made sense as part of a rationale to document the threatened languages of Indigenous 
                                                          
120 Peter Mandler (2013) speaks to the cultural history of Mead’s work in the American imaginary. 
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peoples. It takes on different significance in the context of Whorf’s efforts as a popularizer, 
revealing not only his sensitivity to a prevalent ethnocentrism within the academy and 
without, a dis-ease he shared with Sapir, but also his wavering between the ambivalent 
poles of moral arbiter and the disinterested professional, a partition along which scientific 
careers in the early twentieth century pivoted (Shapin 2008).121 
In the first section below, I dwell on Whorf’s attempts to fashion himself, not as he 
was posthumously consigned—as the “amateur specialist”—but rather as a public genius, 
of the same kind if not caliber as Albert Einstein. Though he generated limited success 
through local publications and talks in Hartford, Connecticut, his efforts to capture the 
attention of national periodicals were resolutely thwarted and, as his work came into 
recognition toward the end of his life, he faced unexpected, sometimes undesirable, 
uptakes of his work. The second section deals with the latter, showing how Whorf’s 
linguistic relativity principle competed with other efforts to master the science of meaning; 
these debates belonged to a growing nexus of conflicting ideals interlacing perceptions of 
scientific genius, the nature of science, and the moral stature of the scientist—and control 
over language appeared as the centre of gravity. 
 
 
 
                                                          
121 Attempts for scientists to appear “disinterested” represent an epistemic virtue as well—and, as such, are 
not actually disinterested. Donna Haraway (1997) explores this calibration of the body that erases its 
involvement through the figure of the “modest witness.” Modesty renders the self invisible in an effort to be 
objective and get at the thing-in-itself. Stressing that this mode of objectivity is really the subjectivity of the 
modern, European man, Haraway argues that the modest witness is marked by the exclusion of women, both 
physically and epistemologically. She underscores that contemporaneous STS theory (by Latour, in 
particular) does not sufficiently remediate this exclusion and communicate with feminist, postcolonial, and 
other oppositional literacies. 
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c. Calibrating—the Public Intellectual. 
To claim Whorf as the first popularizer of linguistic science demands some qualification 
and contextualization. What constitutes the “public” is not a given, nor is its relation to the 
sciences. Rather, as social and political scientists, historians, and STS scholars have shown, 
this relationship is in continual flux, re-emerging through different media ecologies, 
cultures of expertise, and perceived utility (or tractability) of scientific discoveries.122 The 
notion of a public science conveys a sense of the “commons”—both a common experience 
or interpretation to communicate and a common ground on which to do so—but each, 
historically, has been greatly circumscribed, often belonging only to a property-owning 
white middle class (Habermas 1991). This middle class was largely a reading public and, 
from the onset of the nineteenth-century communications revolution (Fyfe 2012), potential 
audiences and opinions on science broadened and multiplied. Out of these conditions arose 
a need for intermediaries—science writers, journalists, publishers, and so on—among 
whom scientific popularizers acquired a significant role (Lightman 2007).123 Scientific 
popularizers often held their own motives. They communicated heterogeneous modes for 
understanding science (rather than merely simplifying results, as a diffusionist 
interpretation suggests), sometimes with agendas at odds with those of scientists 
                                                          
122 In Europe, the movement of science into public life and the advent of public opinion about science are 
often linked to the convergence of industry, intellect, and interest beginning in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries (Cook 2007, Stewart 1992), when a growing middle class found opportunities for 
commercial gain and material comfort in scientific inventions and novelties. In a parallel course, an extension 
of experimental practices and their networks similarly induced junctures with public knowledge (Golinski 
1992) and, by the nineteenth century, technoscience had taken on an increasingly powerful role in the 
operations of society. As Proctor and Schiebinger (2008) reveal, however, these networks have also been 
used as a platform to produce ignorance, obfuscation, and the suppression of knowledge. 
123 It was not until the twentieth century that “popular science” took on its pejorative meaning (Lightman 
2007: 11). 
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themselves. 124 The ascent of popularizers figured into a broader tradition of science as 
spectacle. Performance had long been an integral part of public understandings of science, 
from the gendered and classed rhetorical strategies employed in early-modern scientific 
self-fashioning (Biagioli 1993, Terrall 1995) to the staged replication of experiments 
(Shapin & Schaffer 1989). But as Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfrey (1994) argue, the 
outgrowth of mass culture radically altered the “means and meanings of scientific display 
and communication” (239). Not only was there an expansion of surfaces on which to reach 
and affect large publics (Kittler 1999, Mitman 1999, Orr 2006), with new media such as 
film rupturing the discursive space of an erstwhile republic of letters, but there was also 
the establishment of a new personage: the celebrity-scientist. Few exemplify this figure 
better than Albert Einstein, who “exploded into popular consciousness in 1919” and 
achieved celebrity status through the work of the American press (Fahy 2015: 2). Penny 
Lee (1994, 1996) has detailed the influence of physical relativity on Whorf’s thinking, but 
in Whorf’s lifetime, there was more than relativity in the air, and his efforts to popularize a 
scientific understanding of language and fashion himself as an intellectual must be 
understood in relation to this public character of genius—and his failure to obtain it. 
Whorf had diverse publics in mind from the beginning of his linguistic studies. 
Newly a member of the LSA, Whorf received an SSRC Grant-in-Aid in January 1929 (for 
$920) to conduct research in Central Mexico to study and record modern spoken Nahuatl, 
an Uto-Aztecan language. In his 1928 SSRC proposal, he set a number of (ambitious) 
                                                          
124 According to the “diffusionist” perspective, popularizers were akin to colanders through whom the correct 
uses and interpretations of science could “trickle down” from expert to laity; other analyses have pushed 
against this top-down model, arguing for a view of the sciences “from below” (Cooter and Pumfrey 1994, 
Harding 2008). 
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outcomes for this trip, including an Aztec grammar, a compact Aztec-English dictionary, a 
comparative analysis of Nahuatl and Piman, and a discussion of the relationship between 
oligosynthesis and behaviorism.125 These stated goals were indicative of the academic 
audiences he hoped to reach: anthropologists, philologists, psychologists. What is not seen 
here, but evident elsewhere in his correspondence, was Whorf’s interest in reaching non-
academic audiences. Having had his self-funded work on ancient Aztec covered in The 
Hartford Times, Whorf sought on at least two occasions to publicize his latest research 
endeavour through nationally distributed newspapers. In April 1929, he contacted Barrow 
Lyons, a representative of “Science Service” at the New York Evening Post, with clippings 
from his work on two rare Aztec manuscripts. Later that year, he contacted Merritt Bond, of 
the North American News Paper Alliance, hoping to “furnish a series of weekly articles 
during [his] stay of two months or longer in Mexico and Yucatan, written on the spot about 
the people, the country, and [his] experiences” (21 November 1929, BWP). Both offers 
were rejected. While Lyons was diplomatic in his refusal, Bond replied flatly: “I see nothing 
in the stories you enclosed which will be of sufficient interest to justify our sending them to 
our membership” (Bond to Whorf, 5 May 1930, BWP). Ultimately, Whorf’s only recognition 
in a national periodical was his obituary in The New York Times (1941), which made no 
mention of his contribution to linguistics.126 
Nevertheless, we can discern from these failures more than a lack of interest in 
Indigenous languages and culture (though I will return to this topic below). Indeed, even 
                                                          
125 Concepts from behaviorism were of “marked help” in shaping this concept, he wrote, but "behaviorism in 
turn must undergo modification in light of these phenomena of language" (1928 SSRC Research Fellowship 
Application, BWP). 
126 Whorf’s close friend George Trager later wrote a letter to the editor of the Times to correct their oversight 
(29 July 1941, GTP). 
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the LSA at this point was endorsing the Dialect Atlas of American English over the 
cataloguing of Indigenous languages (Murray 1994: 142). Tracking Whorf’s changing 
tactics after each rejection, rather, offers insight into his understanding of the relationship 
between anthropological linguistics and its potential publics, as well as the role he 
anticipated for himself as a popularizer. In his letter to Bond, for instance, perhaps hoping 
to rectify the response he had received from the New York Evening Post, Whorf made clear 
that his research trip was not merely some excursion but a “planned scientific project” (21 
November 1929, BWP; Whorf’s emphasis), as scientifically interesting as “big expeditions 
that require fortunes in equipment, apparatus, and personnel before they can start.” Whorf 
employed a similar strategy two months later, when he turned his attention toward the 
private sector. He asked the Victor Talking Machine Company to “furnish a small, compact 
recording phonograph and supply of wax blanks such that [he] can carry it in [his] camp kit 
and use it in recording words and sentences in Aztec and Maya” (to Maxfield, 4 January 
1930, BWP)—a donation needed, since his Grant-in-Aid would only cover costs of travel. 
He described this work as essential not only because of its “value to science but also on 
account of the publicity possibilities.”127 Here, we can make out his efforts to recalibrate his 
pitch, emphasizing his study’s contribution to science (and science’s allure to a wider 
public) as much as its appeal to curiosity over different cultures. While the mobility and 
affordability of this human science were prevalent in the first instance, in the second we 
glimpse Whorf’s negotiation of the tools necessary to make his ephemeral phonetic 
analysis more enduring (and hence, perhaps, more befitting of a science in his mind, 
though the phonograph was not a standard tool for the linguist at this time). We can also 
                                                          
127 Whorf is confident that universities and museums will want reproductions of these recordings. 
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make out the fault lines starting to form in the bifurcation of scientific and humanistic 
interest in language, echoed in the concurrent professionalization of the field. 
Whorf’s intended narrative for these unwritten articles might be reconstructed, in 
part, from his letter to Bond. Though Whorf ensconced his request in an appeal to the ethos 
of science, a closer inspection reveals only a loose attachment to the epistemic virtues of 
anthropology or linguistics. At this early juncture of his career, perhaps more the amateur 
than the specialist, Whorf’s pitch broadcasted self-promotion more loudly than any 
particular scientific understanding of language or culture he hoped to convey. Indeed, he 
quickly downplayed the tenor of scientific input in the prospective series, perceiving his 
role as popularizer more along diffusionist lines: 
What comparatively little scientific matter went into them would be 
popularized, and diluted with human details, dramatic incidents, and exotic 
local color. The tone would be personal, adventurous—light, and yet with a 
touch of the mystery and drama that are inseparable from Mexico and 
especially from the aboriginal Mexico that survives among the Indians of the 
mountains. I would seek to bring the Mexican scene vividly to the eyes of the 
American readers and make them feel the spell of the strange environments 
in which I am going to be. (to Bond, 21 November 1929, BWP) 
Whorf was clearly informed by the Americanist tradition, intending to structure his 
accounts in a way that resembled anthropological field journals: “In these articles I shall 
speak of their home life, their amusements, their women and their position and influence, 
dress books, traits, customs such as those relation to courtship and marriage, loves songs; 
the children, the young maidens, the folklore….” Notably, however, Whorf placed an 
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emphasis on his own experience of events: “How will my classical Aztec be intelligible to 
the Indians from the start? Will my accent be terrible? What will the Indians think of a 
white man coming among them and knowing anything of their language at all?” Rather than 
introduce the Native peoples as potential collaborators, a cornerstone of the Americanist 
tradition (Darnell 2001: 17), Whorf’s construction of their experience for a white middle-
class audience would have been immensely ego-centric. Whether this proposal reflected his 
honest perspective, or whether he simply underestimated his readership, remains unclear. 
Regardless of the authenticity of the viewpoint Whorf put forward, his letter to Bond 
nonetheless characterized the kind of intellectual persona he envisioned for himself and 
how his investment in linguistics might help him achieve it: 
I happen to be going into a field that is new and that promises large scientific 
returns, but where there is really only one absolutely essential piece of 
equipment needed, which requires only one man to work it, and is light, 
inexpensive, and very easily transported, because a man can carry it about 
under his hat. This equipment is a working knowledge of the Aztec language. 
The draw of the language sciences, as he presented them here, was multifaceted. There was 
the novelty of it, the association with a pioneering spirit. The allure also lay in its 
methodology: its techniques for employing the linguist’s own mind as a “laboratory” for 
phonetic analysis, which implied careful training and self-discipline to find patterns in 
human behavior. Linguistics had no need of a formal laboratory setting to follow through 
on the promise of research. 
The wording of the passage, moreover, suggests a tug from outside the narrower 
disciplinary formation. It recalls the synecdoche of mind-brain for genius-level intellect, for 
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which Einstein in this era was the archetype. This linkage surfaced earlier that same decade 
in the initial media coverage of Einstein’s arrival in America, where he was depicted as a 
“man in a faded grey rain coat and a flopping black felt that nearly concealed the grey hair 
that straggled over his ears . . . underneath his shaggy locks was a scientific mind whose 
deductions have suggested the ablest intellects of Europe” (“Revolution in Science” 1921). 
For many, Einstein epitomized the figure of the singular genius, a fixture of twentieth-
century imaginaries about scientific success. The scientific genius not only embodied 
prevailing ideals of what a scientist should be—but, through the unique qualities of their 
mind, also exceeded them.128 In Einstein’s case, he was conceived at once of fulfilling the 
virtues of the ascetic intellectual and disinterested professional (Merton 1942, Weber 
1919), working in solitude, divorced from social and material contexts, and of transcending 
those categories through his individuality and creativity. This image was propagated 
through print, film, cartoons, and other media during Einstein’s life and beyond. Though 
intuition and imagination were by this time qualities growing alien to the context of 
scientific justification, they were nonetheless admitted in the context of discovery—when 
they appeared in-born in the body of the genius (Radcliffe 2008: 64), specifically the 
brain.129 Whorf’s address to Bond thus disclosed his yearning to fashion himself within the 
                                                          
128 Part of Einstein’s fame in 1921 came from the recent confirmation of his predictions. A theory forged in 
the mind in 1915 was confirmed spectacularly in the big solar eclipse of 1919. 
129 Roland Barthes (1972) comments on the persistence of Einstein’s brain as such an object of curiosity after 
his death, indicating how, at the same time as it serves as a paragon of human acuity, it is rendered 
nevertheless in dehumanized terms: “The mythology of Einstein shows him as a genius so lacking in magic 
that one speaks about his thought as of a functional labour analogous to the mechanical making of sausages, 
the grinding of corn or the crushing of ore: he used to produce thought, continuously, as a mill makes flour, 
and death above all, for him, the cessation of a localized function: ‘the most powerful brain of all has stopped 
thinking’” (68–69; emphasis in original). 
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same mythos, situating the locus of genius “under the hat” of the linguist, in the brain—his 
brain. 
At the outset of his career as a popularizer, Whorf attempted—and failed—to install 
himself within the iconography surrounding Einstein. To better understand those 
unsuccessful performative acts, it is helpful to analyze the conditions of the felicitous ones 
he sought to imitate. Besides advancing theoretical physics, Einstein’s theory of relativity 
functioned within American narratives of self-improvement and upward mobility (Missner 
1985): depicted as it was in popular media, as fully comprehensible only to a select group 
of scientific experts but littered with strangely familiar concepts (such as a “fourth 
dimension”), Einstein’s relativity offered a means of belonging among the best and 
brightest intellectuals of the Western world. Drawn into momentary identification with the 
celebrity-scientist, an experience irrespective of embodied conditions, readers could be 
rescued from “the humdrum of a daily chore,” to borrow an aphorism from Whorf’s 
obituary. Moreover, the success of Einstein’s image helped manage questions over how to 
contain the figure of the genius, for so long understood as essential to the ideal of scientific 
progress, at a historical moment when the scientist was “on the cusp” of “moral 
ordinariness” (Shapin 2008: 46); the genius offered a site to navigate the uncertainties 
accompanying this newfound scientific self, representing crucial exceptions that could 
preserve qualities in process of being evacuated from the role of the scientist but which 
nonetheless remained essential to the perceived operations of science.  
One of Whorf’s later works, a manuscript unpublished during his lifetime, 
demonstrated how his rhetoric and his treatment of Indigenous experience transformed in 
response to his position amongst the inner circle of American linguistics and, perhaps, his 
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failure to attain celebrity status for himself. Where his earlier unwritten projects would 
have described Indigenous language and culture through the lens of his personal 
experience, “An American Indian Model of the Universe” (published 1950, by Trager, but 
written in 1936) introduced the Hopi worldview as a similarly constructive challenge to 
Western metaphysics as Einstein’s relativity principle: “the Hopi language and culture 
conceals a metaphysics, such as our so-called naive view of space and time does, or as the 
relativity theory does, yet a different metaphysics than either” (58; Whorf’s emphasis). 
Where Whorf had once shown diffidence or indifference, here he demonstrated a stronger 
commitment to the epistemic virtues of anthropological linguistics, specifically Sapir’s 
injunction to describe a language as much as possible in its own terms, rather than 
projecting Western categories: 
In order to describe the structure of the universe according to the Hopi, it is 
necessary to attempt—insofar as it is possible—to make explicit this 
metaphysics, properly describable only in the Hopi language, by means of an 
approximation expressed in our own language, somewhat inadequately it is 
true[.] (1936b/1956: 58) 
Whorf understood the Hopi as having no sense of time as a continuous flow—no words or 
grammatical functions to correspond to the typical Western understanding of temporality, 
where time and space are conceived as separate and unconnected (59). Instead, he 
proposed the Hopi held a “kinematic” worldview, wherein the category of “time” folded 
into spatial language. In his fervor to draw out differences, Whorf perhaps overstated that 
the “Hopi language gets along perfectly without tenses for its verbs” (64), when in another 
document he had noted three tenses in the language (1936a). What was evidently more 
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important to him, on this occasion, was the winnowing he witnessed in scientific 
modernity. What the ”modern western scientist” deemed “mystical” in the Hopi, Whorf 
stressed, was indeed “justified pragmatically and experientially” (1936b: 59); despite its 
underlying differences, the Hopi language could correctly account for any temporal event 
an Indo-European language could, “in a pragmatic or operational sense” (57). Thus, Whorf 
planned to model a form of scholarship that incorporated metaphysical and scientific 
explanation; his stance was less individualistic, reflective instead of his newfound 
responsibility as Yale lecturer, upon Sapir’s declining health, and his hopes to continue his 
mentor’s legacy and refashion how his peers could exhibit linguistic insights into culture. 
Whorf’s career as a popularizer of linguistic science was not comprised only of 
failure. He found his audience, at long last, a year before his death. In 1940, two 
publications in M.I.T.’s Technology Review (“Science and Linguistics” and “Linguistics as an 
Exact Science”) demonstrated his ability to reach institutional publics, in particular. In a 
letter to Reader’s Digest, endeavoring to get the first article republished, he claimed that it 
“attracted rather wide attention” and received enthusiastic responses from a variety of 
sources—English professors, business executives, physicians, and more (3 September 
1940, BWP). These works likely influenced Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, which cites Whorf in its introduction. Elsewhere, relativity enabled 
Whorf to make the achievements of linguistics legible to an uninitiated readership: 
“Discovery of the phonemic principle made a revolution in linguistics comparable to 
relativity in physics” (Whorf qtd. in Lee 1994: 176). In his papers for the Technology 
Review, physical relativity—specifically, the calibration of observers—proved integral to 
the development and uptake of own theory. 
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As Penny Lee (1996) elucidates, Whorf borrowed indiscriminately from the models 
of physical science, molecular chemistry, and gestalt psychology—but calibration, it seems, 
was as crucial a concept for Whorf as it was for Einstein, though in different ways.130 In the 
first essay for the Technology Review, Whorf presented “a new principle of relativity, 
which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same 
picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way 
be calibrated” (1940a: 214). Calibration was useful to Whorf in two ways. In the first, it 
offered a conceptual platform from which he could extend the phonemic principle to the 
study of meaning: where the acoustic range of a phoneme in any given language could be 
quite diverse and impossible to determine without indexing the expertise of a native 
speaker of that language, Whorf drew on a similar logic to construct subjective experiences 
informed by internalized linguistic systems (Lee 1994: 176–177). These experiences, too, 
realized the same underlying pattern as the phoneme, often unnoticed except to the 
discerning ear. Through this process of calibration, Whorf believed linguistics could 
function to decentre “rationalizing techniques” derived from Indo-European languages “as 
the apex of the evolution of the human mind” (1940a: 218). Whorf described his 
formulation of relativity as not “strictly rational,” but based on principles of empirical 
observation: how the world came into focus through a “kaleidoscopic flux of impressions” 
organized by the observer. Calibration offered, for him, a means to appreciate the diversity 
of language and experience but maintain the spirit of “curiosity and detachment” 
characteristic of the empirical scientist (219). 
                                                          
130 Peter Galison (2000), for one, stresses the material circumstances of Einstein’s theory of relativity, 
showing how it was responsive to a widespread fascination over “electrocoordinated time” and the matter of 
synchronizing trains and clocks across great distances. 
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Secondly, calibration was a concept readily translated into a terminology already 
endemic to linguistics: agreement. Lee (1996: 228) describes three meanings of agreement 
at play within Whorf’s work: (1) the checking of statements against one another; (2) the 
implicit agreement embodied by a shared language (the closer the dialect, the easier to 
calibrate); and (3) the modification of our internalized system against others’ in order to 
maximize communicative effectiveness. Agreement, Whorf asserted, is “reached by 
linguistic processes, or else it is not reached” (1940a: 212). It is easy to see how the 
“strong” interpretation of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (known as “linguistic 
determinism”) might be assumed from the tenor of these statements, but perhaps the 
occasional boldness of Whorf’s claims can instead be understood to imbibe the conviction 
he felt for linguistics, his apprehension toward the shifting responsibility of the sciences in 
modern life, and his desire for a wide audience to take seriously an amateur specialist’s 
conjuncture of science and salvation.131 
It was these concerns, I contend, that motivated Whorf to conceive a special role not 
just for himself, as a singular scientific genius, but for the group he identified as “scientific 
linguists.” Whorf believed scientific linguists (or elsewhere, “theoretic linguists”) were best 
positioned to study the systematic tacit knowledge conferred by language, make solvent 
the constraints of grammar, and therefore broker agreement about the world (1940a: 211–
212). He distinguished scientific linguists, here, from a linguist in the more general sense: 
someone who knows a lot of languages. The basis of this boundary work would become 
                                                          
131 Whorf early on sought linkages between scientific and exegetical practices, as he expressed to his cousin: 
“I had begun to see that the cosmology of the Bible . . . could be so interpreted as to combine with the ideas 
and discoveries of our science to produce a philosophy of a very grand, elevating, and religious sort” (Whorf 
to William Rich, 1923, BWP). 
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clear in his next article. In “Linguistics as an Exact Science,” Whorf elaborated on the role he 
envisioned for the scientific linguist, presenting the democratization of scientific logic as 
one of their major contributions.132 He framed the paper as an introduction to phonetic 
formulae for the “philosophical and mathematical analyst who may try to exploit the field 
of higher linguistic symbolism with little knowledge of linguistics itself” (1940b: 222–223). 
Whorf drew strong comparisons to the formal sciences, likening linguistics to mathematics: 
“The exactness of this formula, typical of hundreds of others, shows that, while linguistic 
formulations are not those of mathematics, they are nevertheless precise” (230). He also 
drew comparisons to the experimental sciences, like chemistry: “Its data result from long 
series of observations under controlled conditions, which, as they are systematically 
altered, call out definite, different responses” (230). These comparisons helped lay the 
groundwork for him to pursue the idea that language was the basis of scientific agreement 
to one of its possible conclusions. The “scientific use of language,” Whorf asserted, “is 
subject to the principles or the laws of the science that studies all speech—linguistics” 
(221). He believed that the worldview of modern science arose from a “higher 
specialization” in the grammar of Indo-European languages, but maintained that scientific 
results were not “caused” by a grammar—they were “colored by it” (221). Indeed, 
becoming “semiconscious” of the patterns of language, he argued, removed their binding 
power (225). His understanding of the role of language in science was not deterministic 
but—as was the role of linguistics in his own life—emancipatory. Emily Schultz (1990) 
argues that Whorf emphasized the constraints of grammar because he felt he needed to 
                                                          
132 In a later paper, Whorf argued that the sciences themselves had the potential to become “mutually 
unintelligible” dialects (1941b: 246; emphasis removed). 
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break the “false consciousness” of American liberal individualism and disrupt the 
“monologic” language of science. Through the figure of the scientific linguist, we glimpse 
how he imagined this might be. Rather than imagine a society based on “multiple forms of 
belonging in difference” (Muñoz 2009: 20), Whorf’s utopic vision construed a singular 
solution, employing linguists to solve problems of difference through agreement. 
Sometimes, as Lily Kay (2000) demonstrates in her masterful analysis of the 
mapping of information discourse onto the life sciences in the mid-twentieth century, the 
pathways of scientific exchange fall along lines of sustained analogy. Kay describes 
“catachresis” as the basis of these transfers—a metaphor of a metaphor, a signifier without 
a referent, capacious enough to invest a range of meanings but constrained enough to be 
productive. Relativity, for Whorf, formed such a catachresis. For Whorf, the patent office 
where Einstein worked or the coordination of times across vast expanses were far less 
immediate concerns than the conditions, rather, of the latter’s fame and its influence on the 
public understanding of science in America wherein he sought to make a name for himself 
and, later, for other linguists. In relativity, Whorf found a language that could reach a public 
already inundated by Einstein’s iconography and, in linguistics, a meta-language he 
believed could solve the problems besetting modernity and avert the narrowing 
commitments of the sciences. If Einstein’s relativity “matched the mood of uncertainty that 
followed the savagery of World War I” (Fahy 2015: 4), Whorf’s efforts to attain the status of 
public intellectual and popularize a linguistics centred on difference responded, in turn, to 
his desire to acknowledge a world spun out by centrifugal forces and recalibrate a common 
frame of reference therein. In my reading, however, Whorf ’s relativity was not premised 
on radical difference or the incommensurability of language and experience, as many 
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interpretations suggest, but instead on their resolution into agreement—a containment of 
difference that in effect reaffirmed the indefatigable spirit of Western science, with 
linguistics, its greatest champion, operating as a meta-science capable of fostering 
agreement among its peers. The makings of Whorf’s relativity emerged in this other 
context, amid debates over the nature of science, the role of the scientist, and the value of 
experience and observation, wherein language was an important vehicle. There, he was not 
alone. 
   
d. Between Semantics—and Pseudoscience. 
Previously, I addressed Whorf’s minor works, which dwelt on the difference of Indigenous 
experience in his efforts to cultivate the persona of a scientific genius, and his more 
renowned papers, communitarian in their focus on the construction of the “scientific 
linguist” on similar grounds. In the latter case, however, he met with competition. The 
science of language, in its inchoate disciplinarity, had yet to solidify its cultural or epistemic 
authority. Though by this point in Whorf’s lifetime the field had begun firming its 
boundaries against the contribution of non-experts, relying less on amateurs and 
instituting stricter guidelines for garnering evidence from informants, it had still to 
negotiate with other organizations—some intended audiences or potential allies, others 
not. As a potentially marginal figure himself, Whorf perhaps had a heightened sense of 
these boundaries and felt the need to enforce them at both ends: against the expertise of 
native speakers—his experimental “apparatus”—on the one end, and against other 
philosophies of language on the other. In this section, I show how Whorf’s efforts to 
demarcate a strict role for linguistic scientists responded directly to the challenges posed 
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by the contemporaneous logical empiricism movement and the Institute of General 
Semantics—each brandishing its own illumination of the science of language and meaning, 
each vying for control over its ethos. By triangulating these coordinates, I historicize a 
broader discourse on the role of language in uniting an increasingly specialized, 
internationalized science. Whorf shared in an imaginary that the science of language could 
be employed as a meta-science, a tool to reorient dispersed fields of inquiry and reverse a 
burgeoning “scientific babel” (Gordin 2015); at stake in this boundary work was not just 
Whorf’s career as a popularizer, but the future of science itself. 
In his inaugural address for the history of science journal Isis, Robert Sarton (1924) 
captured the urgency of the time to repair a fractured science. Extoling the virtues of a 
general education in science and the humanities, the article addressed the increasingly 
tapered vision that scientific specialization entails. Despite science dividing into branches, 
he argued, there was nonetheless an enduring “unity of science” (10)—an indivisible whole 
that was also, to him, a reflection of the utopian potential of humanity: “Unity of knowledge 
and unity of mankind are but two aspects of one great truth” (11). Like Whorf, Sarton 
believed that science was the “common thought of the whole world” (24), the only domain 
where “all have equal rights” (13). Whorf’s vision, above, for a unified science was also a 
commentary on a branch of rational thought—logical empiricism—whose expression 
depended, he believed, only “on laws of logic or reason” and thus represented a way of 
distilling reality that was agnostic to the situation of the observer (1940a: 208). To fully 
grasp the extent of this disagreement and language’s fixture within competing visions for 
science and the future, I must flesh out Whorf’s encounter with this school of thought. 
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The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism (2007) provides important 
contextual information on the initiative, its theoretical commitments and its major works. 
The publication “The Scientific Conception of the World” (1929) by Hans Hahn, Otto 
Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap, inaugurated the public phrase of the Vienna Circle, which 
proceeded to spread internationally in Europe through French and English networks 
(Standler 2007: 14). The term “world-conception” (in contrast to “worldview”) conveyed a 
broadening of scientific method to other intellectual and practical domains. It was founded 
on the application of logical reasoning to empirical experience—hence the labels “logical 
empiricism” or “empirical rationalism”—and was meant to counteract overspecialization in 
science, particularly in scientific language.133 The authors conceived of logical empiricism 
as an intellectual tool derived from and embedded within the everyday life of the scientist 
and, as a consequence, a means of consolidating the diverse “mosaic” of knowledge in a 
common sediment. 134 Their goal of a unified theory of knowledge was reinforced by the 
Unity of Science movement, promoted by Neurath, Carnap, and Charles Morris between 
1934 and 1941 in North America (18), the same years Whorf was most active as a scholar. 
As part of this movement, logical empiricism found a warm welcome with New York City 
intellectuals and established a second base of operation in Chicago in 1935 (Reisch 2007: 
61), in addition to their other in The Hague. However, the advent of World War II, in 
addition to Neurath’s death in 1945, put a stop to their momentum. Within the ensuing 
political culture of Cold War America, the prospect of unifying science held uncomfortable 
                                                          
133 Neurath (1955: 5–10) explained history of how empiricism became separate from “philosophico-religious 
constructions.” 
134 Unlike Sarton, above, who conceived of scientific knowledge-making as a “tree” or Korzybski, below, who 
modeled it after the human “nervous system,” Neurath (1955: 3) understood the history of empirical science 
as a “mosaic,” with scientists inlaying and changing its pieces as they built it up. 
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associations with totalitarianism (71), and it met with a “climate of fear” that paralyzed 
leftism in American universities (Schrecker 1986), resulting in another failed project of 
scientific modernity. 
The flagship undertaking of the Unity of Science movement was the International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, though only the Foundations (Neurath et al. 1970) was 
ever published, itself a multi-volume effort incorporating the works of the logical 
empiricists and other notable scholars, such as Niels Bohr, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, 
and Thomas Kuhn. Through the planned Encyclopedia, Neurath (1955) aimed to show how 
a range of activities common to the sciences (observation, experimentation, reasoning) 
“can be systematized to help evolve unified science,” in this way “creating the system of 
science” (2; emphasis in original). The logical empiricists conceived of unified science in 
these terms—as singular, definite—and asserted that a vast “comparative scheme could 
show the amalgamation of . . . the common and different features of various theories” (4). A 
utopic project of a larger scale than Whorf’s dream for scientific linguists, the Encyclopedia 
would serve as a model of human knowledge-making by enacting a “scientific analysis of 
the sciences” (15). It would synthesize rational and positivist approaches that diverged 
centuries before in the early modern period (10). It would contribute to the ultimate aim of 
a “unified science departmentalized into special scientific activities” (20), coordinated 
through this central repository and the efforts of its founders.  
Finding a common a language, not only underneath the specialized discourse and 
symbols of the sciences but applicable to daily life, was the cornerstone of this ambition. 
Carnap's (1955) inclusion in the Foundations highlights the centrality of language—
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specifically, logical syntax and semantics135—to this endeavor, for its capacity both to yolk 
rationalism and empiricism and to reframe the problematic of the unity of science as a 
question of logic, not ontology (49): as a series of formal relations between terms.136 
Carnap defined the “language of science” as the “language which contains all statements . . . 
used for scientific purposes or in everyday life” (45). His analysis took scientific results and 
rendered them thus into a series of “statements asserted by scientists” (42), whose 
component parts could be distilled and reassembled into “ordered systems of those 
statements” (43). For him, “it is possible to abstract in an analysis of the statements of 
science from the persons asserting the statements and from the psychological and 
sociological conditions of such assertions” (43). Within formal syntax, science became a 
system of statements and their logical correlates. Semantics, in addition to the above 
formal analysis, took on the issue of “designation”: how different scientific terms might 
refer to the same object, property, relation, of function (44). Through this process of 
abstraction, logical methods enabled the analyst to compare and connect seemingly 
disparate laws and reduce them to a common language of statements (60). Carnap 
admitted that not all derivations were possible at this stage—that there was not yet a 
unified science—but insisted there was a unity of language upon which to base that greater 
unity, namely “a common reduction bases for the terms of all branches of science” (61). 
Reduction or agreement, then, formed the basis of dissent between the Whorfian 
and logical empiricist articulations. Whorf addressed the difference in the last published 
                                                          
135 In the proceeding chapter, Morris extended this schema to the pragmatics of the language of science, 
taking into account the "psychological, methodological, and sociological aspects of scientific practice" that are 
essential for the process of “confirmation” (72). In this respect, he attended to the remainder of Carnap’s 
theorization of syntax and semantics. 
136 Carnap prefers “term” over “concept” in his nomenclature: the word concept conveys a psychologism, i.e. 
“images or thoughts somehow connected with a word” (49), which he seeks to avoid. 
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article during his lifetime, also for the Technology Review. “Languages and Logic” (1941a) 
presented the reader with two figures, Mr. Everyman (a “natural logician,” or native 
speaker) and the formal logician, neither of whom could see the similarities between two 
statements in English: “I pull the branch aside” and “I have an extra toe on my foot” (233). 
A linguist, on the contrary, had access to a range of languages to compare. In the 
Algonquian language of Shawnee, for instance, those two statements would be alike; a 
Shawnee logician, he surmised, might class the phenomena as similar, because 
linguistically they would be minimally different (234–235). Facticity, Whorf argued, was 
thus modulated by linguistic background, and even logical inference subsumed the 
properties of its original language, rather than foreswore them (236). Where the reduction 
principle threatened to obviate categories alien to the logician’s native tongue, Whorf’s 
relativity principle—founded on agreement and “multilingual awareness” (244)—meant 
that “science can have a rational or logical basis even though it be a relativistic one and not 
Mr. Everyman's natural logic” (239). Calibrating different types of logic would explain what 
appeared as irrational behavior and, through this exposure, defamiliarize the effects—or 
“embroidery” (239)—of language on our own forms of cognition (238), for example the 
dominance of Aristotelian subject-predicate logic among Indo-European languages (241).  
 From his various excurses on natural logic and the science of language, Whorf not 
only engaged the logical empiricists but also attracted the attention of the Institute of 
General Semantics (IGS). A representative of the Institute contacted Whorf in hopes of 
gaining permission to reproduce “Science and Linguistics” for their seminars (Kendig to 
Whorf, 7 May 1940, BWP). The permission was granted, but Whorf admitted his skepticism 
over their initiative to his contact at the Technology Review: “I overcharged partly to 
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discourage them” (to Fassett, 24 May 1940, BWP). The recruitment pamphlet Whorf 
received featured a Memorandum from the Institute’s director and intellectual leader, 
Count Alfred Korzybski, whose work Science and Sanity (1933/1958) served as the 
foundational textbook for the movement. The pamphlet included the Institute’s first annual 
report, covering its “pioneer period,” applications of general semantics in various fields, an 
announcement of seminar courses planned for the 1940 meeting and, finally, a list of 
Institute publications.  
 
Figure 8. The Other Chicago School (7 May 1940, BWP) 
The IGS was founded in May 1938 “for linguistic, epistemologic, scientific research and 
education,” and it was “incorporated under Illinois law as a non-profit educational 
institution” the same year, its students comprising “professionals, scientists, physicians 
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(psychiatrists included), lawyers, and educators, including specialists in speech, linguistic 
and reading difficulties, etc.” (Korzybski, Memorandum, BWP: 5). Within a scant twenty-
five hours of group training, Korzybski claimed a range of beneficial consequences: the 
treatment would dissolve inhibitions or excessive drinking; improve creative capacity, 
intelligence, and reading difficulties; cure stutter; work even where psychoanalysis fails; 
protect against suicide; and eliminate “semantogenic difficulties” related to heart, joint, 
arthritic, respiratory, or sex problems (11–12). Korzybski surmised that a vast majority of 
students (90%) experienced the benefit of general semantics in their professional or 
personal lives, sometimes with as little as one or two hours of personal interviews. The 
Institute wanted to republish Whorf’s article because it lent credence to their claims that 
applied linguistics could effect behavioural change. 
Whorf’s chance meeting with the Institute taught him a lesson that would become 
an enduring feature of his archive. A facet of his work’s going public meant it was no longer 
under the author’s control: “The point is that it is so easy for individuals or organizations of 
a somewhat crackpot nature—I am not saying that the Institute of General Semantics 
belongs to this class—to broadcast this article with all sorts of contexts added, and you and 
I do not know where it goes or how it is used” (to Fassett, 24 May 1940, BWP). In Whorf’s 
implied dismissal of the Institute as chicanery, pseudoscience figures as the failure that 
haunts any act of popularization—the potential for scientific theories or results to be 
applied differently than intended. Albert Wohlstetter and Morton White (1939) did more 
than imply: their article decried general semantics as a threat to the Unity of Science 
Movement over the scientific and cultural authority of semantics. The two factions 
comprised the general semanticists (Stuart Chase, Thurman Arnold, Jerome Frank, 
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Korzybski) and logical empiricists (Rudolf Carnap, Alfred Tarski, Morris Cohen).137 
Wohlstetter and White claimed that the former group were “pseudo-semanticists” who did 
not, like the USM, employ “logical analysis as part of the scientific method”; rather, they 
used “garbled” language to prey on the Movement’s prestige, for unscientific purposes (53). 
The works of Chase, Arnold, and Frank represented an unsavoury fad;138 Korzybski’s 
Institute, they insisted, was “a cult” (53). Wohlstetter and White were highly skeptical of 
the IGS’s implicit claim that any problem, from the medical to the political, could be 
reduced to misunderstandings of language (52). Ultimately, they emphasized that this 
“inept exploitation of the theory of meaning” had to be distinguished “from the science of 
semantics” (57). It was only because the logical positivist method had not yet been 
popularized that such “cure-alls” as the IGS could gain traction (51). 
It is tempting to regard the IGS as an isolated institution, or disregard it as 
pseudoscience, just as Wohlsetter and White did. As I commented above, regarding Whorf, 
sometimes it is more productive to interrogate how and why the claim of pseudoscience 
operates as a threat to scientific ethos than to deny its legitimacy. It is necessary, in other 
words, to take the IGS seriously, as it was most definitely not an isolated institution. Many 
universities offered accredited courses in general semantics; respected scholars endorsed 
its theories. It furthermore influenced an array of thinkers, finding its place within an 
                                                          
137 The occasion of Wohlstetter and White’s paper was Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa’s (1939) defense of general 
semantics in the magazine The New Republic. They claim that Hayakawa displayed “ignorance of the 
authorities he cites and an extreme technical incompetence in semantics” (51), blurring the meaning of 
“semantics” entirely and grouping together unlikely thinkers. Wohlstetter and White used their response to 
Hayakawa as a platform to detail the errors of general semantics and derail its chief proponents. Whereas the 
Carnap collective were “interested in the formal and procedural aspects of inquiry,” Korzybski’s by contrast 
were concerned with the “latest best-sellers” and “get-rich-quick” schemes (51). 
138 Arnold, Chase, and Frank published, respectively, The Folklore of Capitalism (1937), The Tyranny of 
Words (1938), and Save America First (1938). 
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intellectual culture already disposed to treat language as a vehicle for addressing other 
social anxieties (Cameron 1995).139 For example, in The Tyranny of Words (1938), Stuart 
Chase understood general semantics in terms of a language improvement initiative, 
convinced that it would offer a way to make language a better means of communication: 
“Language itself needed to be taken into the laboratory for competent investigation” (6).140  
He framed abstract or “bad language”—and those who abuse it, like politicians—as the 
enemy. Only through mastery of general semantics could one employ abstract language 
safely, conscious of it as an “expert lion tamer” would be their big cat (9). Like Whorf, Chase 
believed the basis of clear communication was agreement over a common referent (9), but 
unlike Whorf—whose analysis was founded on multilingual awareness—Chase located the 
basis of that agreement in words which corresponded to his own experience (5). That 
difference was of particular significance because the general semantics movement was, 
lastly, another site of uptake for results from anthropology and linguistics, though perhaps 
an unexpected or unintended one. While Korzybski asserted that his work derived 
independently of other theories of semantics, which did not espouse “a general theory of 
values” like his own (1958: xxii), the IGS nevertheless conjured an atmosphere to which 
Whorf and the Unity of Science Movement also belonged—one in which a “moral self” 
emerged through efforts to craft a linguistic self (Cameron 1995: 68), and one where 
debates over science and democracy were threaded through a contested expertise over 
language and meaning. 
                                                          
139 Cameron (1995) understands “verbal hygiene”—when popular discourse (for example, style guides or 
political correctness) renders some language “good” and other “bad”—as standing in, symbolically, for real-
world subjects that are too uncomfortable for commentators to address directly (217). 
140 Following Korzybski, Ogden and Richards, Chase defines semantics as the “science of communication” (7), 
at odds with today’s meaning, which distinguishes itself as the branch of linguistics concerned with 
“meaning.” 
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  How, then, did the supposed cure-all of general semantics work? Korzybski 
explained: 
General Semantics formulates a new branch of natural science, an empirical 
theory and general method of human evaluations and orientations. This 
science is concerned with the control of the linguistic and semantic 
mechanisms present in all human nervous systems which condition all our 
knowledge, activities and adjustment. Thus General Semantics as a complete 
systematic methodology is applicable in all specialized fields of scholarship 
and scientific investigation, in the professions, in general education and 
psychotherapy, in everyday living, etc. (Memorandum, BWP: 14) 
General semantics posited a direct channel between higher cognitive functions and “the 
extenionsialized structure of language,” a process by which attending to one’s language 
introduced “delayed reactions” into the impaired functioning of the cerebral cortex and 
thereby induced “emotional balance, normal blood pressure, glandular secretion, 
regulation of acid formation, etc.” (10).141 In Science and Sanity, Korzybski elaborated on 
the biological inferences informing this model of embodied cognition. He understood the 
human organism as a system of relations within an integrated “whole,” in contrast to an 
“Aristotelian” understanding, premised on subject-predicate logic and thus with no 
opening for relations among parts (187).142 Whereas the Aristotelian model must assume 
                                                          
141 Chase (1938: 41) offered a succinct breakdown of the three regions of the brain invoked by this therapy: 
the spinal cord and cerebellum, which managed automatic response to stimuli; the midbrain and thalamic 
region, which took “care of vivid, dynamic, and emotional matters calling for quick response with little 
reflection”; and the cortex and higher brain, which were responsible for messages that require reflection, 
namely “thought.” 
142 A rejection of binarism in Aristotelian systems of thought is central to Korzybski’s text—which puts 
forward instead “multiordinality” as the main innovation of general semantics (14)—but not central for my 
purposes. Within Korzybski’s conceptual order (194), “pre-human” or “primitive” reasoning functions 
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that impulses spread simultaneously through the body (akin to the immediate 
identification enacted by the copular verb “to be”), so order was not important, in a non-
Aristotelian model this process was realized in terms of a spatialized coordinate system: 
within the “finite and known velocity of nervous impulses, and the serial, chain structure of 
the nervous system, order becomes paramount” (193; emphasis in original). Although the 
two did not reference each other, Korzybski’s theory of language and mind, like Whorf’s, 
belonged to an intellectual sphere stimulated by Einstein’s work. For Korzybski, however, 
“the achievement of Einstein was the building of a linguistic system similar in structure to 
the world, which eliminated a pathological pre-human factor of objectification of terms” 
(655). Namely, Einstein’s theories made it clear for Korzybski that ordinary language 
structured concepts of matter, space, and time differently—and erroneously—from the 
structure of the material world (657). As a map represents the world, Korzybski believed 
language should do the same for the nervous system (11); accordingly, transformations in 
linguistic structure would improve navigation, and consequently the function, of the human 
nervous system. Re-ordering one’s language, in other words, re-ordered oneself. 
In this way, Korzybski’s general semantics initiative corresponds to Joe Dumit’s 
(2003, 2004) analysis of “objective-self fashioning.”143 Dumit’s notion of objective-self 
fashioning attends to the rhetoric surrounding the production and translation of brain 
images in late-twentieth-century America. Position emission topography (PET) scans, he 
                                                          
through unrestricted (one-valued) identification, for instance the absolute sameness of taking signal for food 
in the classic Pavlovian experiment; “infantile” or “Aristotelian” thinking through restricted (two-valued) 
identification, for example perceiving a strange animal as a dog, with the associations that entails; and “adult” 
or “non-Aristotelian” thinking through no identification at all (infinite or n-valued). 
143 Object-self fashioning belongs to a broader tradition investigating “brainhood” (Vidal 2009). Vidal speaks 
to the broader history of the rise of the “cerebral subject” in Western societies from the seventeenth century 
to the present, emphasizing its embeddedness within scientific understandings of the brain and sociocultural 
accounts of individuality. 
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argues, emerged in this period as a focal point between biomedical technology and 
identification. Drawing from rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke, Dumit understands 
“identification” as a form of self-persuasion, whereby one is convinced of the objectivity of 
one's own experience—but where one is also, through that aperture, perpetually open to 
refashioning when ways of knowing the “objective self” change or fail (7–8). He cites a 
1983 cover of Vogue as a crucial moment when the public eye was turned to the association 
between brain scans and normative identity; the cover juxtaposes three such images with 
the captions “Normal,” “Schizo,” and “Depressed.” The images, however, represent idealized 
composites of behaviour types and resemble very little typical brain patterns. Dumit thus 
makes the observation that the authority that these scans convey often exceeds the control 
of the scientists and experimental practices that create them. Once a public began to 
identify—or not—with these images, their influence on normative personhood and self-
knowing took on a life of their own. 
The two main arguments that Dumit draws out in his analysis of objective-self 
fashioning—the pathologization of difference and the porosity of scientific authority—
come to bear on Korzybski’s project, as well. Korzybski framed general semantics as a 
guide to “mental hygiene” (1933: 9). In normal thought processes, Korzybski explained, 
impulses pass directly through the thalamus into the cerebral cortex, but in abnormal, the 
“main impulse [was] blocked semantically” and did not (193). The key to sanity, he 
claimed, was a rejection of entrenched structures of language that led one to false 
conclusions about the world and hence disruptions in the nervous system; for him, these 
errors of identification represented “extremely wide-spread delusional states” (195). 
Rather than rely on visual culture to convey its objective self, general semantics seized 
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upon the zeitgeist of language improvement initiatives—“[W]e must build a new language” 
(373), Korzybski urged, one that is “structurally reliable and safe” (372)—which, much like 
discourses of endangerment, often positioned linguistic purity against virus-like threats to 
the health of the body-politic (Heller & Duchêne 2007: 4). General semantics also echoed 
narratives of upward mobility through scientific understanding that permeated the public 
imaginary alongside Einstein’s theory of relativity, with Korzybski asserting that “very 
simple yet powerful structural factors of sanity can be found in science” (lxxxvi).  
Nonetheless, Korzybski perceived popularization itself as a threat to the ethos of 
science, often doing more harm than good, because scientific facts could not be properly 
utilized with “antiquated psycho-logical orientations,” which to him lent themselves to a 
form of “structural ignorance” (lxxxi). For Korzybski, the potential for scientific results to 
operate independently of their authorities was as much a hindrance to his model of the 
objective self as false identifications—indeed, part and parcel of the same problem. General 
semantics, on the other hand, promised to adapt scientific facts into the structure of 
language directly, forging an isomorphism between thought process and the structure of 
the world. Unlike modes of identification through the propagation of scientific images or 
celebrity-scientists, discussed above, general semantics instead sought to erase the analogy 
implicit in any act of identification—to flatten entirely the differences among language, 
cognition, scientific theories, and the natural world. The Institute of General Semantics took 
the international aspirations of the logical empiricists a step further: rather than one 
language for a united science, it posited one language for one cosmos—the ultimate unity, 
putting the rational mind not only in the driver’s seat of the body, but in confluence with its 
environment, as well.  
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The general semantics movement thus struck their own balance between relativity 
and unity, difference and experience, and science and democracy that were features of this 
era—as did Whorf and the logical empiricists. The theories each group espoused 
sublimated their concerns over scientific modernity within the contested terrain of 
language and meaning; their fragile utopias appeared alongside attempts to guard against 
misinterpretations or misappropriations by each other and by the audiences they sought to 
persuade. Efforts to galvanize a science of meaning dealt, in other words, with the 
problematic of translation on both fronts. Within the budding disciplinarity of linguistics, 
scientific knowledge about language was detachable and afloat between varying modalities 
of expertise and authority. It was through an appeal to scientific ethos that Whorf and these 
movements aspired to avoid the complexities and uncertainties of translation, but it was 
within that flux that they also met them. If pseudoscience is a label meant to unite science 
as a whole by designating a common antagonist to its authority or credibility (Gordin 2012: 
104)—for contemporary linguists who dismiss him, that antagonist is Whorf; for Whorf, it 
was the Institute of General Semantics—then in this way it functions as the inverse of and 
supplement to popularization. The designations of pseudo and popular are both a form of 
boundary work, both a means of extending and solidifying the cultural authority of science: 
one in the negative, the other positive. Despite such efforts, however, the ethos of science 
remains porous and uncertain. At times, each of the approaches discussed in this section 
was believed, endorsed, popularized—at other times, each was rendered unbelievable, 
illegitimate, pseudoscientific. Identification with scientific success—whether it be through 
the charisma of genius, the austerity of objectivity, or the dominance of a theory—proves to 
be a fleeting, fragile form of self-persuasion, a momentary passing. If Whorf’s legacy of 
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failed translations is of any indication, it is the porosity of scientific ethos that adheres well 
after the initial contexts of discovery and justification fade from view. 
 
Conclusion: Benjamin Lee Whorf—a Failure. 
In this chapter, I have portrayed Whorf as the last amateur and the first popularizer of 
linguistic science. Under the guise of neither persona did he make all the right choices. 
Whorf was not a master of communication and persuasion, arguably not even a master of 
linguistics. He was a hobbyist—and a professional. An engineer—and a bricoleur. A 
popularizer—and unpopular. A unifier—and divisive. Above all, he was a failure: in none of 
these identifications was Whorf ever fulfilled. But as Shoshana Felman (2003) reminds us 
in her close reading of J. L. Austin’s speech act theory, every promise is predicated on the 
possibility of its failure. The promise of linguistics, through the eyes and ears of Mr. Whorf, 
was no different. An analysis of failure—elsewhere, and here, a task of some perversity—
enabled me to consider how the amateur specialist and his unruly mind stacked up against 
the archetype of “good linguists” that the Linguistic Institutes sought to train, or how his 
self-fashioning depended upon callous newspaper editors and uncertain sites of uptake. 
Nonetheless, despite the litany of failures and mistranslations that followed his career and 
relativity hypothesis, Whorf’s purported unbelonging remains a historical retrojection—a 
refusal of the amateur and, perhaps, of the history of the discipline itself. The persona of 
amateur specialist did not represent the oppositional logics of a scientific identity—its 
subjectivity was not moulded solely in relation the virtues of objectivity, was not 
repeatable within a standardized training regimen—but instead a conflation of categories, 
a desire to close the gap between longing and belonging. Belonging as a category of analysis 
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thus ruptures the binarisms upon which scientific personas are often premised: of subject 
and object, amateur and master, success and failure. In my study as in Whorf’s life, failure 
proved to be generative and, in its way, more inclusive category than success for assessing 
the common goals and relations that structured who belonged and how to the science of 
linguistics—and who did not. 
 
Figure 9. Mr. Whorf—the Mis-fit (Miscellanea, BWP) 
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This chapter has thus examined the messy formative years at Yale through the eyes 
of an amateur specialist who, through his propensity to swim upstream, cut through the 
heart of them. I presented both Whorf’s career and the theory of linguistic relativity—
persistent bugaboos in the science’s self-memory—as manifestations of the field’s inchoate 
disciplinarity, a map hence redrawn to exclude them. Whorf’s archive is often used to think 
about the influence of language alone: namely, the effects of language on thought. Here, I 
have used it to tell another story: how the emerging professional identity of the linguist, 
now taken for granted because of its success, obliges us to think about the linguist alone. 
Linguistics fused elliptical space by increasingly refusing the participation of amateurs and 
delimiting the scope of contribution for informants. Whorf’s partial uptake of this identity 
reminds us—perhaps more apparently because of his slippages—that the linguist’s 
subjectivity was formed at the height of the salvage paradigm and resonated its 
assumptions about the failed self-determination of Indigenous peoples over their language 
and culture. The next chapter examines the concurrent construction of an epistemic system 
that further marked who would count as a “linguist” through the bracketing of an object of 
study that was foremost their own. 
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~ 3 ~ 
“The decadence of linguistics is largely your own fault. You’re an individualist and haven’t 
built up a school.” 
- A. L. Kroeber to Edward Sapir, 1917 
 
“One can describe what is peculiar to the structural organization only by not taking into 
account, in the very moment of this description, its past conditions: by omitting to posit 
the problem of the transition from one structure to another, by putting history between 
brackets.” 
- Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play,” 1978 
 
Bracketing Time:  
The First Yale School of Linguistics, a Study of Method 
 
Introduction: Becoming Linguists. 
The project of disciplinarity within linguistics intensified during Edward Sapir’s years at 
Yale University (1931–1939).144 Perhaps inspired by his colleagues at the Chicago School of 
Sociology, or motivated by the stifling museum culture in Ottawa, or incensed by recurring 
debates with his peers in anthropology, Sapir began to realize the advantages of distilling a 
disciplinary identity for linguistics. Indeed, Sapir’s dedication to linguistics resulted in his 
declining positions at the Chicago Field Museum, Bureau of American Ethnology, the 
University of California, and the University of Pennsylvania (Darnell 2001: 122); he even 
turned down an offer to succeed Boas at Columbia the same year he took the position at 
Yale (131). Already a focal point for Indo-European studies and site of the Linguistic 
Society of America’s (LSA) first summer Linguistic Institutes, Yale was fast becoming a 
                                                          
144 The chapter subtitle references Sapir’s (1916) “Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Cultures, a Study 
in Method.” 
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major centre for linguistic research in America—and, with Sapir’s addition, the only such 
program to offer advanced studies in Indigenous linguistics. It was there that Sapir trained 
a coterie of students to take up the mantle of salvage; with his support, they conducted 
fieldwork and amassed archives on Indigenous languages and cultures from across North 
America. What’s more, they advanced methodologies for the elicitation and study of sound 
systems that Sapir had developed over previous decades. At this juncture, linguists were 
prepared not only to dash the competition but to bracket the conditions of their mastery. 
My final chapter examines how the Yale school codified their intimately distant methods 
but, in the process of securing this scientific expertise, failed to preserve its humanistic 
foundations. 
Linguistics professionalized rapidly in North America, with the founding of the 
Linguistic Society of America (1924), its journal Language (1925), and the emergent 
training centres that were the Linguistic Institutes (1928). The national association was 
organized by George Bolling and Leonard Bloomfield, who recognized the need for a 
society for the general study of language rather than of specific language families (Murray 
1991). In the first paper published in Language, Bloomfield (1925) articulated the 
exigencies which a linguistic society would assuage: it would bring together a generation of 
scholars who had scant opportunities to meet, yet whose aims were “so well defined,” their 
methods “so well developed,” and their field’s “past results so copious” (1). It would also 
acquaint lay and academic audiences with a science of language, of which they were either 
unaware or, at most, believed a practitioner of it “merely a kind of crow-baited student of 
literature” (4). The independence of a linguistic science depended, then, on the 
consolidation of a network of scholars, institutions, professional associations, and 
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publication venues across the space of the United States (and Canada) and, moreover, on 
the construction of a legible scientific identity for linguists to occupy in their own and their 
publics’ minds. These conditions did not appear all of a sudden but, as my previous 
chapters demonstrated, emerged out of existing disciplinary and nationalistic frameworks 
for conducting science and in relation to shifting understandings of the role the scientist. 
Chapters 1 and 2 traced, respectively, how salvage linguistics relied on a web of 
informants, stenographers, collectors, missionaries, amateur ethnologists, and 
professionals to enact their research and, through the figure of Benjamin Lee Whorf, 
explored the positionality of the amateur amidst the field’s nascent disciplinarity. 
Becoming a science, however, required more than the organization of a network or the 
identification with a scientific self: linguists also needed to bracket an object of study that 
was exclusively their own. Bloomfield (1926) registered a set of axioms for this 
undertaking, but a science—even the science of language—is more than a series of 
statements. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997) introduces the concept of “experimental 
systems” to describe the “genuine working units of contemporary research in which the 
scientific objects and the technical conditions of their production are inextricably 
interconnected” (2). Scientists, he contends, are not engineers: they are bricoleurs working 
within the limitations of their experimental systems to produce unexpected (and even 
unprecedented) “epistemic things.” These epistemic things are “material entities or 
processes—physical structures, chemical reactions, biological functions—that constitute 
the objects of inquiry” (28). Where for nineteenth-century linguistics the regularity of 
sound laws discovered via comparative reconstruction was the process in question, in the 
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twentieth century linguists inaugurated another epistemic thing: the phoneme.145 In 
contrast to phonetics—the study of the physical properties of speech-sounds—phonology 
represented the study of the structural unity of a sound system despite its overt acoustic 
differences. The phoneme ultimately enabled linguists to assemble synchronic descriptions 
of linguistic systems, bracketing off the historical dimension of prior comparative work. 
Sapir (1925) and Bloomfield (1926) introduced this mode of analysis in the American 
context.146 
The advent of the phoneme coincided with the proliferation of linguistics programs 
in America. Between 1927 and 1931, the number of American university positions in 
linguistics expanded, with trained faculty offering courses on the subject at California, 
Pennsylvania, Chicago, Washington, and Yale (Leeds-Hurwitz 2004: 160), in addition to the 
bastions at Columbia and Harvard. Due in part to the profile of the Committee on Research 
in Native American Languages (discussed below), the development of these university 
programs, and the launch of the summer Linguistic Institutes (LIs), professional linguistics 
in America began to rely less on the work of talented amateurs (though some, like Jaime de 
Angulo and Whorf, persisted) and more on their own university-trained peers. The 
                                                          
145 Indeed, both the novelty and the thing-ness of the phoneme were subjects for debate at the outset. 
Behaviorist William Twaddell (1935) disputed each. For Twaddell, the concept of phonology was not new, 
but “its apparent newness [was] a product of increased accuracy of phonetic observation” (5). Awareness of 
the range of phonetic difference, “even within the usage of a single individual,” induced the need for a 
separate technical term. Twaddell furthermore challenged proponents of the phoneme to restrict the 
indeterminacy of its descriptions, arguing that previous psychological and physical definitions were “open to 
serious if not unanswerable objection” (33), and proposing his own theory of the “macro-phoneme” in their 
stead. I would argue that the phoneme may not have been new as a concept, but it was novel as an epistemic 
thing, and consistent with Rheinberger’s definition that such things “present themselves in a characteristic, 
irreducible vagueness” (28). 
146 A parallel articulation of the phoneme occurred overseas in the works, for instance, of Ferdinand de 
Saussure and Nikolai Trubetzkoy. Although there was some interchange between the two groups (Bloomfield 
reviewed Saussure’s Cours), limited circulation of texts and American hostility toward European intellectuals 
in the interwar period kept the two streams independent of each other until after the Second World War.  
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cleavage between the expertise of the professional linguist and that of the amateur or 
informant grew commensurately, as linguists circulated their thoughts and practices 
increasingly amongst themselves. Of those institutions named, this chapter attends to a 
group of scholars who composed the “First Yale School” of linguistics (Hymes & Fought 
1981), led by Sapir.147 From its inception upon Sapir’s arrival at Yale as the Sterling 
Professor of Anthropology and Linguistics to his death almost a decade later (1939), this 
collective served as a nexus for research in the Indigenous languages and cultures of North 
America—much of which unraveled soon after its leader’s demise when his program was 
dismantled (Darnell 1998b).148 The majority of Sapir’s disciples in the Linguistics 
Department worked on Indigenous languages: Walter Dyk, Mary Haas, Fang-Kuei Li, 
Stanley Newman, Morris Swadesh, Charles Voegelin, and Mr. Whorf. 149 By the mid-1930s, 
Sapir and his former and current students “formed the core of the LSA committee on 
                                                          
147 Sapir joined three other prominent linguists at Yale: Franklin Edgerton, Edward Prokosch, and Edgar 
Sturtevant. Together, they offered a graduate program in Linguistics that was independent of other language 
departments at the university (Darnell 1998b). Language departments at American universities were 
interested in "literature rather than linguistics and in the practical abilities of speaking, reading and writing 
rather than in general problems of structure” (Boas et al., Report on April 1937 ACLS Conference: 50, APS). 
148 Sapir’s hiring was endorsed by the newly appointed president of Yale, James Angell, and by the Rockefeller 
Foundation (Darnell 1998b). Yale offered him a salary of $12,000 (with $5,000 for fieldwork), a tremendous 
amount within the Depression, which Chicago was unable to match (Murray 1994: 102). However, there were 
tensions at Yale from the beginning of Sapir’s appointment: Angell hired him to act as a bridge between the 
social sciences for the Institute of Human Relations. Sapir was meant to be “as a superstar—an exception to 
the corporate rules” (Darnell 1990: 384). Boasian anthropology, however, was at odds with the evolutionary 
sociology practised at the university and the differences proved to be insolvent. For more on Sapir and the 
IHR, see Darnell (1990: 383–397; 1998b). At Yale, Sapir also faced anti-Semitism: Jews were not allowed to 
teach undergraduates at Yale, and Sapir was prohibited from joining the faculty club (1990: 327–328).  
149 When Sapir returned from Canada in 1925 to teach as Professor of Anthropology and Linguistics at 
Chicago, he attracted a number of students, many of whom later followed him to Yale and wrote dissertations 
on Indigenous languages of North America (Murray 1994: 101): Walter Dyk (Wishram, Yale, 1933); Mary 
Haas (Tunica, Yale, 1935); Harry Hoijer (Tonkawa, Chicago, 1931); Fang-Kuei Li (Mattole, Chicago, 1928); 
Stanley Newman (Yokuts, Yale, 1931); Morris Swadesh (Nootka, Chicago, 1931 M.A. Thesis). Only Hoijer 
remained at Chicago to teach linguistics; Li became a visiting professor at Yale from 1937 to 1939, during 
Sapir’s declining health (103). 
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American linguistics” (Darnell 1990: 285).150 The department at Yale—a font for vast 
funding agencies, a host to the first LIs, and a centre for the use and theorization of the 
phoneme—therefore became vital to the discipline, with Sapir’s pupils at the vanguard of 
refining its epistemic things. 
Only a fraction of the LSA’s founders worked on Indigenous languages of America.151 
Nonetheless, these scholars were central nodes in the development of American linguistics, 
training a generation of scholars, elaborating on theoretical principles, and proving their 
methods of analysis. Within this experimental system, the unwritten languages of America 
were likewise integral for refining modes of elicitation and recording; they were frequently 
called upon to exemplify rarefied linguistic features. Moreover, they facilitated boundary-
work between the lay or philological privileging of literary languages and the linguist’s 
scientific view that all languages were equally complex and thus worthy of study.152 
Bloomfield, for instance, cites the systemic properties of non-literary languages as a basis 
of their scientific impartiality: “linguistics finds . . . a similarity, repugnant to the common-
sense view, between the languages of highly civilized people and those of savages, a 
similarity which disregards the use or non-use of writing” (1925: 2).153 The figure of the 
“savage,” in other words, was foundational to the ascent of American structural linguistics, 
                                                          
150 In her history of linguistics lecture, Mary Haas recalled that the Yale school "had the reputation, at the 
time, that MIT had in the '60s” (1976: 367, MHP). No other linguistics program in the country offered serious 
work on Indigenous languages (Darnell 1990: 359). 
151 Of the initial membership in the LSA, there were “nine philologists and more than ten modern language 
teachers for every two anthropological linguists” (Murray 1991: 5), 
152 The title of “linguist” was by no means a new designation, but in this disciplinary context it was invested 
with new significance to distance the “linguist’s” activities from those of the philologist. Haas commented on 
the distinction: “one of the reasons why then ‘linguists’ objected to the term ‘philology’ [was] because they 
wanted to work with living languages and with unwritten languages and they didn’t like this restriction in the 
use of the term ‘philology’” (1976: 9, MHP). 
153 Bloomfield, like Sapir, was trained in Germanic philology and comparative Indo-European methods but 
expanded his purview to the study of Indigenous languages, particularly the Algonquian language family. 
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both in principle and in practice. Jodi Byrd (2011) recognizes that “the idea of the savage 
and the ‘Indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, 
as well as their posts-” (10). For Byrd, the transit of empire has depended upon a correlate 
process of “becoming savage,” validating Western narratives of progress by relegating 
Indigenous peoples to the past perfect.154 The “Indian” nonetheless remains the ghost in 
the machine and field upon which these becomings are predicated: “They might also be 
said, as savages, to signify the necessary supplement that continually haunts the edges of 
any evocation of civilization or Western thought” (9). So too, I contend, is the transit of 
linguistics in America haunted by “Indianness,” the ghost in their experimental system that 
was used to legitimate their objects of study and advance their growth as a discipline. 
However, even with the support of institutional patrons and the enthusiasm of a 
generation of newly trained workers, the scope of these linguists’ goals to document all the 
extant languages of North America was impracticable. Sapir, along with his colleagues 
Bloomfield and Truman Michelson, surmised that the rate of decline of these languages 
would always exceed their ability to document them: 
These languages are rapidly disappearing; many, indeed, are extinct and will 
never be known to us. Those which remain are in all likelihood doomed to 
disappear in a generation or two. Students of language are in the position, let 
us say, of botanists who should see a vast and interesting flora which has 
been doomed to extinction; they must gather specimens before it is too late. 
                                                          
154 Jodi Byrd’s (2011) commentary draws attention to Derrida’s evocation of “tattoed savages” (quoted from 
Gustave Flaubert) and Deleuze and Guattari’s reference to the Hopi spiral. She finds in both these 
articulations of poststructuralist philosophy the presence of the “Indian” as a figure always already deferred, 
already known, and completed. 
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 (“Project for a Survey of North American Indian Languages,” 1926, APS) 
Salvage linguistics hence prefigured discourses of endangerment that gained prominence 
later in the century. Within these discourses, Fernando Vidal and Nélia Dias (2015) show, 
“endangerment” refers not only to a state of affairs in the world but becomes a means of 
understanding and responding to that world. Vidal and Dias review an “endangerment 
sensibility” that has come to activate a network of values and affects, rousing “the 
perception that vast portions of the human and non-human world are in danger of 
extinction or destruction” (2). In the realm of biocultural diversity, this sensibility renders 
Indigenous communities stewards of their local environments, their cultures experientially 
linked to their surroundings: they become akin to an “ecologically noble savage” (10). In 
contrast, Western science understands itself as reasoned, universalized knowledge, whose 
techniques of classification and description ensure a supposed emotional distance (27)—
or as I argued previously, rather an intimate distance. Indeed, despite claims of 
impartiality, these cataloguing practices often carry with them a fatalistic attitude, 
“anticipating the failure of the cure” (2), such as that glimpsed in Sapir, Bloomfield, and 
Michelson’s statement above. Caring for the communities themselves becomes secondary 
to gathering data on their language and culture.155 
Both for contemporary preservation movements and their precursors earlier in the 
century, prognostications of endangerment and impending loss have been accompanied by 
this impulse to archive, as we saw through the work of the Geological Survey in Chapter 1. 
                                                          
155 Rebecca Lemov (2015) historicizes another degree of displacement, which took place from the 1940s 
through the 1960s, when anthropologists sought to revivify their field by turning to its stores of dormant 
data. Here, concern transferred to the archives of anthropology (“an archive of archives”), which were 
themselves in peril and subject to a process of "second-order endangerment" (89). 
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In his reflections on scientific archives, Geoffrey Bowker (2005) troubles the “avowedly 
perfect memory” of the sciences (5), focusing instead on the informational technologies 
and habitual practices that scientists employ to memorialize their objects of study and 
maintain disciplinary histories. The archive establishes a series of traces that govern what 
is remembered and, by the same token, what is forgotten. Bowker argues that 
transformations in the dominant medium of storage evoke different “memory regimes.” 
These regimes “articulate technologies and practices into relatively historical constant sets 
of memory practices that permit both the creation of a continuous, useful past and the 
transmission sub rosa of information, stories, and practices from our wild, discontinuous, 
ever-changing past” (9). For contemporary diversity studies, Bowker highlights the digital 
database as the central technological achievement supporting their cataloguing 
practices.156 Salvage initiatives of earlier in the century relied on analog approaches to do 
comparable work, employing such mnemonic devices as journals, index cards, 
photographs, and audio recordings. Apprehension governed their work of apprehending 
cultural and linguistic data; adhesion to flat surfaces assuaged their concerns over their 
subject’s finitude. To this end, they also developed systems of classification to sort out 
languages and cultures and synchronize them within the same archival framework. My 
chapter will foreground the documentation practices of the First Yale School, examining 
how the archival activities of these linguists were intermeshed with the field’s disciplinary 
development. What was the cost of memory and which organizations funded it? How did 
                                                          
156 The database, according to Bowker, is an invention that confers “the ability to order information about 
entities into lists using classifications” (2005: 108), dating back to rise of statistics and government archives 
in the nineteenth century. 
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the trained linguist generate and manage their memory prostheses? What was the fate of 
their stores of information, and how might those collections be remembered differently? 
In addition to studying the discourses that instituted these archives and the memory 
practices that furnished them, I will consider the archives themselves as historical objects. 
Lorraine Daston (2017) evaluates how the archive manifests many functions in relation to 
the sciences: it not only establishes continuity with the past, as Bowker shows, but also 
renders comparable research in the present and stores material for future use (3). The 
archive serves “to annihilate time” and make data commensurable across periods (11). 
Judith Kaplan (2017) attests to the durability of practices in linguistics, examining how 
basic vocabulary lists were maintained as a tool across “disciplinary, technological, and 
linguistic” (204) systems over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—a phenomenon 
which she terms “data drag.” Kaplan configures drag as a recalcitrance toward change, but 
Elizabeth Freeman (2010) offers another articulation: her phrase “temporal drag” recalls 
“all the associations the word ‘drag’ has with retrogression, delay, and the pull of the past 
on the present” (62).157 These practices proved to be a durative aspect of the linguist’s 
experimental system (both for their durability across time and for their fixed temporal 
parameters), but the archives they supplied were nonetheless conjugated in the 
imperfective—as events without completion, as directions of pull dragging the past to an 
unknown future point. Where linguists once utilized their archives to look backward into 
deep history, the salvage program was oriented more so toward a speculative futurity: its 
adherents assembled archives of partial data in expectation of a later opportunity when 
                                                          
157 Freeman defines temporal drag in relation to the “time” of queer performativity. She identifies that time as 
linked implicitly to the progressive, the avant-garde, the new, whereas she locates it in “cultural debris [that] 
includes the incomplete, partial, or otherwise failed transformations of the social field” (2010: xiii). 
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their work might be completed. These linguists were conscious that their efforts would 
never match the rate of diversity being lost.158 Their memory avowedly imperfect(ive), 
they assembled descriptions of languages in anticipation of an occasion outside the 
temporalities of salvage, when there would be time for further analysis, theorization, and 
revision.159 In this way, languages were not only objects to be archived but were also 
archives in and of themselves, each containing stores of potential information for their 
successors to resume and advance. Within the salvage framework, the anticipated failures 
of cultural and linguistic reproduction gave rise to the need to memorialize that which 
would be lost, but the durability of the archives themselves was not a given. The work of 
rendering data commensurable across periods depended on their eventual retrieval, for 
which there was no certainty. Bloomfield declared continued work in this area “a national 
duty”: “If we fail, we shall be shamed before the judgement of posterity: we may be certain 
that it is by this kind of thing that future generations will judge us” (to Boas, 17 February 
1937, BWP). This was a field of inquiry at a crossroads, replete with themes of salvage and 
loss that could apply equally to their own endeavours as to the subject of their study. 
Time, therefore, was not so much annihilated in these archival practices but a 
precious commodity, on which these linguists hoped their investment would bring returns. 
Bloomfield’s framing draws attention to an adherence to the settler state as a depository 
for collecting interest upon that investment. Mark Rifkin (2017) develops the notion of 
“temporal sovereignty” to discuss the ways in which the state restricts Indigenous self-
                                                          
158 In Charles Voegelin’s (1941) account of the Native languages spoken north of Mexico, he estimated that 
there existed just under 150, excluding those already “extinct” (16), especially along the East Coast. Less than 
half of that number were studied by this point, at varying levels of detail. 
159 Boas commented on the need to revise early work: “It is very seldom that a single investigation, extended 
over a few months, clears up adequately the structure of a language, and a revisit of the tribe is often 
essential” (Report on Committee on American Indian Languages, January 1941, APS). 
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determination through asserting a monopoly over time. For Rifkin, “settler time” signifies 
“a particular way of narrating, conceptualizing, and experiencing temporality” (viii), one 
which limits how Indigenous peoples establish continuity with the past, inhabit the 
present, and envision the future. The state reproduces its authority either by consigning 
First Peoples to the traditional or by incorporating them into settler-governed modernity: 
either arrested in the past or winnowed into the present. Narratives of both stasis and 
transit, then, become mobilized to bolster settler frames of reference. Or as Rifkin puts it: 
non-native acts of translation work “not primarily to understand Native temporalities but 
to insert them within settler timescapes” (25). Linguists were enrolled in the modernist 
project to manage its excesses in this way, turning loss into a scientific commodity. Rifkin 
goes on to consider what conditions might rupture settler time and promote “temporal 
multiplicity,” fostering different fields of relations to continuity and change. To this end, I 
will show that the failure of Sapir, Bloomfield, and their peers to complete a totalizing 
archive of languages, installed within the temporalities of the settler state, can be read as 
the condition of possibility for re-thinking settler frames of reference within the science of 
linguistics. Failure, here, evokes different mappings of time and potential retrievals of these 
archives, their latency a subject of fertile reworkings rather than regret. 
My chapter thus extends Rifkin’s argument to the temporalities of salvage 
linguistics, which were—and remain—entangled in questions of Indigenous sovereignty. 
As the collection practices in Chapter 1 suggested, over the course of the twentieth century 
the “lifespan” of endangered languages has come increasingly to intersect with linguistic 
science: with the theories that linguists profess, with the collective memory they curate, 
with the inscription technologies they employ, with the evidence they publish and 
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discuss.160 Taking seriously the metaphor of language as a living entity, I interrogate the 
ways it gets materialized in scientific practice and ask: what is lost when a language is lost, 
and who grieves its passing? I argue that American linguists established themselves as 
scientists in relation to these not-yet-dead languages and, as such, their successors must 
recognize a collective responsibility and “response-ability” (Haraway 2008) toward 
Indigenous peoples, upon whose knowledges and expertise they once depended. I 
therefore join recent postcolonial rethinkings of such scientific collection practices (Fabian 
2010, Reardon 2005). Radin et al. (2013), for instance, stress how technologies for freezing 
and storing blood for genome diversity studies “reveal enduring colonial dimensions of 
scientific practice in our global age and demonstrate new openings for ethical action in the 
realm of the biosciences” (468). By a different measure, so too have linguists operated 
within parallel ethical frames—their methods, techniques, and technologies for isolating, 
storing, and classifying languages have no less formed the “connective tissue” (Stoler 2013) 
that ties together colonial legacies and contemporary language revitalization movements.  
The installment of linguistics as a science in America marked these and other ways 
of inhabiting time. Rifkin explains how such temporal “orientations” are the product of 
repeated encounters: they are “shaped by existing inclinations, itineraries, and networks in 
which one is immersed, turning toward some things and away from others” (2017: 2). 
Accordingly, I cast the events described in this chapter as a series of turns. For linguists, the 
advent of their discipline turned the production of novelties within their experimental 
system into a recognizable expertise and career path; it disclosed an expectation that the 
conditions of labour to reproduce that system would persist without interruption within 
                                                          
160 I deal with the metaphor of language-as-a-living-entity and its critiques in more detail below (§f). 
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and beyond their lifetimes. For Indigenous informants, it anticipated their willing 
participation in settler-colonial collection projects; it turned their tacit knowledge into 
linguistic data and, in turn, bound up the transmission of many of their languages with the 
archives of linguistics. The phrase “time binds” takes on several meanings here, but I follow 
Freeman’s definition of it: “naked flesh is bound into socially meaningful embodiment 
through temporal regulation: binding is what turns mere existence into forms of mastery in 
a process I’ll refer to as chrononormativity, or the use of time to organize individual human 
bodies toward maximum productivity” (2010: 3). What applies to bodies, I argue, is also 
true of the languages they (re)produce. The binding of bodies into settler time that turned 
amateurs into specialists and First Peoples into informants depended upon the actual 
bindings of texts, the brackets within which linguists organized languages and out of which 
derived their mastery. Bracketing time was necessary, in other words, to render productive 
others’ words. My chapter therefore presents a history of turns and brackets (that which 
enables but also impedes turning). It explores two brackets in particular, unfolding in 
different time-scales but bound together, like vocal cords: the methodologies the Yale 
School developed for deriving linguistic data from living informants and the materiality of 
the records of those languages traced within the archives they left behind. My chapter 
raises the question, worked out in historical time but mindful of present engagements and 
future horizons: how does one care for a language? In the sections below, I examine the 
temporalities inscribed into the First Yale School’s commitment to the salvage formation, 
their regimens for training the body, their rhythms of elicitation and transcription, their 
genres of synchronic description, and finally the archives of their material records. In each, 
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I pick out strands of imperfection and incompletion that characterized this project’s 
entanglements and unravelings over time.  
 
❖ Living Proof 
a. [Committing to Knowledge] 
Much of the work of amassing data on Indigenous languages was orchestrated through the 
Committee on Research in Native American Languages.161 The American Council of 
Learned Societies (ACLS) helped to sponsor the Committee, which was active from 1927 
until 1937 when it ran out of funds. Franz Boas chaired the project, alongside Sapir and 
Bloomfield.162 The Committee proved to be a crucial node for concentrating funding and 
support for American linguistics amid the Depression and interwar period, in addition to 
raising the profile of a predominately linguistic research program. It represented a 
renewed commitment to the salvage formation, and it was a space for negotiating different 
bracketings of knowledge therein: between the “conservative” and “imaginative” 
approaches respectively of Boas and Sapir. For Sapir, it was moreover a means of 
advancing an anthropologically informed Americanist tradition to his colleagues at Yale, 
who belonged to a “general” linguistics concerned with the written languages of Indo-
European descent. Through the Committee, Sapir could also offer his students the 
opportunity to conduct fieldwork on yet-unstudied languages of North America and help 
maintain their status as scholars in hard economic times.  
                                                          
161 For the fullest account of the formation, activities, and dissolution of the Committee, see Wendy Leeds-
Hurwitz (1985, 2004). 
162 The Committee itself was composed of three subcommittees: the Council Committee (Edward Armstrong, 
Edgar Sturtevant, and John Swanton), who oversaw funds on behalf of the ACLS; the Committee of Execution 
(Boas, Sapir, and Bloomfield), who directed the project; and the Advisory Committee (later, the Advisory 
Board), a supplementary consulting group (Leeds-Hurwitz 2004: 129). 
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Before the Committee’s establishment, there was no single body to coordinate the 
study of Indigenous languages across America. In ten years, it spent over $80,000 for 40 
workers to survey over 70 languages (Leeds-Hurwitz 2004: 132).163 The primary use of the 
Committee’s funds was to facilitate fieldwork, rather than training or publication, with the 
aim of collecting expansive material on languages at risk of vanishing; administrative costs 
were to be kept to a minimum, with grants directed through existing scholarly 
infrastructures (127).164 The April 1927 “Conference on Research in the American 
Languages” established the fundamental goals and procedures of the Committee, along 
with a provisional list of research centres through which those funds would be 
administered. These institutions included: Universities of California, Chicago, Columbia, 
Harvard, Pennsylvania, and Washington, in addition to the Bureau of American Ethnology 
and American Museum of Natural History (130). Invitations for advisory members were 
sent to scholars already active in the field: Roland Dixon, Pliny Goddard, John Harrington, 
Diamond Jenness, Alfred Kroeber, Truman Michelson, Paul Radin, Frank Speck, and John 
Swanton; all but Radin accepted, and each member (except Jenness in Ottawa and 
Bloomfield at Ohio) was located at one of the approved research centres (131).165 Within 
this arrangement, universities operated as training centres; the majority of workers 
supported were already known to the Committee, usually students of Boas or Sapir, who 
                                                          
163 The Carnegie Corporation provided the first grant of $10,000 per annum for five years, administered 
through the ACLS. 
164 On rare occasions, the Committee supported publication directly, such as Sapir’s account of Southern 
Paiute (Leeds-Hurwitz 2004: 136). Otherwise, it recommended texts to be published by the American 
Ethnological Society and grammars by the Bureau of American Ethnology; full dictionaries were held back 
(168). 
165 Later members of the Advisory Board included: Jaime de Angulo, Berard Haile, Melville Jacobs, Alfred 
Kidder, and Gladys Reichard (Leeds-Hurwitz 2004: 131). Bloomfield rejected Father Adrien-Gabriel Morice, 
deeming missionaries lacking in the scientific spirit (130). 
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often tested their charges with university funds before recommending them to the larger 
project (139). All of Sapir’s linguistics students but Voegelin received support through the 
Committee, amounting to nearly one fifth of its total funds spent.166  
The Committee began with two separate petitions to the ACLS in 1926: one by Sapir, 
Bloomfield, and Michelson, and another by Boas. The ACLS consolidated these applications 
into one, but the distinct perspectives would persist throughout the decade. At first, Boas 
had wanted a single large group responsible for the project, including Bloomfield, Goddard, 
Kroeber, Michelson, Sapir, and himself (Leeds-Hurwitz 2004: 128). ACLS representative 
Armstrong prevailed in recommending a smaller administrative committee of three, of 
which Boas and Sapir were the two first choices.167 The different approaches of Sapir and 
Boas were known from the outset, but rather than a cause for reduction, Boas agreed that 
the Committee should accommodate these multiple epistemologies:168 
There are two lines of research represented in American linguistics; the one 
strongly imaginative, bent essentially upon theoretical reconstruction. This is 
represented by Sapir. The other more conservative, interested in the same 
problem but trying to reach it going back step by step; in other words more 
conservative. This is represented by myself. Both, of course, should be 
represented in the committee in charge of the work. 
                                                          
166 The total was $14,941.23. It was distributed among the researchers as follows, with languages studied in 
parentheses: Dyk (Wishram, Washo): $4,625.02; Haas (Tunica, Natchez): $2,185.00; Li (Mattole, Wailaki, 
Hupa, Chippewyan, Hare, Sarcee): $2,457.43; Newman (Yokuts, Bella Coola): $2,669.90; Swadesh (Nitinat, 
Chitimacha): $2,253.88; and Whorf (Hopi): $750.00 (Wendy Leeds-Hurwitz 1985: 135–136). 
167 The choice of the final member was between Bloomfield and Michelson, who possessed similar 
qualifications: both were trained in Indo-European and both studied Algonquian. Michelson, who worked for 
the Bureau of American Ethnology, was closer to the matter of Indigenous languages, but Bloomfield proved 
to be the better worker and prevailed (Darnell 1990: 280). 
168 There was, ultimately, a parity between the two camps, with grantees of the Committee “fairly evenly split 
between Boas students and Sapir students” (Darnell 1990: 281). 
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(Boas to Armstrong, 19 February 1927, APS) 
Despite their contrasting views on methods (discussed at greater length in Chapter 1, §13, 
and in the following section), Sapir and Boas promoted a harmonious portrait to ensure 
continued funding from the ACLS (Darnell 1990: 367).169 Indeed, the topic of comparative 
reconstruction—so divisive in the previous decades—became a secondary concern amidst 
the urgency of salvage, and little comparative work ultimately took place under the aegis of 
the Committee.170 As §e will make clear, rather than epistemological strife between Sapir 
and Boas being the cause, it was rather the conditions of fieldwork that disfavoured 
historical reconstruction in this period. Once, the comparative method was at the vanguard 
of linguistic science, “introduc[ing] into the order of sciences the peculiar rate of change 
known as history—a rate of change more rapid than the biologic, and therefore more 
subject to observation” (Bloomfield 1925: 3).171 However, within the temporalities of 
                                                          
169 Rarely were epistemological differences the cause of friction in Committee operations. Wendy Leeds-
Hurwitz (2004: 145–172) details other problems they faced: choosing fieldworkers; conflicts of interest 
between researchers; lack of training; coordination across the country; difficulty of funding publication; and 
the expansion of territory into Latin America. 
170 Voegelin (1941: 15) observed that comparative work had begun for Algonquian and Athabascan, was in 
progress for Uto-Aztecan, and was minimal for Siouan and Salish language families. For other Indigenous 
languages north of Mexico, there were some comparisons between word lists, but not at the level of 
systematicity that reconstruction required; in many cases, dictionaries were lacking, and there existed 
comparisons of structure but not word lists, or vice versa. Sapir’s (1929a) republication of his schematic 
super-stocks appeared to have satisfied the classificatory for delineated language families that initiated by the 
Bureau of American Ethnology in 1891, freeing linguists to focus on descriptive work (Darnell 1998a: 242). 
171 Bloomfield (1939) considered the discovery of regular sound change through the comparative method one 
of the greatest scientific accomplishments of the nineteenth century: “The method of this study may fairly be 
called one of the triumphs of nineteenth-century science. In a survey of scientific method it should serve as a 
model of one type of investigation, since no other historical discipline has equaled it” (2). 
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salvage, this experimental system became less productive.172 There was not enough 
material available to reconstruct Indigenous proto-languages, nor enough time.173  
Sapir encountered another peculiar rate of change at Yale. There, he occupied a 
median point between not only anthropology and linguistics but also “general” linguistics 
and the Americanist tradition. Relations between the latter two groups were more strained 
than the former two. Students interested in unwritten languages could belong to either the 
anthropological or linguistic streams at Yale, and Americanists interested in exploring 
historical relationships often had to seek training outside anthropology (Koerner 1984: 
116). Sapir felt more resistance among traditional linguists toward nonliterary languages 
(though he and Sturtevant, who worked on Hittite, were mutually fascinated by each 
other’s specialties), and he consequently made efforts to promote anthropological 
linguistics among his other colleagues (117).  The LSA committee on American linguistics 
planned an introduction for “general linguistic scholars,” but the publication only appeared 
in 1946 (Darnell 1990: 285). Earlier, Sapir had wanted to employ Committee results in that 
regard, advocating for his colleagues to publish materials in Language: 
In the first place, it is of the utmost important not to disconnect American 
linguistic work from the general linguistic current. Dr. Boas seems to cling to 
a somewhat adequated [sic] convention which looks upon American Indian 
linguistic material as somehow “anthropological” rather than strictly 
linguistic in character. It is, as a matter of fact, exceedingly unfortunate that 
                                                          
172 This was not the case for Indo-European linguistics. Sturtevant’s (1931) breakthrough glossary of Hittite 
and later comparative grammar demonstrated the continued vibrancy of the reconstructive method in that 
area of study. 
173 That is not to say there was no desire. From 1934–1936, Sapir offered a course in “Comparative Problems 
in Primitive Languages,” less due to his own interests than to student demand (Darnell 1990: 362). Some of 
Sapir’s students returned to these topics after the war. 
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so much of our American linguistic work is buried in anthropological series 
that are practically inaccessible to the few people, linguists, who could make 
intelligent use of it. . . . I should certainly like to see my three Paiute papers 
published in the LSA series. I should then feel that they were being 
presented, as it were, to the linguistic world at large instead of to 
constituencies compose chiefly of ethnologists, archaeologists, and physical 
anthropologists, who get linguistic papers in the mail and neglect even to cut 
their pages. 
(Sapir to Kent [cc Armstrong, Sturtevant, & Bolling], 1927, APS) 
Though Sapir shared with Boas a commitment to interdisciplinary synthesis, he 
increasingly guarded the autonomy of linguistics. Darnell (2001) comments: The 
“irresolvable divergence from Boas in models for cultural process was undoubtedly one 
reason Sapir increasingly identified himself as a linguist in the second half of his career. 
Boas’s intransigence made Sapir’s position increasingly awkward” (65). The advent of a 
linguistics society offered Sapir “an easy alternative professional identification” (66), 
where he could enjoy the pleasures of disciplinarity without the continued demand of 
justifying the basic parameters of their field. In the culture of experimentation he helped to 
foster at Yale, linguistics continued to develop methods and objectives that differed from 
those of Boasian anthropology. The parity between Sapir and Boas, which had previously 
held them in productive tension, became sedimented in the administrative procedure of 
the Committee rather than an active agent in its scientific process. 
Sapir, meanwhile, found his time divided among other obligations. In addition to his 
duties on the Committee and his responsibilities as professor and mentor, he ran the 
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Impact Seminar (1931–1932) for the Social Sciences Division of the Yale Graduate School 
(Darnell 1990: Chapter 17), served on the Advisory Committee on Personality and Culture 
(1930–1934) for the Social Science Research Council (Bryson 2009), and chaired the 
Division of Psychology and Anthropology (1934–1936) for the National Research Council 
(Darnell 1990: 319–320), along with other conference and committee work. By the mid-
1930s, he retreated from active research on Indigenous languages, except Athabascan, and 
contributed more to that field in the form of administration and supervision. His own 
studies shifted to topics of culture and personality and, late in life, to problems in Indo-
European and Semitic languages (Eggan 1986: 12).174 He remained available to the needs 
of his pupils, making efforts to train and secure fieldwork funds for them, but Sapir’s 
dedication to his own work wavered.175 He was no longer immersed in the experimental 
culture he helped cultivate for his students. In a sense, Sapir’s commitment to American 
linguistics resulted in his withdrawal from it to this organizational role. Intimate distance 
relocated to managerial distance, and the “imaginative” dimension migrated elsewhere: 
epistemologically, from historical reconstruction to phonemic analysis and, generationally, 
from Sapir to his students, especially Haas, Swadesh, and Voegelin.176 
 
                                                          
174 Fred Eggan (1986) speculates that Sapir’s turn away from research on Indigenous languages of America 
toward questions of psychology and personality coincided with the loss of his first wife and his move to the 
interdisciplinary program at Chicago. There, he encountered Harry Stack Sullivan, who had lost his mother 
around the same time and whose teachings were influential on the similarly bereaved Sapir. 
175 Stephen Murray (1994) recounts the consistent stream of failures and false starts that characterized 
Sapir’s late career. Sapir faced personal tragedy, institutional setbacks, and anti-Semitism during his years at 
Yale, but Murray speculates that he may also have been “self-defeating” (109): “I do not think that the 
increasing failure to prepare data for publication, to write planned books or monographs, to lay out a case for 
his synchronic and diachronic models, and the failure to produce exemplars of analyzing personality, intra-
cultural variability, or any language studied after 1910 can be attributed entirely to external enemies or to 
bad luck” (110). 
176 Before his death, Sapir bequeathed to which students he wanted his linguistic materials to go (Jean Sapir 
to Mary Haas, 16 Feb 1939, MHP). 
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b. [Training the Linguist’s Judgement] 
Despite their accommodations on the Committee, the epistemological rift between Sapir 
and Boas nonetheless continued to widen. The divisions fell along institutional and 
professional lines: Boas had his school at Columbia and scholarly networks in American 
anthropology; Sapir developed his own at Yale and through the LSA. They also surfaced 
methodologically in the differentiation of phonology from phonetics that took place in the 
same period.177 Sapir’s (1925) “Sound Patterns in Language” and Bloomfield’s (1926) “A 
Set of Postulates for the Science of Language” introduced the phoneme to American 
audiences as a new standard for the structural description of languages—and as an object 
of study exclusively linguistic. In contrast to the physical study of speech-sounds 
(phonetics), phonology investigated the patterning of significant sounds.178 A phoneme 
represented a “distinctive sound” (Bloomfield, 157), capable of distinguishing meaningful 
elements in a language.179 The linguist discerned these patterns through the intuitions of 
native speakers; they were otherwise imperceptible within the “grosser physiological 
substratum” of acoustics alone (Sapir, 37).180 Both Sapir and Bloomfield believed that the 
                                                          
177 The transition from phonetics to phonology was not a stark break. Linguists continued to assemble 
phonetic descriptions but increasingly supplemented them with phonological methods. Sometimes, the terms 
were used metonymically. 
178 The term pattern is key to understanding the distinction between phonetics and phonology and deserves 
clarification. Stephen Anderson (1985) defines the use of “pattern” in phonology as the variation permissible 
within the repetition of a sound for it still to be considered linguistically “the same” (7). For Anderson, “rule” 
versus “representation” distinguish phonology and phonetics, respectively: phonologists believe it is 
impractical to include predictable, or “irrelevant,” information about sounds that could be derived instead 
from grammatical rules (9). Independently, he observes, the information theory of the 1940s and ‘50s 
pursued a similar elimination of redundancy, for instance in the work of Roman Jakobson (13). 
179 One tactic for identifying phonemes in a language was the use of contrasting pairs: if a pair of words with 
minimal phonetic differences (for example, bit and bid) demonstrated a meaningful contrast to a native 
speaker, then those sound elements were understood to be distinctive in that language. Swadesh (1936) 
discusses the uses and limits of such phonemic contrasts, especially in polysynthetic and other 
morphologically dense languages. 
180 Unlike contemporary generative linguistics, which understands the phoneme to be an underlying form 
realized in rule-governed phonetic output, their predecessors conceived of the phoneme as a subset of 
possible speech-sounds, those which informed meaning. 
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linguist could gain access to the totality of a linguistic system through such a process of 
induction. The rise of phonology follows Rheinberger’s event structure for the production 
of epistemic things: “They usually begin their lives as recalcitrant ‘noise,’ as boundary 
phenomena, before they move on stage as ‘significant units’” (1997: 21). The phoneme, as a 
measure of the significant sounds amidst the “noise” of the raw acoustic overflow of a 
language, epitomizes this course, almost literally. Later theorizing of the phoneme occurred 
throughout the 1930s alongside its use in the description and analysis of Indo-European 
and Indigenous languages; in this section, I examine the parallel development of training 
measures for the linguist to apprehend the phoneme and the corresponding modes of 
objectivity that marked the body of the knower.  
Both phonetics and phonology relied on the collector’s ear as an instrument to 
acquire linguistic data, as Chapter 1 showed through Sapir’s network of fieldworkers. Even 
here, however, the aural dimension of their collection practices was put to different ends: 
Boas wanted to represent the phonetic features of a language indiscriminately; Sapir, to 
interpose the judgement of the linguist and uncover abstract rules about the language’s 
sound system. The two approaches embodied, respectively, the principles of mechanical 
objectivity and trained judgement. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2007) work out 
these “mesoscopic” categories of objectivity in relation to the visual cultures of science. 
Through the science of language, I extend them to a type of aural objectivity.181 For their 
part, Boas and his students prioritized keeping records of the “essential character” of 
                                                          
181 Below (§d), I consider in more detail the interplay of aural objectivity and the writing systems that 
supplemented it visually. 
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disappearing languages with the greatest technological accuracy possible (Darnell 2001: 
179). Their efforts were consistent with Daston and Galison’s “mechanical objectivity”:  
By mechanical objectivity we mean the insistent drive to repress the willful 
intervention of the artist-author, and put in its stead a set of procedures that 
would, as it were, move nature to the page through a strict protocol, if not 
automatically. This meant sometimes using an actual machine, sometimes a 
person’s mechanized action, such as tracing . . . to shift attention to the 
reproduction of individual items—rather than types or ideals. (2007: 121) 
Boas was hostile toward phonologic methodology replacing phonetic because, he believed, 
phonemic forms could be inferred from the latter but not the other way around; he wanted 
investigators to be free of predispositions and criticized what he understood to be the 
imposition of the observer in the description of languages (Anderson 1985: 207–208).  
By contrast, Sapir distanced the phoneme from the acoustic or articulatory 
properties of speech-sounds. In his words, the phoneme represented “the inner 
configuration of the sound system of a language, the intuitive ‘placing’ of the sounds with 
reference to one another” (1925: 40). In Chapter 1, I described how Sapir pioneered the 
use of native speakers’ intuitions to construct grammars. In the 1930s, the phoneme was 
used to exemplify this approach. His (1933/1949) paper on “The Psychological Reality of 
Phonemes” outlined five situations where speakers’ intuitions revealed the presence of 
phonemes. He argued that the phoneme’s physical features were a “signal” for the 
“identification of the given entity as a functionally significant point in a complex system of 
relatedness” (46). Sapir stressed how this process of identifying phonemes within a “total 
system of sound relations” was not an abstract calculation imposed upon language, but a 
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sensitivity felt in the speaker. This sensitivity was particularly evident in the “unguarded 
speech judgements of native speakers who have a complete control of their language in a 
practical sense but have no rationalized or consciously systematic knowledge of it” (47). 
For example, teaching an informant to write down their own language phonetically could 
produce consistent errors—to the point of view of the linguist—that disclosed phonemic 
patterning: “a native speaker’s phonetic ‘ignorance’ proved phonologically more accurate 
than the scientist's ‘knowledge’” (56).182 Rheinberger (1997) argues that the productivity 
of an epistemic thing derives from the “mutual nonfitting” of theory and practice (56). 
Phonology depended, here, on the nonfitting between sounds heard by the observer and 
those held meaningful by the informant. The phoneme was therefore the appropriate unit 
of an intimately distant methodology: an abstraction from the physical event which yet 
maintained its relationality, one system signaling a constellation of features to the other, 
with the linguist expertly mediating.183  
The works of Sapir, Bloomfield, and their students advanced this mode of expertise. 
It is important to note that informants were taught to transcribe phonetically and not 
phonemically in these encounters. The prioritization of pattern over sound manifested in 
the latter orthography: 
                                                          
182 Morris Swadesh’s (1934) article on “The Phonemic Principle” provided other examples of this kind. 
Swadesh presented six criteria to determine the phonemes of a language and account for their “range of 
deviation” phonetically. One example was the test of substitution: “This consists in pronouncing a word with 
some modification in one of the phonemes. If the modification cannot be perceived by a native, it is within the 
range of normal deviation. If the modification seems to trouble the native, it is an extreme deviation from the 
norm, a distortion” (124). 
183 In the Sapir memorial volume, Swadesh (1941) elaborated on this process of mediation: “We do not offer 
as established fact every golden remark of the native informant, but check it against the phonetics of his 
utterance, his handling of an experimental alphabet, his facial and verbal reactions to our attempts to speak 
words of his language, his pronunciation of other languages we know, and any other item that may suggest 
something. This is Sapir’s method, the critical use of every bit of evidence” (59). 
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Figure 10. Phonetic vs. Phonologic Orthography in Southern Paiute (Sapir 1933: 50) 
The phonological style was accompanied by a series of rules, similar to the laws of sound 
change, from which the linguist could derive the phonetic form. Sapir remarked: 
“phonologic orthography . . . is useless for one who has not mastered the phonology of the 
language” (1933: 50). This orthography added another layer of mediation to the procedure 
of taking down a language: the linguist’s ability to interpret the pattern back to the speaker. 
Phonology thus exemplified an interpretive interposition characteristic of trained 
judgement: 
[T]wentieth-century scientists stressed the necessity of seeing scientifically 
through an interpretive eye; they were after an interpreted image that 
became, at the very least, a necessary addition to the perceived inadequacy of 
the mechanical one—but often [it was] more than that. The use of trained 
judgment in handling images became a guiding principle . . . in its own right.  
(Daston & Galison 2007: 311; emphasis in original)  
Despite a tacit knowledge of their phonology, informants were not granted the same level 
of mastery or at least not the right tools to demonstrate it. Their knowledge was rendered a 
form of “ignorance” (even within the palliative of scare quotes) rather than another form of 
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expertise. Phonetic orthography was yet adequate for descriptive purposes; more to the 
point, it maintained the “unguarded” judgements of the informant and elevated the trained 
judgement of the linguist. The phoneme, in this light, manifested not only as the significant 
sounds of a language but also as the socio-semiotic-material expression of the colonial 
power of linguistics: phonemic records of sounds were made accessible only through the 
interpositioning of the linguistic analyst and their scientific expertise. 
Around the same time as the advent of the phoneme, procedures for teaching 
linguistics began to depend less on the apprenticeship model and instead became 
integrated into university programs. As a teacher, Sapir had once been eager to get in touch 
with any student who had “a good natural ear” and was willing to train in field methods 
(Sapir to Sturtevant, 9 April 1927, APS), including such amateurs as Whorf and Jaime De 
Angulo. In the 1930s, however, he became more invested in students who possessed not 
only a good ear but also the cultivated judgement of the phonologist. De Angulo, for 
example, had only acquired the methods of phonetic transcription. Sapir, who previously 
ranked De Angulo’s grammars highly, lost confidence in him, believing that the moment of 
“indiscriminate salvage” had passed (Leeds-Hurwitz 2004: 18):  
The fact is that I think we are allowing too many poor or improperly qualified 
men to do linguistic work that should be entrusted to well-trained persons 
with a special flair for both phonetics and morphology. Boas still has very 
much the old pioneering attitude that the main thing is to rescue languages 
and put a lot of uncritical material on record. I do not subscribe to his view in 
the least. I think it is high time all the work that we sponsor be of quality that 
is high enough to satisfy the requirements of a genuine linguist. 
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(Sapir to Kroeber, 28 November 1930, ALK) 
A “good natural ear” was no longer sufficient to be a “genuine linguist”: the student of 
linguistics now had to acquire a discriminating ear, as well. American linguistics 
distinguished itself from philology in large part for its attention to non-literary languages 
and from Boasian anthropology through its emphasis on trained judgement: the phoneme 
was a vital tool in both regards. Within the span of only a few years, and with increasing 
confidence, linguistics guarded its expertise from the contribution of amateurs and other 
academic disciplines upon which it used to depend. 
Nevertheless, curricula varied across the country, and not all subjects could be 
taught adequately in every linguistics department. In his final report for the Committee, for 
instance, Sapir identified the “Training Needs for Students of American Indian Linguistics” 
at American universities. Among his recommendations were improved standards for 
“phonetic recording,” “morphological analysis,” and “inductive field training.” Future 
research directions in this area depended, in his opinion, on instruction in phonology:  
Above all, the student should be trained in the reduction of a set of minutely 
accurate phonetic distinctions into the basic phonemic system which 
characterizes the language. It is disappointing to note that many excellent 
phoneticians are incapable of a satisfactory phonemic interpretation of their 
records. Yet without the phonemic interpretation it is quite impossible to 
compare dialects or languages and to reconstruct from them the phonetic 
patterns which lie back of the dialectic ones. (1937, APS) 
With an uneven distribution of training centres in the country, the Linguistic Institutes 
remained necessary sites for the emerging research culture: they could offer courses on 
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specialized subjects available at few American universities. Whereas the early LIs discussed 
in Chapter 2 served to generate student interest in linguistics, later Institutes—which from 
1936 on made a point to receive “Ph.D. guests without fee” (Hill 1963: 21)—were tailored 
to fill training gaps for scholars who already belonged to the academic profession.  
Notable were the 1937 and 1938 Institutes, held at the University of Michigan at 
Ann Arbor under the direction of Charles Fries, where Sapir and then Bloomfield taught the 
“Field Methods in Linguistics” course. Sapir’s class, especially, was deeply influential on 
important figures in American linguistics to follow, such as Bernard Bloch and Zellig Harris: 
“Sapir came as the star speaker, which would have some unanticipated and far-reaching 
implications for the whole field of linguistics” (Barsky 2011: 93).184 These courses 
provided students and colleagues the opportunity to learn the inductive method and refine 
their judgement in recognizing the phonemes of a language unknown to them.185 Sapir’s 
course description placed a great value on the aurality of this practice: “The materials are 
not to be obtained from books but by direct questioning, the phonetic notations of the class 
corrected by the instructor being the final authority. No reference to printed literature will 
be allowed. It is hoped to show that a perfectly adequate grasp of any language, even a 
complex one, can be obtained by the direct phonetic approach.”186 Phonology was by no 
                                                          
184 The event of Sapir’s star performance was not without its toll. Swadesh (1939) believed Sapir’s 
commitment to the summer Institute precipitated the decline in health that ultimately led to his death: “The 
enthusiasm and energy which he put into his teaching and scientific discussion and his cordiality in social 
contact with colleagues and students sapped his strength and brought on a heart attack” (132). 
185 Voegelin called this training the “spoonfed inductive method” (Handwritten notes from 1937 LI, APS). 
186 Here is the full course description for Sapir’s 1937 “Field Methods in Linguistics”: 
It is hoped to make this course as inductive as possible. The task will be set the members of 
the class to find out all they can about the phonetics and morphology of some language 
which is entirely unknown to them. The materials are not to be obtained from books but by 
direct questioning, the phonetic notations of the class corrected by the instructor being the 
final authority. No reference to printed literature will be allowed. It is hoped to show that a 
perfectly adequate grasp of any language, even a complex one, can be obtained by the direct 
phonetic approach. The phonetics needed to carry on the course will be developed as need 
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means limited to the Field Methods courses of Sapir or Bloomfield but permeated many of 
the classes and topics at these Institutes; nonetheless, for linguists to go beyond axioms 
and absorb the virtues of aural objectivity from the founders of phonological methods, they 
had to attune their ears specifically to the sounds of Indigenous languages.  
Indeed, Sapir’s model of elicitation was a major innovation of these Institutes and 
distinguished a uniquely Americanist brand of linguistic research. In this mode of training, 
the ear relied on the presence of Indigenous informants to volunteer their forms of speech: 
The effect of the Institute upon field work on unrecorded languages began 
with Sapir's course, Field Methods in Linguistics, in the session of 1937, 
supplemented by an informal course on the phonetics of Navaho, which Sapir 
gave during the same session. At Sapir's suggestion two American Indian 
informants were brought to Ann Arbor for the session of 1938 [taught by 
Bloomfield, who replaced an ailing Sapir], where their speech was studied 
and recorded under more advantageous conditions than can usually be 
secured by a single worker who visits an Indian tribe. In particular, texts 
recorded by a first rate phonograph, such as could not readily be taken on a 
field trip, yield samples of natural speech which can then be played 
repeatedly. In this way stylistic and other features usually distorted by 
dictation can be secured. More important still, linguists who were not 
                                                          
requires. It is believed that the fear which so many students of written languages have of the 
direct phonetic method is entirely unwarranted, and it is hoped that this course may do 
something to make real the oft-repeated statement that languages exist primarily as oral 
phenomena, not as written symbols. 
(Qtd. in Joos 1986: 60) 
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familiar with the methods developed by the Americanists observed and took 
part in this sort of study. 
(“Report of the Special Committee on the Linguistic Institute,” 1940: 87) 
Rheinberger (1997) reminds us of Michael Polanyi’s formulation that all types of 
knowledge, including the scientific, involve the tacit dimension: “Being experienced enables 
us to literally embody the judgement in the process of making new experiences, that is, to 
think with our body” (77). These training procedures show how two categories of 
experience emerged within the linguist’s experimental system and were distributed into 
the distinct but inseparable roles of expert and informant. Aural objectivity, whether 
mechanical or trained, depended on a repeated interchange between knowers: linguists 
acquired their embodied reasoning by extracting it from the bodies of their informants.187  
The Institutes thus replicated in a controlled setting the conditions that made the phoneme 
a productive epistemic thing: the contingency of salvage. Whether in class or in the field, 
the phoneme—and, in turn, the linguist’s trained judgement—relied on this reproduction 
of differences between expert and informant, heard and meaningful, settler and native. 
These categories were nascent in Sapir’s early experiences in Ottawa, but by the time he 
was established at Yale, they were becoming the standard. 
 
 
 
                                                          
187 This mode of elicitation continued in future instantiations of the Field Methods course: “Demonstrations of 
eliciting Native American languages, a major if not exclusive focus of Sapir's and Bloomfield's field methods 
courses, were continued in a course ‘Recording and Analysis of a Living Language’ taught by C. F. Voegelin 
(1906–1986), Murray B. Emeneau (b.1904), and George L. Trager (b.1906) in 1939 with a Delaware native 
speaker, and by Voegelin in succeeding years with native speakers of Ojibwa in 1940 and 1941” (Murray 
1991: 13). 
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c. [Collecting the Linguistic Laboratory] 
I now address a crucial nonfitting in my translation of Rheinberger’s theoretical apparatus 
to my own practice, and my re-working of it within the spatiotemporal coordinates of 
early-twentieth-century linguistics. Rheinberger works through the concept of the 
experimental system from the inside—specifically, from within the confined space of a 
biochemistry laboratory located in a university research hospital, within the temporalities 
of a bourgeoning Big Science and its demand to produce novelties.188 Anthropological 
linguists notably operated in a different context: in the open air fieldwork and the 
temporalities of salvage. They were, as I remarked in the previous chapter, bricollecteurs. 
Where Rheinberger borrows Derrida’s notion of the bricoleur to examine the play within a 
system of knowledge already given, my portmanteau extends this analysis to systems 
taken: from Indigenous languages and informants, whose presence would otherwise be 
erased in a history of the epistemic thing alone. Rather than follow the progression of the 
phoneme through an intellectual history of the theoretical and pedagogical anchors of this 
methodology, I attend to the nonfitting that resulted from the translation of this theorized 
methodology from the controlled setting of the classroom to an empirical practice in the 
field. Through this variability of theory and practice, the phoneme became an increasingly 
productive metre for the linguist to capture the modulations of Indigenous languages. As 
such, I argue that the cadence of fieldworkers and their Indigenous informants stimulated 
                                                          
188 Rheinberger asserts: “It is not, in the end, the scientific or the broader culture that determines ‘from 
outside’ what it means to be a laboratory, a manufactory of epistemic things becoming transformed, sooner or 
later, into technical things, and vice versa. It is ‘inside’ the laboratory that those master signifiers are 
generated and regenerated that ultimately gain the power of determining what it means to be a scientific—or 
a broader—culture” (37). In the same manner that Rheinberger’s work manifests “the Derridian program of 
reworking . . . oppositions from within, of trying to perfuse and defuse their limits” (19), I likewise employ a 
logic of supplementarity to reorient this opposition of outside/inside. 
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the uptake of the phoneme in an American context, their rhythms pulsing within its 
epistemologies. 
Initially, the ACLS recommended that the Committee on Research in Native 
American Languages establish “a laboratory of phonetics, which might serve both for the 
education of field workers and for the settling of difficult points encountered by workers in 
the field” (9 June 1926, APS). The ACLS representative perhaps had in mind the laboratory 
for experimental phonetics at Collège de France, launched in 1897. Robert Brain’s (1998) 
account of this truth-spot describes the “linguistic laboratory” as a crucial space for the 
language sciences where speech was made to “speak for itself.” He emphasizes the role of 
the phonograph and chronophotograph as inscription technologies that forever changed 
the study of phonetics: acoustic images, he claims, helped to codify the concept of the 
phoneme in Europe (252). The phoneme could, as the European context demonstrated, suit 
the virtues of a mechanical objectivity. These technologies also afforded a newfound 
mobility to linguists, a result of which was a decentered locus of research (and 
corresponding shift in research subjects) from Paris to the provinces: “implanting the 
phonetics laboratory in the byways of the countryside as a means of making visible the 
elusive and prolific patois that thrived there” (269). The task of obtaining linguistic data in 
America similarly overlapped with the conditions of doing field science, in keeping with the 
dispersion of other American social sciences at the time (Gieryn 2006, Igo 2007, Lemov 
2005).189 However, across the Atlantic, the phoneme was not technologically driven in the 
same way; for its proponents there, the phonetic laboratory was not an indispensable site 
                                                          
189 Alongside the collection of Indigenous languages, the LSA also encouraged the study of the dialects of 
North American English. These two initiatives, both directed toward the analysis of oral language, were the 
major developments of the early LIs. 
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for taking down knowledge.190 Bloomfield (1933), for example, surveyed technologies akin 
to those Brain describes, but deemed them inadequate for distinguishing consistent 
patterns of form and meaning (i.e. phonemes): “The phonetician finds that no two 
utterances are exactly alike” (76).191 Like Sapir, for Bloomfield phonemes exceeded 
“muscular movements” or “disturbances in the air.” They were not sounds in themselves, 
but “features of sound” (80), patterns of relative variability shared by a speech 
community.192 The American phonologist distilled such patterns from physical sound 
events, not in the hermetically sealed environment of the laboratory, but from timely 
encounters in the field when they had access to those communities, and where the 
linguist’s trained judgement could be brought to bear. 
Indeed, the failure of the phonograph to be employed for recording speech sounds 
illustrates a major difference of its uptake in American linguistics. The “cost and 
cumbersomeness” of the phonograph often made it impractical in the field (Bloomfield & 
Bolling 1927: 123), but it was nonetheless available despite economic and technical 
obstacles. Its main use, however, was to collect records not of speech but of songs.193 Haas, 
                                                          
190 It could be said that phonology was technologically driven in a different sense: phonologists certainly 
employed technologies of transcription, such as the “Indian typewriter” discussed in Chapter 1, even if they 
disregarded technologies of recording like their European or anthropological contemporaries. 
191 These technologies included the laryngoscope, a mirrored device that allowed one to examine the vocal 
cords; x-ray photography of the tongue’s positioning in the mouth; a false palate, coloured to reveal the place 
of articulation; and a kymograph, for recording vibrations (Bloomfield 1933: 75–76). 
192 Bloomfield did not, importantly, dismiss phonetics but distinguished it as a separate scientific practice: 
“Only two kinds of linguistic records are scientifically relevant. One is a mechanical record of the gross 
acoustic features, such as is produced in the phonetics laboratory. The other is a record in terms of phonemes, 
ignoring all features that are not distinctive in the language” (1933: 85). 
193 Mechanical recording was sometimes employed to study the syntax of tonal languages: “I made some 
Dictaphone records (a half dozen or more) of Tunica speech for the purpose of making a more detailed study 
of sentence dynamics. It was observed that the sentence dynamics of Tunica and Chitimacha bore a certain 
resemblance. The Chitimacha tonal phenomena presented certain interesting features which required careful 
study and, because of my musical training and experience, my husband [Morris Swadesh] asked me to make 
the necessary musical analysis” (Haas to Boas, 16 Oct 1933, MHP). 
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for instance, provided Voegelin with detailed instructions on how to operate the 
phonograph for recording songs in the right pitch, which included a series of warnings: “Be 
careful not to try to play the record over (after recording) by means of the recorder as this 
will ruin the record. . . . [T]he records are breakable and need to be handled with 
reasonable care. Also it is a very good idea not to get fingerprints on the record” (Haas to 
Voegelin, 18 November 1935, MHP). Even here, mechanical recording did not displace the 
act of transcription, but introduced to it another layer of mediation: “Now we come to one 
more thing which I would like you to do as it is of considerable help to the transcriber (me, 
that is). At the end of the first record and while the recorder is still recording, blow into the 
horn (or, in other words, record) the pitch A above middle C by means of a pitch pipe. . . . 
[I]f at any time you do change the speed you should get the pitch again immediately 
afterwards” (ibid.). Recording linguistic data such as stories was another matter (literally 
and figuratively). The use of mechanical recording devices to enhance the linguist’s 
imperfect senses was recommended when available, but as supplement to their bodies, 
whose “good natural ears” were still trusted above all.194 The differences between 
recording phonetically and phonemically, which map respectively onto mechanical 
objectivity and trained judgement, did not translate to the kinds of technologies employed 
by both camps. Phonographs were available to each group, but for neither did it supplant 
                                                          
194 In 1929, a two-day Conference on a Linguistic Atlas took place immediately following the second Linguistic 
Institute. There, the LSA flirted with the use of mechanical acoustic records of speech. G. Oscar Russell’s talk 
on “The Mechanical Recording of Speech” put forward five reasons in support of it (from Joos 1986: 34): 
(1) Permanence, even after a recorded dialect is extinct.  
(2) Preservation of fine detail lacking in phonetic notation.  
(3) Repeated listening always possible, both (a) enabling interpretation of written phonetic 
symbols, and (b) picking up details which field workers may have disregarded as irrelevant.  
(4) No limit on the number of experts who can be invited to listen.  
(5) No time limit on discussion of disputed or puzzling observations.  
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the technology of transcription (see §d for more). The technological “failure” of the 
phonograph did not impel modes of objectivity, but rather those ideals shaped the 
implementation of the technology and linguists’ strategies to remediate and re-mediate its 
limitations. 
Bloomfield himself, however, only had intermittent opportunities to conduct 
fieldwork in his later career, and Sapir had none during his years at Yale. Indeed, Sapir had 
little participatory experience beyond the dictation of texts with a single informant and 
even less “dealing with the variability of having multiple informants” (Murray 1994: 109–
110). When faced with multiple speakers of the same dialect, whose intuitions sometimes 
produced contradictory evidence, Sapir was frustrated by the difficulty of finding canonical 
forms (Darnell 1990: 249). With Sapir occupied in administrative roles at Yale, it fell to his 
students to negotiate the contingencies of the field. In her 1976 History of Linguistics 
lectures, Mary Haas reflected that there were no determined guidelines for this practice: 
It is something we usually don’t know very much about: how people did their 
field work. Of course, the anthropologists argue about this endlessly, because 
they have all this participant-observer and all that kind of thing. And of 
course you can do the same thing in linguistics, but most people don’t, for 
instance, most field workers in linguistics didn’t learn to speak the language 
and so on. 
(Haas 1976: 346, MHP) 
In spite of this variability, there were elements that most linguistic fieldwork had in 
common. For instance, research often took place during the summers or on longer 
stretches when the worker was on paid leave; there were limited opportunities for follow-
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up investigation.195 It furthermore depended upon the availability of adequate informants. 
Fieldworkers relied on spontaneous or solicited speech to yield evidence of desired 
linguistic features, not always forthcoming: “you never quoted a form that hadn’t been 
more or less volunteered by an informant by a speaker. Now more recently people have 
gotten further away from that. You can make up things and test them out” (Haas, 349). 
Field notes included texts and stories in interlinear translation, alongside and out of which 
linguists derived phonemic inventories, vocabulary lists, and grammatical paradigms, in 
addition to collecting ethnographic details. Interlinear translation imbricated a text 
through four tiers of progression: traditional spelling (in the original language); phonetic 
transcription (later phonological); word-for-word translation; and free translation (in 
English usually). In some cases, the circuits of collection continued at a distance with 
informants who were trained to write in their native language phonetically, as Sapir did 
from his headquarters at the Victoria Memorial Museum decades earlier. Ascertaining the 
total system of a language depended on partial encounters such as these. 
 In keeping with the relationships described in Chapter 1, the conditions of fieldwork 
also fostered an interchange between informants and researchers that exceeded the 
parameters of data collection alone. For one, informants found their stores of knowledge a 
source of remuneration: “To a certain extent, one can ask questions of natives without 
paying them for their time, but the most effective work is done when one can spend hours 
at a time with the same individual, and this is ordinarily possible only if one can 
                                                          
195 Boas (1938) outlined the importance of follow-up research, though these sessions were not always 
forthcoming: “The best results are obtained if the field work is done in more than one separate period. After a 
season of say three months in the field, the worker spends a somewhat longer period in studying and 
classifying his material so as to get a fairly thorough control of the language and, especially, so as to formulate 
the problems and difficulties; in a second season of field work he is then able to round out and perfect his 
material” (Report of the Committee on Research in American Native Languages: 2 APS). 
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compensate him for his services” (Boas et al., Report on April 1937 ACLS Conference: 54, 
APS).196 These encounters were not only economic exchanges but also transfers of 
knowledge and skills. Informants readily accepted instruction in the reading and writing of 
Native and European languages. Haas, for example, collaborated on her doctoral 
dissertation with Tunica informant Sesostrie Youchigant (Sam Young), “all but the last 
surviving speaker of the language” (Haas to Sapir, 29 August 1933, APS), who provided 
linguistic materials and aided her in checking them over. The encounter was a useful 
mnemonic prompt for Youchigant: “Sam said that ‘in one way’ he was glad I came back [to 
Marksville] because I reminded him of many words he had forgotten” (Haas to Sapir, 14 
October 1934, MHP). Such collaborations created opportunities for informants to speak 
and recall their heritage languages, when they may not otherwise have had the occasion to 
converse with other living speakers.197 
Under Sapir’s tutelage, Haas continued her work on Indigenous languages through a 
series of fellowships at Yale.198 She later studied dialects of the Muskogee on two occasions: 
the first from 1936–1938, funded by the Department of Anthropology at Yale, and again 
                                                          
196 Boas (1938) elaborated on the day-to-day costs of fieldwork: “The cost of living on or near an Indian 
reservation is relatively small; most of one’s money is spent in paying informants. There may be some 
expense for presents or entertainment; this varies with the traditions of the tribe that is being visited. 
Traveling expenses to and from the field will bring the cost to range between five and ten dollars a day” 
(Report of the Committee on Research in American Native Languages: 2 APS). 
197 There was often a generational divide between speakers. On one occasion, Haas persuaded the dean of a 
Junior College to let her interview students there: “I found that in a number of cases, students who felt very 
shaky about their ability to speak their languages were somewhat reluctant to talk to me. Two of them offered 
to write home and have their folks send them a list of words which they wouldn’t be able to pronounce after 
they had them” (Haas to Swadesh, 10 May 1937, MHP). 
198 At this time, Haas also contemplated training for a high school teaching certificate. To avoid prejudicial 
anti-nepotism rules, she asked her then-husband, Morris Swadesh, for a divorce: "My decision to go to school 
again to complete my education requirements involves a difficulty—I think you know what it is—namely, that 
as a married woman I shall in all probability be unable to get a job teaching in the public schools, as a matter 
of fact, there is no doubt about it. However, quite aside from this it seems to me (and you doubtless feel the 
same way) that it might be the best thing for both of us if I were to get a divorce. . . . We have discussed these 
things before, and I do hope that it doesn't come entirely as a shock to you” (Haas to Swadesh, 10 May 1937, 
MHP). Their relationship continued amicably after the separation. 
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from 1938–1939, with additional funding from the APS (Haas 1945). Muskogee was “the 
numerically and politically dominant language of the Creek Confederacy,” itself a “linguistic 
situation . . . of great complexity” (69). Within the Confederacy, she estimated there were at 
least eight different languages spoken, six from the Muskogean family. Political leaders 
hence needed a great deal of “linguistic versatility,” a fact which remained evident in the 
informants she contacted. The Muskogee nation spanned most of contemporary Oklahoma 
and possessed considerable dialectal variation, still present at the time Haas conducted her 
research; she visited a number of informants in different towns that belonged to the former 
nation to access this diversity. Most of the transcriptions Haas took between fall 1936 and 
spring 1937 were phonetic, after which she switched to the phonemic style. She later 
recalled: “One of the really great advantages, of the great contributions, I should say, of 
phonemics, is that it forced people to be more accurate phonetically, because if you have a 
theory about what is the, important in the language, significant is the word I want, you had 
to check it out again in the field” (1976: 383). Over the 1936–39 period, she kept over a 
dozen detailed journals from the field, and with the aid of Creek informant James Hill 
ultimately filled a total of twenty-two notebooks, in addition to six that Hill sent Haas in 
between her fieldwork sessions.199 From these notes, she prepared descriptive grammars 
of Muskogee before the U.S. involvement in the War (Haas 1940, 1941) and comparative 
reconstructions afterwards (Haas 1946, 1947). 
 
                                                          
199 Haas maintained a friendly relationship with James Hill and his family. Hill later wrote that he “never 
forgot” Haas, who had “thought so much” of their sons, the youngest of whom, Alex, was killed in action 
during the War (Hill to Haas, 15 July 1944, MHP). 
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Figure 11. Mary Haas’s Creek Notebook I (MHP) 
Her work with Hill, recently republished (Haas & Hill 2015), offers a window into 
the realities of data collection. The editors of this corpus outline Haas’s methods for taking 
down linguistic data in their Introduction, worth quoting at length:  
Haas began by eliciting verbal paradigms for person and tense. She then 
moved on to possession, infinitives and nouns, plural forms and verbs, and 
agent nominalizations. By page 25 [of the journal], she felt ready to collect 
her first story[.] . . . She did this by asking a speaker to read or dictate a text, 
which she transcribed in her own orthography. She would then have the text 
interpreted, usually with another speaker. She would transcribe the text in 
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this second session along with word for word translations below each word. 
She would make a note of any corrections or alternate communications 
offered by the second speaker. . . . Before the advent of computers, linguists 
made extensive use of file slips. Every word in a text was copied on a piece of 
paper along with a phrase it occurred in so that the linguist would have an 
index of every word in context. These slips allowed vocabularies to be 
compiled and helped identify inconsistent transcriptions or speaker 
variation. Slips were also made of grammatical topics or specific affixes. Haas 
had students help copy her file slips, just as she had helped Sapir at Yale. 
 (Martin et al. 2015: xxii–xxiii) 
This approach was based on the preparation Haas received from Sapir during her Ph.D., 
later reduplicated at the Linguistic Institutes. Teaching his students in New Haven, 
however, where there was a dearth of informants, Sapir employed himself to ventriloquize 
forms of speech: “We finally persuaded Sapir to give a phonetics course, a non-credit 
course. He would dictate himself. He made an informant of himself for us to listen to in the 
various languages he commanded. He was very good at it, but as for determining the 
structures of the various languages, he did that by bringing in a sheaf of slips and talking 
about it” (Haas to Murray, 26 July 1978, qtd. in Darnell 1990: 361–362). At the Institutes, 
students likewise continued to learn from a single informant; even when two were present, 
they often belonged to different linguistics groups.200 The cross-hatch of multiple 
informants that Haas employed thus represented an innovation of Sapir’s students, a 
                                                          
200 At the 1939 Linguistic Institute, for example, “the same method was employed not only with an 
Algonquian informant, but also with a Dravidian informant, brought to Ann Arbor for the purpose, and with 
Lithuanian and Polish informants” (“Report of the Special Committee on the Linguistic Institute,” 1940: 88). 
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necessary improvisation to meet the demands of the field and supplement the material 
practices of collections.201  
 The inductive method conferred a greater role to the linguist’s professional 
judgement, but it also facilitated a greater speed of collection: the linguist who developed a 
theory for how the sound system of a language worked could more swiftly bracket off the 
noise of phonetics to derive its phonology. As Haas suggested above, her shift to phonemic 
transcription was motivated by the rapid pace of data collection.202 Swadesh’s (1937a) “A 
Method for Phonetic Accuracy and Speed” affirmed how the experience of duration in the 
field necessitated techniques of rapid retrieval. The article promoted guidelines that even 
“a relatively unequipped person” could follow “in the field situation”: 
The procedure may take from a couple of days to a week or so, depending on 
the difficulty of the language and the ability of the student. When he has 
followed it through, he will have a complete or nearly complete knowledge 
phonetics of the language, and be able to do further recording both 
accurately and at a rate that will justify the initial investment of time. (728) 
Swadesh outlined eight steps to reduce the heard sounds of a language to a limited 
inventory of phonemes and a relatively narrow range of conditions that they may vary. It 
                                                          
201 For example, Haas located an informant of the Siouan language Biloxi, Emma Jackson of Port Arthur, Texas, 
with whom she compared vocabulary items of ethnologist James Dorsey: “Of course, fifty words are far from 
sufficient to work out the phonemic system of the language, but they are sufficient to furnish evidence on 
some of the points that strike one in regard to Dorsey’s treatment [of vowels]” (Haas to Sapir, 14 October 
1934, MHP). 
202 Haas (1938) expands on her choice to employ phonological transcription over phonetic: “On the basis of 
my own experience, I would say that completely adequate phonetic results are not likely to be obtained by the 
linguistic field-worker unless, through the course of his work, the principles of phonemics are kept constantly 
in mind” (64). For Haas, it was perilous to interpret phonemically, after the fact, what had been recorded 
originally phonetically: “Whereas the phonemic structure of a language cannot be worked out without 
accurate phonetic data, accurate phonetic data are not likely to be obtained without consideration of the 
phonemic structure” (65). 
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began with a back-and-forth, the linguist soliciting their informants’ judgement and getting 
them to repeat words back for the linguist’s discernment: “Use your eye as well as your ear, 
by looking into the informant’s mouth (in so far as you can and he will permit) to observe 
the mechanism of production” (730). It proceeded to drawing up lists and tables of sounds, 
to assessing their variability, and finally to settling on a corresponding alphabet. With 
practice, these instructions promised to make the researcher feel quickly “at home” with 
“strange sounds” in any language (732). Swadesh established a sequence to reliably 
mediate both the strangeness and the pace of collection. In this way, the linguists of the 
First Yale School fell into the rhythms of fieldwork, but to stabilize their experimental 
system and ensure its productivity, they had also to bracket off the temporalities of salvage 
on whose urgency they depended but, at the same time, could not sustain their work. 
Collection practices were thus inextricably linked to the exterior: whether in 
training or in the field, linguists depended on the speaking bodies of their informants. 
Shoshana Felman (1980/2003) recognizes the radical potential of locating the speaking 
body within linguistic theory. Felman argues that speech act theory in particular 
“reintroduces the problem of the referent into linguistics” (49), which had been rendered 
foreign to the linguist’s experimental system in both structural linguistics and 
transformational grammar. For Felman, the performative utterance does not index a 
closed, self-referential system, but the body of the speaker and their relationship to a pre-
existing world. The authority of the performative coheres around its capacity, in each 
iteration, for failure: for the speech act to be infelicitous, for the promise to be broken. I 
extend Felman’s analysis to encompass the promise of the languages sciences, a series of 
perlocutionary acts par excellence. The actions that compose any theory of speech 
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unavoidably traverse the body and follow directions determined neither by reference nor 
by the intentions of language users. In the context of salvage, the “linguistic laboratory” was 
less a space for language to “speak for itself” than a temporally bounded linguistic 
encounter that depended on persuading informants to speak. Rather than take the 
“laboratory” as a settled space where languages acquired an authentic identity, it was 
instead a contact zone where bodies interacted and patterns inhered through repetition. 
The field conditions of salvage linguistics show how repeated encounters between the 
bodies of informants and bricollecteurs marked the linguist’s epistemic system and 
rendered it productive within the scope of those limits. The velocity and volatility of field 
collection helped to propel the phoneme as the standard tool of descriptive linguistics. At 
the same time, the phoneme encapsulated the colonial power of the linguist, marking the 
slippage between the intimacy of their encounters with informants and the distance that 
their trained judgement cultivated to capture the phoneme as the fundamental unit of 
sound and therefore to guard their scientific authority and autonomy. 
 
❖ Analog Afterlives 
d. [Analyzing Writing Systems] 
In the previous sections, I demonstrated how linguists trained their ears to perceive sounds 
from the speaking bodies of informants and how, amidst the zeitgeist of salvage, the First 
Yale School in particular employed these methods to meet the pace of fieldwork. Despite 
the importance placed on aurality in the disciplinary identity, training procedures, and 
collection practices of linguistics, a great deal of their activities remained textual: linguistic 
science could not proceed without systems of transcription to bridge the gap between the 
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field and analysis. To betray an aphorism of Whorf’s: the linguistic laboratory was not 
under the hat, but in the inscription technologies linguists employed to render sound 
systems a constellation of symbols and offset the temporalities of collection. Specialized 
orthographies were employed alike by phoneticians and phonologists, but in the 
phonological mode especially they authorized linguists speak on behalf of the languages 
they collected. Below, I show how the codification of the phoneme within specialized 
orthography and styles of transcription supplemented the provisional linguistic encounter: 
through the delimited space of the page, linguists re-framed the temporal limitations of 
these encounters as a source of productivity. Rheinberger (1997) characterizes research 
systems by their capacity for “differential reproduction”: “the temporal coherence of an 
experimental system is granted by recurrence, by repetition, not by anticipation and 
forestalling. Its future development, on the other hand, if it is not to end in idling, depends 
upon groping and grasping for differences” (75). Repetition sustained the momentum of 
the linguist’s epistemic system through a two-fold displacement of the speaking body: first, 
through the linguist’s trained judgement, repeated speech forms were translated into 
patterns; and second, through the synchronization of linguistic and symbolic systems, 
those patterns were made further iterable on the page as structures relatively fixed in time. 
The development of writing systems enfolded languages within the linguist’s experimental 
system as an assemblage of paper and ink. This assemblage proved to be an important 
crumple zone where the discordant tempos of fieldwork and analysis could be absorbed 
and re-mastered.  
Fieldwork was contingent, fast-paced, and open-ended. For both Boasian 
anthropologists and dedicated linguists, it suited the material conditions of salvage that a 
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small number of informants could confer substantial data on endangered languages: “Even 
if the language is no longer really alive, but still remembered by one or a few individuals, it 
is possible to gain a considerable amount of knowledge by working with the surviving 
speakers” (Boas et al., Report on April 1937 ACLS Conference: 46–47, APS). In the 1930s, 
Sapir and his students also commenced describing languages as closed systems, in part to 
mitigate the urgency of salvage that gave rise to their collection practices. Understanding 
endangered languages as closed systems enabled linguists to maximize their knowledge 
claims with the minimal data pool available to them. Swadesh in particular emphasized 
that the phoneme was the best tool to access the “totality” of these closed linguistic 
systems: “any scientific procedure that aims at finding the elements of a closed system is 
valid only if it takes into account the totality of the system” (Swadesh 1935: 248).203 For 
Swadesh, the aim of phonemic analysis was to establish a “maximally simple, self-
consistent, and complete” formulation of systematic sound relationships (1937b: 11). 
Swadesh acknowledged the concern that “pattern-conscious investigators” might distort 
material to make sound systems appear more symmetrical, but felt the risk was small 
compared to taking no notice of pattern at all (11). Like the structural linguistics of 
Saussure, patterning within the closed sound system was defined by a web of differences. 
Phonemic criteria were relative within a given language and depended primarily upon 
contrastive alternations rather than on any absolute standard for measuring sound 
(Anderson 1985: 262). 
                                                          
203 Bloomfield elsewhere framed this relationality in behaviourist terms: “The persons in a speech community 
coordinate their actions by means of language. Language bridges the gap between the individual nervous 
systems: a stimulus acting upon any one person may call out a response action by any other person in the 
community. Languages unite individuals into a social organism” (Bloomfield 1942: 173). 
238 
 
For the purpose of their descriptive grammars, however, phoneticians and 
phonologists together sought to establish a phonetic alphabet with a standard 
correspondence between sound and symbol. The need to standardize a system of 
orthography was especially imperative for any linguist working on predominately oral 
languages or dialects: “Human utterance is so fleeting that even the field-worker placed 
most fortunately as he is in the immediate presence of his material, must seek to hold this 
transitory phenomenon—to make an artificial record of it for re-examination” (Bloomfield 
& Bolling 1927: 123). Certainly, in the 1920s and ‘30s, the major proponents of the 
phonetic alphabet in America were involved in collection practices, either through the 
Committee on Research in Native American Languages or the dialect atlas of American 
English. Toward the end of the Committee’s funding, when its members most keenly felt 
their work’s impermanence, the ACLS held a conference on past and future directions of 
the initiative.204 One topic was a history of writing systems in the Americas. The authors of 
the conference report observed that, before the arrival of European settlers, traditional 
writing developed only in Central America, where Mayans inscribed monuments and made 
hieroglyphic codices; elsewhere, there existed instead picture writing or tally sticks and 
knotted cords used as mnemonic devices. Makeshift systems of writing emerged out of 
contact situations, often with missionaries. It was not until the Bureau of American 
Ethnology and Boas’s Handbook, however, that these became formalized: 
                                                          
204 The conference encompassed the history of Americanist linguistics, field methods and facilities for study of 
Indigenous languages, and recommendations for future research directions and initiatives. It comprised joint 
sessions of the LSA and AAA (American Anthropological Association) at Columbia University, 25–26 April 
1937, with a lengthy report written by Boas (chair), Bloomfield, Kroeber, Sapir, and Swadesh (secretary). The 
report discussed the scientific significance of Indigenous languages of the Americas and recommended a 
permanent organization for their study and a continuation of the International Journal of American 
Linguistics to publish on these topics regularly. 
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Out of the experience of the Bureau of American Ethnology there gradually 
grew a new conception of the scientific study of language. It was found that 
haphazard alphabets were inadequate for the accurate representation of the 
varied sounds encountered in such studies. It became apparent that the old 
conception of grammar, based on the work of Greek and Roman 
grammarians, though fairly well suited to these languages, was not adapted 
to the multitude of new linguistic structures. Two things resulted: the 
introduction of scientific phonetic alphabets, with a wealth of carefully 
defined symbols designed to represent in a relatively standard way many 
different kinds of sounds; and the notion that each language must be studied 
and described in terms of its own peculiar structure. 
(Boas et al., Report on April 1937 ACLS Conference: 27, APS) 
Linguistic encounters thus affected both the observed subjects and the linguist’s tools for 
recording observations: “the experience of workers in the field has impressed upon them 
the inadequacy of much that has been recorded. We know that it is possible by modern 
methods to obtain a dependable phonetic record of a language, and it is evident that much 
of what has been recorded falls far short of this ideal” (29). As the dissolution of the 
Committee attested, however, access to resources limited how this ideal could be realized. 
Economy structured the linguist’s records in many ways, often leveraging accuracy. 
In their reflection on symbol use in linguistics, Bloomfield and Bolling (1927) recognized 
that the phonograph could produce the most accurate phonetic recordings, but the least 
economical. The fieldworker had to rely on graphic symbols to describe speech sounds, 
although even this technology had its price: “We are rapidly reaching the point where 
240 
 
linguistic matter is so expensive to print that the claim of our science upon the economic 
resources of society does not suffice” (124). Perfect phonetic accuracy was not only 
impossible but, in light of the phoneme, also a detrimental ideal to pursue: “No series of 
human speech-sounds can be represented exactly and completely by any system of written 
symbols” (125). Phonemic transcription, by contrast, gave linguists more leeway on what 
information to include and what to omit. All the same, Bloomfield and Bolling noted that 
linguists, who were best suited to comprehend the conventionality of symbols, yet felt the 
weight of their conventions:  
The special conventions of our science, the queer-shaped letters and the 
diacritic marks, are but creations of yesterday. They have sprung up almost 
before our eyes in a haphazard fashion, inventions to meet a momentary 
need, controlled largely by the native speech-habits of the inventor, or 
dictated perhaps by a passion for an illusory ‘accuracy,’ combined with the 
conveniences of a particular printer. (124–125) 
Up until then, analysts had regularly established idiosyncratic systems of transcription for 
features specific to the language they studied or to the constraints of publication, internally 
consistent but with limited continuity elsewhere. With the advent of a linguistic science 
and its scholarly network, the authors saw the opportunity to establish a symbol set with 
more uniformity across different languages and scholars. The “queer-looking symbols”—
those same apostrophes that Sapir “clearly loved” in the phonetic transcription style of the 
previous decade (Haas 1976, History of Linguistics Lectures: 380, MHP)—now seemed to 
them unwieldly relics: “A superfluous complication of the symbols cannot reproduce the 
sounds for a reader unfamiliar with the language; all it can do, and it will do it, is to confuse 
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him” (Bloomfield & Bolling, 126). Diacritics would not be abandoned entirely but closely 
scrutinized (128).205 Preferably, each mark would symbolize a discrete phoneme: “The gain 
in elegance (in the mathematician’s sense) will repay us for whatever nostalgia may result. 
. . . [T]hese suggestions should be more welcome, because they lie in the direction not of 
crippling our science, but of greatly enhancing its power by giving it a suppler and more 
abstract symbolism” (129). The specialized orthography of phonology proved “economic” 
both in cost and presentational style: it fostered a more mathematically elegant analysis 
that took up less space on the page and, consequently, on the budget. 
Phonetic alphabets were therefore an additional arena to register the conflicts 
between phonetic and phonemic styles of transcription. Phonetics and phonology largely 
made use of the same set of symbols. However, the two styles varied in the level of detail 
each demanded: phoneticians wanted to record, mechanically, all possible acoustic 
information about the sounds of a language, whereas phonologists trusted their judgement 
to unpack sound systems from a more terse description accompanied by a series of 
rules.206 Swadesh (1934) more overtly advocated for phonemic values to be cemented 
within the standard alphabet: “phonemic orthography provides the most adequate, 
economical, and effective method of writing a language” (124). A phonemic alphabet 
                                                          
205 Six Americanist linguists—George Herzog, Sapir, and Sapir’s students Newman, Haas, Swadesh, and 
Voegelin—published their own orthographic guidelines a few years later. Like Bloomfield and Bolling, they 
believed that one symbol should equate a single phoneme; digraphs were misleading, to this end, suggesting 
sound was not unitary. Nonetheless, certain cases where providing a unitary symbol for a digraph created 
recurrent problems: sounds with timbre features (such as labialization or palatalization), nasalized 
consonants, and affricates. They recommend limited use of pre- or “post-posed superscript diacritical marks” 
that were “as easy as possible to print” (Herzog et al. 1934: 630): for example, pw (labialized), py 
(palatalized), np (nasalized). 
206 Anderson (1985) distinguishes phonology and phonetics through a different emphasis on rules or 
representation: phoneticians sought to represent every phonetic difference accurately; phonologists sought 
to represent only those sounds that could not be predicted by rule-governed regularity. 
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represented “all the pertinent facts and only the pertinent facts”: “Each sign in an alphabet 
represents one phoneme, and the implicit or explicit definition of each sign is an account of 
the norms (and deviations) of the phoneme in the various positions it may occur” (125). 
Besides economical, phonemic transcription was moreover fungible. The symbols 
themselves, whose value in a given language depended on their placement within a pattern, 
were interchangeable so long as the pattern was maintained: “a mechanical substitution of 
the values of the signs for the signs will reproduce the recorded forms correctly and 
completely” (125). Even though the sound features of phonemes in different languages 
could vary dramatically in their range of deviation and more so in their positional variance, 
Swadesh did not recommend using different symbols for each language, as a phonetic 
analysis might entail.207 This “treatment would make linguistic science extremely difficult,” 
he opined: “It has therefore become conventional to use the same or similar signs in 
different languages to represent roughly similar phonemes. This method works out 
perfectly well as long as one does not carelessly assume standard or familiar values for 
given signs whenever they occur” (126). Phonemic orthography, rather than treat phonetic 
minutiae in precise and exhaustive detail, instead translated them into phonetic schemas 
that relied on a shared linguistic expertise to decipher. This choice facilitated a greater ease 
of standardization, reducing the demands of accuracy and making interpretations more 
replicable and persuasive. The symbolic realm synchronized the differing tempos of 
                                                          
207 Swadesh argued that phonetic writing was lacking in four ways: it did not indicate significant phonetic 
units of a language (phonemes); was “overly microscopic, complex, and hard to handle”; did not “distinguish 
errors and distortions from normal forms”; and was “likely to be phonetically inaccurate” (127). 
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collection and analysis, keeping the machinery of linguistic science going even amid ebbs in 
fieldwork or constraints of economy.  
In the latter half of the 1930s, Bernard Bloch and George Trager—the latter another 
of Sapir’s students at Yale (1936–1938)—introduced a symbolic system that encompassed 
both the phonetic and phonemic approaches. They called it, informally, the 
“phoneticophonemic” alphabet (Bloch to Trager, 18 February 1939, BBP), which would 
later become the basis of the American phonetic notation. Together, Bloch and Trager 
dreamed up an alphabet to “end all alphabets”: “It is guaranteed to last a lifetime, will not 
rust, can be used for writing any language dead or alive (including Esperanto and the Slavic 
tongues) either phonetically or phonemically, either correctly or incorrectly, and can be 
learned as a game during your spare time at home” (ibid.). Figure 12 shows the 
standardized set of symbols they established for the consonant chart, and Figure 13 the 
corresponding sheaves that linguists might take with them into the classroom or the field. 
It was through such prostheses that linguists learned to inscribe speech sounds into visual 
representational. In practising this language “game,” they learned to distill patterns of 
sound from the speaking bodies of informants and transpose them onto the page. For the 
linguist, the symbolic realm of the page not only instantiated sound systems but also served 
to solidify their expertise and black-box the voice box. 
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Figure 12. Full Consonant Chart (4 April 1940, BBP) 
 
Figure 13. Vowel and Consonant Sheaves (BWP) 
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Sapir once commented: “Systems of phonetic recording have their history, like 
everything else cultural” (to Mason, 11 September 1936, APS). As we saw in Chapter 1, the 
standardization of transcription practices had a contested history—and so, in the following 
decades, it remained. Gladys Reichard, an anthropologist and linguist who also trained 
under Boas, concluded that the lack of agreement on a phonetic writing system was the 
greatest hindrance to the progress of linguistic research: “If the energy which has been 
expended during the past fifty years in quarreling over symbols had been diverted to the 
actual study of language and languages, our materials would be more adequate, our 
knowledge would be much greater, and our understanding more complete” (to Boas and 
Sapir, February 1937, BWP). To the contrary, I argue that the dissonance between the 
imperfect systems of collection and transcription was important for stimulating the 
discipline’s growth. This remediation of language through writing recalls Derrida's (1978) 
concept of différance—but with an important difference.208 Derrida argues that the 
technology of writing fissures the immediacy of the spoken sign and its correlate logic of 
presence. Writing distances the sign from its point of origin and hence provokes a moment 
for other meanings or uses of that sign to inhere. For the bricollecteurs of the First Yale 
School, the phoneme was such a tool of differentiation: it enabled linguists to abstract 
patterns from the physical event, dislodging language from its origins in the speaking body 
to another mode of materiality: writing. Where in Derrida’s analysis, the technology of 
writing ruptures the rational self that was believed ever-present in European thought, here 
it functioned to braid the oral languages of Indigenous cultures into a Western knowledge-
                                                          
208 The term différance plays off the French words for “differ” and “defer,” respectively a difference in space 
and in time. 
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taking system. The rational agents of this settler-colonial collection project employed 
writing in concert with their trained judgement to absent the speaking bodies of their 
informants and extract linguistic data therefrom. However, as I will show in the sections 
below, the synchronization of systems of languages with systems of writing failed to 
control the drift characteristic of either. 
 
e. [Classifying Genres of Collections] 
Specialized alphabets were not the only material-discursive practice through which 
linguists captured the voices of their informants and consolidated their scientific expertise. 
As Bruno Latour (1986) writes, the inscription alone does not empower science to displace 
that which it seeks to describe, but it is rather the “cascade of ever simplified inscriptions 
that allow harder facts to be produced at greater cost” (16; emphasis in original). 
Rheinberger (1997) takes up this line of argumentation, impressing upon it his notion of 
differential reproduction: “Languages, scientific ones not exempted, do not describe the 
world, they inscribe themselves into practices—whence their power, their seductive force, 
and the cross-fertilizing hubbub to which they give rise. Science does not work in spite of 
the fact that there are different languages on different operational levels, it works because 
there are so many of them” (142). These thoughts on discursive heterogeneity resonate 
with the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1953/1986) on “speech genres.” Bakhtin identifies the 
speech genre as a relatively stable form of communication that combines “thematic 
content, style, and compositional structure” (60). In everyday discursive situations, 
language users navigate an environment stratified with heterogeneous speech genres; 
within more regimented activities, such as those of the sciences, they develop secondary 
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speech genres to formalize “complex and highly developed and organized cultural 
communication” (62). Charles Bazerman (1988), for one, has extended an analysis of genre 
to the forms of science writing, tracing how the experimental report came into the service 
of different scientific communities since the seventeenth century; he argues that scientific 
genres become conventionalized to allay recurring rhetorical problems that scientists face. 
These genres respond to rhetorical situations, on the one hand, but they also interact with 
other scientific practices to affect social reality. I follow Bazerman’s model in my analysis of 
the generic activity of the First Yale School. Above, I showed how the linguistic encounter 
developed in the field as a regimented speech genre to meet the exigencies of salvage. I 
examine here how linguists further textured such encounters through “synchronic” 
grammars: the synchronic was a genre that bracketed off the historical (both in the form of 
comparative reconstruction and cultural ethnography) from the structural description of 
language, a deferral upon which future research platforms in linguistics depended.209  
Any linguistic description must attend to some elements of language and not others. 
In the grammars of salvage linguistics, features of sound or word structure were usually 
central, alongside lexicography: “every study must include an analysis of the phonetics and 
morphology of the language and a fairly complete assemblage of vocabulary elements. This 
material constitutes a general description” (Boas et al., Report on April 1937 ACLS 
Conference: 29, APS). In the 1930s, there were two prevailing methods for organizing a 
grammar: “alphabetical, according to either the native language or the language of the 
                                                          
209 The term synchronic refers to the structural description of languages in a single state, in contrast to the 
diachronic or historical reconstruction that compares two states. Voegelin and Harris (1947) put it this way: 
“In descriptive linguistics, a form is regarded as explained when found in the total structure of a single 
language. In historical linguistics, form is regarded as explained when the forms from which it developed 
reconstructed, or found in early records” (594) 
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linguist” and, less often, by “presenting small amounts of vocabulary scattered through a 
grammar, organized according to the parts of speech as they [were] analyzed” (Leeds-
Hurwitz 2004: 119). The majority of linguists used these alphabetical or grammatical 
categorization schemes, although some, like de Angulo, recommended a semantic 
organization. Bloomfield (1926) explained the preference for organizing data around 
lexical or grammatical categories rather than semantic: “The morphemes of a language can 
thus be analyzed into a small number of meaningless phonemes. The sememes, on the 
other hand, which stand in one-to-one correspondence with the morphemes, cannot be 
further analyzed by linguistic methods. This is no doubt why linguists, confronted with the 
parallelism of form and meaning, choose form as the basis of classification” (157).210 
Constructing a grammar was a process of continual reduction, and morpho-phonemic data 
were the most readily systematized: “The only method which may hope to succeed in 
giving an exhaustive, yet finite, description of a language, accounting for all potential 
usages, is to organize the observed data into a system of generalizations, testing 
generalizations into larger generalizations whenever feasible, being always ready to 
experiment with an entirely new systematization if it promises to be more effective than 
the last” (Boas et al., Report on April 1937 ACLS Conference: 30, APS ). The scientific 
grammar, in contrast to the classical prescriptive grammar, “must exercise the extremest 
economy in the number and complexity of [its] formulations, for otherwise [it] risks the 
possibility of losing the actual facts in the maze of complexity” (31).211 Thus, the same 
                                                          
210 Bloomfield (1926) defined the terms morpheme and sememe as such: “A minimum [grammatical] form is 
a morpheme; its meaning a sememe. Thus a morpheme is a recurrent (meaningful) form which cannot in turn 
be analyzed into smaller recurrent (meaningful) forms. Hence any unanalyzable word or formative is a 
morpheme” (155). 
211 Voegelin and Harris (1947) recounted the virtues of compact organization that grammars centered on the 
phoneme had epitomized: 
249 
 
principles of elegance and economy that marked phonetic notation also codified the 
linguist’s scientific grammars. 
The synchronic model was rapidly becoming the standard in the American tradition, 
notably displacing the comparative: though the two could work in tandem, the synchronic 
description was increasingly seen as an end unto itself rather than as a precursor to 
determining linguistic genealogies. In his report for the Committee, Voegelin (1937) 
observed the trend for publications on Indigenous languages to be primarily descriptive. 
He outlined the number and type of papers published in the International Journal of 
American Linguistics (IJAL), the only journal dedicated to Indigenous languages of America, 
from 1917 to 1937: 
Number of papers: 
Texts (usually with grammatical notes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Grammatical discussion of special features of a language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Grammatical discussion of all or most features of a language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
Vocabularies (often with grammatical or comparative notes) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
Michelson-Uhlenbeck Algonkin notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
Comparative studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . 9 
Classification studies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
                                                          
The older grammars showed some interrelations among the materials treated, usually in the 
form of paradigms; otherwise the materials were presented with something of an archival 
organization (with all the materials on nouns in one chapter, materials on the adjectives in 
another),—perhaps convenient but not compact. Such organizations often followed 
categories of meanings which reflected some kind of translation from Latin or other western 
grammatical tradition. These grammars were often neither exact nor consistent. For 
unwritten languages, a given word or morpheme (if not normalized) would be recorded in 
several different ways. The first great advance in the direction of exactness and consistency 
came with phonemic writing. (595) 
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Criticisms of specific Am. Ind. Languages published  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Problems reviewed and recommended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
(C. F. Voegelin, “American Linguistics,” 1937, APS) 
Nearly two-thirds of the papers published, he noted, were descriptive (60 of 97). The 
remaining focused on analytic problems in these languages, only nine of which being 
exclusively comparative. Voegelin cautioned readers against the thrall of epistemic things 
such as the phoneme and morpheme: “Technical advances such as these are obviously 
advantageous, but there is a danger that their seductive fascination will act as an incubus 
holding the worker to an exclusive occupation with descriptive material.” He believed that 
descriptive data were “fertile crop for comparative uses and other special problems,” but 
the sample suggested a distinct turn away from historical reconstruction to synchronic 
descriptions, especially with the advent of new techniques of description in the 1930s. 
Voegelin himself trained in anthropology with Kroeber, Robert Lowie, and Melville 
Jacobs at Berkeley, studying the language and culture of Tübatulabal, an Indigenous people 
of Southern California. Later on, he became one of Sapir’s postdoctoral students at Yale 
between 1933 and 1935. Voegelin reflected on the paucity of his own reconstructive 
training in an earlier paper. His discussion “On Being Unhistorical” (1936) commented on 
his recently published texts and grammar from Tübatulabal. On omitting reconstructive 
work, he disclosed: “I found it difficult to apply an historical point of view not because 
comparative data were lacking, but because I was lacking in an understanding of how to 
make use of these data” (345). The major advantage of synchronic grammars was their 
simplicity. Historical work, by contrast, was “more or less encumbered by considerations 
which tend[ed] to distract attention from the powerful simplicity of the central theme, from 
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the clear-cut picture of movement arrested for a static moment” (345). Voegelin noted that 
Americanists were eager to discover the “genius of each language” independently, showing 
little interest in comparative work (345). With the aid of Whorf’s historical data, Voegelin 
measured his synchronic account of vowel increments in Tübatulabal against a diachronic 
one. The two analyses revealed how different patterns emerged depending on the 
viewpoint of the analyst: the reconstructed material revealed a different pattern, more 
complex than the synchronic interpretation. Voegelin stressed how these presentation 
styles generated multiple ontologies of “living culture”: “Subtle patterns in language and 
culture are difficult to delineate with certainty. Perhaps more often than is consciously 
admitted, alternative interpretations present themselves” (349). Historical work, for him, 
thus bestowed “additional perspective to a flat description” (349), and he worried that his 
peers would believe that the “preferred perspective is the only perspective” (350). In 
addition to being a worthwhile subject in itself, reconstruction could also improve 
synchronic interpretations, yet this genre of analysis remained in decline. 
The reconstructive and phonemic principles were compatible in the linguist’s eyes, 
but not in their practices. Reconstructive work held greater demands for data collection 
and analysis that did not suit the constraints of the field. The procedures for describing the 
phoneme and the morpheme, conversely, grew out of these rhythms. Phonemes could be 
discerned through “direct questioning or by observing reactions” of informants, a dialectic 
process of theorization and investigation: “Further deductions about the phonemic system 
are made after a collection of phonetic observations has been made, tabulated, checked, 
and various possible analyses tried out” (Boas et al., Report on April 1937 ACLS 
Conference: 41, APS). For morphemes, the procedure was similar: “to collect sentences, 
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either by asking a bilingual native how one expresses a given meaning or by recording 
what one hears used. A considerable amount of material may be gotten by having natives 
dictate stories and other material while the student records it. It is then necessary to get a 
translation of then native material, if possible a word-by-word translation and also a 
sentence-by-sentence translation” (41). Historical reconstruction relied on the same 
materials, but to conduct a secondary comparative analysis it also required extensive 
vocabularies and consistency between datasets. The goal of historical linguistics was to 
establish genetic relationships, and “the final proof must depend on the discovery of 
consistent phonetic formulae of correspondence” (42). Building useable datasets was more 
time and resource intensive, and so were the interpretations that drew on them: “Since 
contemporary sister languages represent the end results of different lines of gradual 
change, the formulae of correspondence may be fairly complicated” (42). Indeed, even the 
results of reconstruction were unavoidably approximate: “it is hardly possible to expect an 
accurate reconstruction of what the sounds and structure of the original language might 
have been” (43). The methodological innovations of structural description meant that the 
linguist was no longer beholden to the process of linguistic drift that Sapir illustrated two 
decades earlier. The genre of synchronic description offered linguists a more controlled 
drift for their scientific advancement. 
Even within synchronic grammars, however, styles of presentation differed. A 
structural description preserved different contents than did other types oriented toward 
ethnographic uses. Haas and Swadesh’s (1933) work on Nitinat, for instance, represented 
an earlier style of organizing data (see Figure 14). It proceeded from an interlinear 
translation of a Nitinat text to a full English translation; commented on the morphological 
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and phonetic structure of the language; derived phonological rules and performed a 
grammatical analysis; and finally listed a complete glossary of vocabulary items from the 
translated text (whose entries were connected to the text via endnotes).  
 
Figure 14. Interlinear Translation of Nitinat (Haas & Swadesh 1933: 195, 197) 
This genre of presentation was more anthropological, story-centered, and stood in contrast 
to structural descriptions that omitted many of these elements in favour of treating the 
phoneme or morpheme as the primary concern. Voegelin’s (1935) report on Shawnee 
phonology was an example of the latter (see Figure 15). It began immediately with a table 
of phonemes; addressed the distribution of phonemic classes and the role of syllabification 
in the language (phonetic variety being determined with reference to its syllabic 
placement); and proceeded to a lengthy discussion of consonant variability. Absent were 
efforts to commemorate stories or enumerate lexical inventories.  
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Figure 15. Phonemic Inventory of Shawnee (Voegelin 1935: 23) 
Where the older genre was extensional, demonstrating the transliteration of text to 
grammar and then vocabulary, the structural model was intensional, foregrounding only 
the sound system and its rules. The choice of genre therefore had consequences for how 
data were organized and, in turn, what details entered into the collective memory that 
linguists curated. Both genres manifested the selective memory of the linguist’s colonial 
power, but the latter increasingly bore the mark of the linguist’s trained judgement and 
their decision to position the phoneme as the main object of linguistic analysis. 
 Indeed, linguists deliberated what elements of their study should be prioritized, 
given the limits of their resources. Approaching the end of the Committee on Research in 
Native American Languages, Boas and Sapir sent around a circular letter to other major 
figures in salvage linguistics, soliciting their views on past initiatives and future directions 
and on the possibility for a new society (8 February 1937).212 Many of the respondents 
underscored the need of funding for research and publication; for an expansion to Latin 
                                                          
212 Respondents to the circular letter included: Kroeber, Michelson, Kent, Bloomfield, Whorf, Mason, Swadesh, 
Newman, Voegelin, Herzog, Reichard, and Hoijer. Carl Buck, President of the LSA for 1937, appointed them as 
members of the Committee on a Society for American Indian Linguistics. Haas was away doing fieldwork and 
unable to attend the organizational meeting (to Whorf, 16 February 1937, BWP). 
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and South America; the consolidation of research platforms; and the desire to further 
standardize transcription symbols and disseminate phonemic training. Some, like Kroeber, 
lamented the dearth of comparative work. Most lauded their efforts to record the 
unwritten languages of North America and this work’s contribution to linguistic science, 
particularly through the phonemic principle. Swadesh, for one, felt the “pioneers in this 
field ha[d] contributed more to the science of linguistics than they gained from it at the 
outset.”213 As a consequence of their strained budgets but also as the result of principled 
choices, these linguists were less inclined to publish full texts. Whorf, whose response was 
the most detailed, explained this rationale. He saw little need to prioritize the publication of 
texts because, in his view, they served now as “raw material” rather than the “final result”:  
The data of a rapidly dying language can be preserved for science only in the 
form of a complete grammar with illustrative analyzed texts and as large as 
possible a dictionary—a mass of recorded texts with translations, no matter 
how voluminous, does not so preserve it, and assays so little linguistic ore to 
the ton that the future publication of texts qua texts should be avoided, lest it 
divert needed funds from the more important publications above-mentioned. 
(Whorf to Boas and Sapir, February 1937, BWP) 
Texts were only valuable to him if they were worked out phonemically, a feat which most 
informants were not capable of performing. Where the realities of fieldwork were a leading 
                                                          
213 Swadesh also recognized their failed ambitions: not enough collection work was being done while 
Indigenous languages continued to fall into obsolescence. At the same time, he believed that work “on dying 
languages should be done by experienced workers, because there are problems involved to which the novice 
may awaken only too late.” Newman likewise believed it should not be necessary for the beginner “to travel 
several thousand miles and to waste time and effort on the many distracting problems that arise in the field, 
such as tracking down informants, attending to transportation in the field, arranging for shelter, food and 
water supply, medical facilities, etc.” He suggested there were enough informants in large cities near 
universities to train and research. 
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factor in the reduction of comparative grammars, the movement away from storied to 
structural descriptions was a categorical decision sedimented into the genre of synchronic 
grammars and hence into published documents. 
Structural linguistics came into even greater prominence in the following decade, 
and this closure of historical and ethnographic avenues was then hailed as central to the 
discipline’s advance. Voegelin and Zellig Harris (1947) cited the shift from historical 
reconstruction to the synchronic description as the foundation of “modern linguistics” in 
America (594): historical reconstruction was “very demanding,” and it was “not often 
profitable . . . to explain or state linguistic forms in one of these languages relative to earlier 
forms, or to forms in some other language” (595). In “the formulation of linguistic 
structure,” furthermore, they discovered “problems of a mathematical or logical nature” 
that distinguished their inquiry from cultural anthropology (594). The science of language 
was a “handmaiden” no more. In this received narrative, linguists had established their 
autonomy in a double movement: they employed trained judgement to differentiate visual 
patterns from aural data and the genre of synchronic analysis to defer historical 
reconstruction and cultural ethnography. Within this increasingly closed system, we find 
an analogue in the analog approaches of salvage linguistics to the cybernetics discourses 
that would become dominant mid-century.214 In the 1930s, however, that moment had not 
yet arrived: linguists still debated methodologies, their training and funding structures 
remained unstable, and their genres of analysis had not totally calcified in response to the 
                                                          
214 Katherine Hayles (1999) describes the history of how information lost its body: “Seeing the world as an 
interplay between informational patterns and material objects is a historically specific construction that 
emerged in the wake of World War II” (14), precipitated by the interconnection of humans and computers. 
Where Hayles “recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being” within this uptake of 
informational technologies (5), I find similar themes in relation to the finitude of endangered languages. 
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exigencies of salvage. These linguists were “riding the cusp,” as Katherine Hayles would put 
it: at the median point between real and virtual spaces. They attempted to develop a 
virtual, laboratory-like space on the page where they could identify totalizing patterns in 
language, but their efforts functioned instead in a virtu-real space where experimentation 
(linguistic encounters in the field) and simulation (modeled systems on the page) 
interacted. For the First Yale School, there was no closure, neither for their system of 
analysis—still marked, indelibly, by fieldwork—nor for their imperfect data, which they 
hoped—but had no proof—would be resumed. Writing, then, was not a technology of 
distantiation, emptying the sign of its origins; rather, it was one of dormancy, a relay 
signaling the intimacy of these hopes across time to an imagined future. 
 
f. [Archiving Analog Afterlives] 
In Rheinberger’s (1997) theorization of the temporalities of experimental systems, he 
asserts that there is no totalizing exterior force guiding their development: there is “no all-
encompassing theoretical framework, no overarching political program, no homogenizing 
social context effective enough to pervade and coordinate this universe of drifting, merging, 
and bifurcating systems” (181). Rather, these systems are characterized by their own 
internal time-scales, “shifting and drifting in an open horizon” (181), with their relative 
“age” a product of their continued ability to produce novelties. Rheinberger defers the 
conditions of emergence, which to him “seem accessible only by way of a recurrence that 
requires the existence of a product as a prerequisite for assessing the conditions of its 
production” (177). Certainly, for the bricollecteurs I have followed in this chapter, neither 
the impetus of salvage nor the practicalities of data collection overdetermined the 
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phoneme or other epistemic things, which acted productively—and still do—in other 
branches of linguistics. However, the coordination of the linguist’s experimental system 
with the sound systems of Indigenous languages was not an open horizon: it was 
embedded in the colonial mechanisms that foreclosed upon Indigenous sovereignty over 
their land, culture, and language. The temporalities of this knowledge-taking system, rather 
than eking toward an always already present “vanishing point” (Rheinberger, 185), 
reinscribed the surmised temporariness of these vanishing voices. Returning to the 
originary in this context is, in Byrd’s (2011) words, a recognition that “Indigenous peoples, 
[their] ongoing colonialization, and [their] historical dispossessions and genocide continue 
to be pushed toward a vanishing point within critical theory and diaspora studies” (3)—
and within science and technology studies, as well. In this final section, my most 
speculative, I reflect on the traces of the symbolic systems that the First Yale School 
assembled and the futures of the data they archived, which are now being reclaimed by the 
Indigenous communities from which they originated. Out of these entangled lines of 
descent, I contemplate how the metaphor of language-as-a-living-entity has become 
differently materialized in the archives of linguistics and in the practices of language 
revitalization movements. 
 The Committee on Research in Native American Languages came to an end in 1937 
and with it much of the infrastructure for the collection, publication, and analysis of 
Indigenous languages of North America. The ACLS appointed other committees to assess 
the situation and find solutions that would facilitate future research. Boas recognized that a 
“few specialists and a limited number of university libraries [would] be the only purchasers 
of publications that deal[t] with a single American language,” and he hoped to enlist the 
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cooperation of universities to perpetuate this line of study: “It might be well if a successor 
to our Committee, armed with the prestige of the Council and the inducement of financial 
contribution, tried to bring universities to undertake systematic work in the recording of 
American languages” (“Report on the Committee on Research in American Native 
Languages,” 1938: 3, APS). Publication remained “hampered by lack of funds,” with even 
the $1000 allotment for manuscript completion reduced to $500, so that a majority of data 
remained in manuscript form: “We are in the unfortunate position that a great deal of 
material has been collected by the Committee but very few opportunities for publication 
have presented themselves, so that a large amount of material remains in manuscript” 
(Boas, “Report on the Committee on American Indian Languages,” January 1941, APS). 
Further exacerbating these conditions, the International Journal of Linguistics ceased 
operations between 1939 and 1944, coinciding with the war and the deaths of Sapir (1939) 
and Boas (1942).215 With the loss of these important nodes for organization, publication, 
and leadership, not only were the languages that linguists studied in peril, but their data 
too seemed threated to fall into obsolescence. 
 This exigence was allayed not through genre but the archive. Voegelin and Florence 
Robinett’s report on “Obtaining a Linguistic Sample” (1953, APS) addressed the topic of 
language archiving, much needed to safeguard existing data in the decades following the 
collapse of salvage linguistics. Based on a four-day conference at Indiana University held in 
conjunction with the concurrent Linguistic Institute, Voegelin and Robinett’s report 
focused on the practices of collecting, archiving, and analyzing data; archiving they divided 
                                                          
215 The International Journal of American Linguistics was suspended due to lack of funds (Boas to Whorf, 24 
November 1937, BWP). 
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into the tasks of storing, cataloguing, and indexing. Their principal example was the Franz 
Boas Collection.216 At the time, the Boas Collection consisted of seven large steamer trunks 
that “Boas managed to cram with manuscripts—his own, those of contributors to the 
International Journal of American Linguistics, and those of graduate students” (2), much of 
them unpublished and even unedited written materials.217 The authors highlighted how the 
process of cataloguing transformed the haphazard collection into an organized archive: 
“The Franz Boas Collection was changed or transformed from the status of being in 
storage—when it was in the basement of the American Council of Learned Societies in 
Washington—to that of being catalogued when it was classified by Voegelin and Harris for 
the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia” (4).218 Voegelin and Robinett further 
opined that such archives would need to store materials “either for a brief period of time, 
or else for decades” (2).219 Accordingly, they assigned a newfound importance to the 
archive and the archivist in linguistic analysis: “The Archive will stimulate returning to the 
field, both for the sake of solving problems in analysis and for collecting additional 
materials to enable resident scholars to make additional analysis in the Archive” (7). They 
regarded analysis as a “post-storage, post-cataloguing, post-indexing task” (7), but the 
                                                          
216 Boas’s son donated the collection to the ACLS after his father’s death and, in 1945, the ACLS presented it as 
a gift to the American Philosophical Society, which placed it in their library in Philadelphia. 
217 Voegelin and Harris (1945) offered a detailed index of the collection’s range of contents: “Some 
manuscripts were written before [IJAL] was founded. . . . Some manuscripts are unorganized and appear to be 
field notes[.] . . . Some manuscripts have been published more or less in their entirety[.] . . . In many cases 
manuscripts have been published in part, or used as a basis of subsequent publication” (9). 
218 Voegelin and Harris made a decision to index the contents of the Boas Collection by separate languages. 
Voegelin and Robinett (1953, APS) named other possible systems of classification, “such as area of 
provenience, such as dialect, . . . or such as language family. Or the classification can be based on a common 
type of language (irrespective of linguistic history),” i.e. “typological” (4). 
219 Voegelin and Robinett also considered the problem of phonographic preservation: “Tape recordings are 
most efficient because they can be played back in stretches shorter than a word, and because their fidelity is 
not lowered in the slightest, no matter how frequently they are played back. Phonograph discs are known to 
have a long shelf life but deteriorate when played back. The shelf life of tapes is not now known” (2–3). 
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archive itself was not oriented to the posterior but the future. Synchronic descriptions 
were not therefore timeless, but marked by the temporalities first of salvage and then of 
the archive. They were not inert, or “arrested” in the present moment, but inertial: 
linguistic and epistemic systems drifting together into a speculative futurity, vibrating 
vocal cords reverberating in the vibrant matter of these records. 
 Reverberation refers to the phenomenon of sound being caught in an echo chamber, 
reflecting cacophonously off its surfaces until decaying as the sound becomes absorbed 
into objects in space and time. To an extent, reverb characterizes the fate of sound systems 
reflected in the archives of linguistics. The linguist’s trained judgement winnowed the 
channel of sound to categorical patterns and their writing systems absorbed the frenetic 
flow of fieldwork to produce manageable data, enfolding languages into the interior of their 
experimental system. The linguist’s mastery required a closure of the box to fortify their 
methodology as scientific—here, instantiated by the literal and existential remainder of 
black boxes in the archive, inside of which over 160 Indigenous languages have remained, 
dormant.  
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Figure 16. Photograph of the Archive’s Black Box (Mary Haas Papers, APS) 
As Derrida (1995) writes, the archive as a site does not embody the closure of the past but 
opens instead to the future: 
the question of the archive is not, we repeat, a question of the past. It is not the 
question of a concept dealing with the past that might already be at our disposal 
or not at our disposal, an archivable concept of the archive. It is a question of the 
future, the question of the future itself, the question of a response, of a promise 
and of a responsibility for tomorrow. The archive: if we want to know what that 
will have meant, we will only know in times to come, later on or perhaps never. 
A spectral messianicity is at work in the concept of the archive and ties it, like 
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religion, like history, like science itself, to a very singular experience of the 
promise. (36) 
The promise of salvage linguistics was elliptical and always already out of reach. When 
their boxes are re-opened, the spell of mastery is broken: the indeterminacy of these 
languages is reprised, and not even the expert linguist knows how or where they will go. 
The future that linguists anticipated in preparation of these archives is not now the present 
that we inhabit. The archive has become a platform for the uncharted “afterlife” of these 
boxed languages and for Indigenous revitalization movements that open these boxes and 
re-verb their speech with the voices that have persisted therein. The failures of the 
linguists’ theorizations and the incompleteness of their empirical work, in this sense, 
become a site of creative recuperation, innovation, and play. 
At this juncture, I remove the brackets (and scare quotes) from around the 
metaphor of language-as-a-living-entity that has underwritten my chapter. When we speak 
about endangered languages, we refer to a complex of issues, both matters of fact and 
matters of concerns. As such, the topic requires an account not only of the materiality of 
archives and the methods of collection and preservation that substantiated them but also of 
the semiotics through which they were and are transmitted and understood. I take the 
metaphor seriously not to reify an organicist understanding of language, which reached its 
zenith in the nineteenth century (Alter 1999), but to consider how this conceptual mapping 
has nonetheless informed the chimerical practices of linguistics and language revival. Even 
Sapir, who rejected a “superorganic” account of language and culture (1917), drew on it 
figuratively to discuss language obsolescence: “Language is probably the most self-
contained, the most massively resistant of all social phenomena. It is easier to kill it off than 
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to disintegrate its individual form” (1921/2004: 170). Criticisms of its recent application in 
biocultural diversity studies point out the inconsistencies of the organism metaphor: the 
“ecologizing” comparison obscures vastly different mechanisms of “extinction” (for 
instance, by a speech community shifting to a different language); furthermore, it exoticizes 
languages by associating them with rarefied animal species (Cameron 2007: 272, 281). 
What both proponents of this metaphor and its discontents have in common, though, is 
their use of the metonymic: each substitutes concerns over language for closely associated 
parts. Language endangerment comes to stand in for a constellation of other meanings and 
values, including the self-determination of speakers and their communities (Perley 2011), 
the ecological value of linguistic diversity (Nettle & Romaine 2000), the affects of 
“intergenerational continuity” and minority rights (Fishman 1991), and the effects of a 
globalized economy (Heller & Duchêne 2007). Without detracting from these issues, I 
observe that each consequently brackets off the question of “language itself.” These 
displacements reduce the nature of language to a passive reflection of social structures, 
political economy/ecology, or ideology, leaving its ontology available only to linguists and 
their forms of expertise.220 
As I have shown in this chapter, salvage linguistics encountered language 
endangerment as a symbolic problem: in response, they trained their judgement to 
condense speech into patterns and, through specialized orthographies and genres of 
presentation, transformed patterns into an assemblage of data on the page. Rather than 
understand the situation of language endangerment and revival through symbolism (a 
                                                          
220 In their guidebook to language revitalization, Grenoble and Whaley (2006) suggest that local communities 
consult linguists as experts to help create language programs (192), rather than examining the values 
sedimented within linguistic expertise. 
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substitution of languages for rules and representations) or metonymy (a substitution of 
languages for their associated parts), I argue that revitalization should be treated instead 
through the figure of analogy. In this reconfiguration, I follow Paul De Man’s (1983) 
formulation of the symbolic and allegorical (an allegory being otherwise a sustained 
analogy). De Man analyzes the symbolic as figural language that renders life and its forms 
identical along one spatialized plane, “always part of the totality it represents” (192); by 
contrast, the allegorical refers to a dialectic of subject and object, of an original meaning 
and its proxy, both “unveiling” in time (206). Where the symbolic corresponds to a relation 
of simultaneity, within the allegorical the sign consists of repetition: it has no identity, only 
a distance in relation to its origin (207). The aim of salvage linguistics was symbolic in the 
manner that de Man articulates: it sought to spatialize data on Indigenous languages along 
the static space of the page. Revitalization movements, by contrast, are analogous: they 
occur not in the confines of one flat system, but in the multidimensional relations of 
linguistic and epistemic systems unfolding over time. As Shaylih Muehlmann (2015) 
observes, the brackets around such archived languages are artefactual, referring to a point 
of origin but increasingly distant from it: they are not based on “internal consistency,” but 
“rather on the historical circumstances that allowed them to be identified, documented, 
and standardized” (51). Regardless of their origins, Muehlmann explains that people’s 
experience of “language practices and identity” nonetheless matters to their feelings of 
cultural belonging. Indigenous communities must employ settler categories even as they 
seek to rupture them, their becomings entangled but in a state of mutual unravel. 
Revitalization initiatives thereby re-introduce the problem of the signifier into 
structural linguistics, from whence it had been so carefully bracketed off, and bring to the 
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fore an ontology of language that is indeterminate, contingent, and multiple.221 The 
material-semiotics of these boxed languages provides an opening for us to think about 
linguistic performativity on a different scale. Questions of language preservation ask that 
we take into account relationships of responsibility and response-ability beyond the scope 
of individual speaking bodies—indeed, to reconsider what can be acknowledged as a 
“body” in relation to languages and what bodies are required for their (re)production. In 
Beyond Settler Time, Rifkin (2007) mobilizes queer theory to show how ordinary 
experiences reveal the inertia of dominant formulations: they “help open ways of 
registering the imposed straightness of time while also highlighting alternative kinds of 
temporal experience” (37). In an analog(ous) way, the temporalities of revived languages 
have queered the genealogical model of language transmission: forms of speech are passed 
not from “mother” to “daughter” languages, but laterally through a salon of material actors. 
The queer genealogies of linguistic revival show that caring for language in its multiple 
ontology means recognizing, too, the stuff of language. This recognition also queers “the 
signifier’s collapse into the letter’s cadaverous materiality” (Edelman 2004: 7), revealing 
this materiality to be a lively space and open horizon of futurity. By positioning the 
linguist’s archives as the scene of these intersections, I foreground the work that goes into 
assembling languages and their nature, arguing that they are “made to matter” differently 
in the environments that reproduce and activate them. As such, linguists must learn to 
think in allegorical terms when constructing their archives, anticipating a future not only 
for their successors but also for their failures. They must take into account how the 
                                                          
221 I play off Annemarie Mol’s (2002) argument for multiple ontologies of the body that, in the same gesture, 
reduces language (or “talk”) such that it occupies a purely referential function (objects become clustered 
under the “same name”). 
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reverberations reflected in the surface of their writing systems might decay, both 
materially and in the loss of metadata. They must also consider how their traces will get 
taken up again by the communities they once consigned to loss. In what other ways can the 
nature of language be included in discussions of its politics, rather than bracketed off and 
left only for linguists or grammarians to play with? Time will tell. 
 
Conclusion: The Transit of Linguistics. 
Time cycles and circulates, accelerates and decelerates, refigures and defigures the 
archives of linguistics. Amidst this shuffling of countless pages, the zeitgeist of salvage 
faded, the linguist’s experimental system found other productive epistemic things, and a 
“Neo-Bloomfieldian” structuralism predominated. The work of the First Yale School was 
disrupted by the end of the Committee on Research in Native American Languages, the 
deaths of their intellectual leaders, their recruitment into the Army Specialized Training 
Program during the War, and their institutional scattering afterwards. Through the ASTP, 
however, linguistic methods found a new application: training soldiers and army personnel 
in strategically important languages. Haas (1943) expounded on the newfound role of 
linguist as teacher. She explained how the best practice of instruction employed a trained 
linguist alongside a native speaker of the target language: 
He [the linguist] persuades the informant . . . to talk in the foreign language; 
he listens carefully, and writes down what the informant says in a phonetic 
alphabet, which he converts as soon as possible into a practical orthography 
(a phonemic transcription); he compares and analyzes the forms of the new 
language; and classifies them in terms of its own grammatical system, 
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without reference to the grammar of English or of any other language 
previously known to him. (205) 
The linguist then guided students through a similar process, imparting onto them the same 
techniques of elicitation that Sapir pioneered decades earlier. The temporalities of 
fieldwork continued to reverberate in their methods, now matched by the demands of an 
intensive army training program. Once again, the “Indian” was the field of transit for 
linguistics: each time a proof of the success of their science. Mastery of the phoneme 
therefore incited the transit of linguistics from an elliptical network and inchoate identity 
to a scientific discipline with a valued expertise. The phoneme captured the linguist’s 
knowledge of sound systems, but it also reiterated the salvage paradigm’s logic of capture: 
the phoneme, as I have shown, was a more-than-linguistic substance that conjured an 
assemblage of social and material actors and reproduced power relations between linguists 
and their informants. Other epistemic systems have taken hold in linguistics since then, but 
neither the linguist nor the phoneme can be fully extracted from the unsettling history of 
salvage or its unsettled futures. 
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~ CONCLUSION ~ 
 
“Edward died with the feeling that he had an important point to make that he hadn’t 
managed to get across. He gave up even hoping to get it all written, even before he 
accepted the fact that he was ill. His work on language was such a pleasure to him that 
he was able to remain ‘busy’ in that manner, but he did deeply feel that he died 
without saying his full say!” 
- Jean Sapir, 1967 
 
 Toward an Intra-Linear Linguistics 
Through this dissertation, I have told a thematic history of American linguistics from the 
perspective of its failures: my three chapters reconstructed the dynamics of space, identity, 
and time in the formation of this human science and dwelled on their imperfections and 
incompletions. I examined how Edward Sapir, a talented linguist, adapted to his role on the 
Geological Survey of Canada by employing an elliptical network of actors to retrieve 
intimate linguistic data from his distant offices at the Victoria Memorial Museum; there, 
Sapir learned to negotiate both the expanse of Canada and the limited recognition his work 
accrued within anthropology and museum culture. Professional and geographic circuits for 
linguistics drew closer together at Yale University, an institutional centre for linguistic 
research in the 1930s, around which the next two chapters revolved. I turned to Benjamin 
Lee Whorf, Sapir’s controversial apprentice, and the mistranslations that plagued Whorf’s 
career across his lifetime and beyond; this “amateur specialist” has dashed contemporary 
critics’ expectations for a stable scientific identity because, in his generation, the category 
of “linguist” had only begun to form—and because Whorf himself was attuned to 
frequencies other than the academe. Finally, I attended to the First Yale School, led by 
Sapir, and the experimental system they worked out in the field and on paper to capture 
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linguistic sound systems; tracing the development of the phoneme, their chief object of 
study, prompted further reflection on the transience of these linguists’ collective memory 
practices and the loosening brackets surrounding their archives today. Failure emerged at 
every turn in the disciplinary history of American linguistics, but it was most evident in the 
enduring failure of the salvage mentality that animated these collection practices across 
three and more decades: specifically, the focus on extracting knowledges and cultural 
artifacts from Indigenous communities without contributing to the continuation of their 
civilizations.  
As the epigraph indicates, Sapir ended his life thinking he was a failure: linguistics 
always approached the pole of perfection but, for him, never reached it. Indeed, following 
his death was a rapid dissolution of the scientific network that he had helped to establish 
for the study of Indigenous languages in America. In addition to discontinued patronage, 
his protégé Whorf died in 1941, his mentor Franz Boas in 1942, and Leonard Bloomfield 
(who took over the Sterling Professorship of Linguistics at Yale in 1940) suffered a 
disabling stroke in 1946. His other students, like Mary Haas, were scattered 
(geographically and epistemologically) by World War II: “people had been dragged into 
doing unusual languages that they had never done before during the War” (Haas 1976: 367, 
MHP). The “Neo-Bloomfieldians” of the next two decades—though they were the first 
generation to be employed as “linguists” in America—focused all but exclusively on 
synchronic descriptions of languages and eschewed the historical work to which Sapir had 
dedicated much of his career. No linguist ever fully recuperated the scope of Sapir’s 
scientific interests or resumed his incomplete intellectual or empirical projects. His legacy 
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was one of thwarted ambitions, but consistent with the manifold scenes of failure that 
interleaved the emergence of an independent science of language in America.  
 The great success of linguistics during and after the War also occasioned a 
divestment from the salvage paradigm, a forgetting upon which the discipline’s humanistic 
ideals later depended. Linguists continued to elaborate on the experimental system that 
Sapir and his cohort worked out on Indigenous languages, but in application increasingly 
derived its productivity from more available world languages and through formalism 
rather than fieldwork. Ultimately, the most memorable tenet of the First Yale School 
proved to be the incomplete postulate of its most peripheral member: Whorf’s theory of 
linguistic relativity. The “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” re-emerged in the 1950s amid a new 
context of cultural relativism and liberal multiculturalism. Within anthropology, relativism 
had been employed methodologically to gain access to foreign cultures and ideologically to 
mobilize doubt against ethnocentric Western worldviews (Hollinger 2003). However, in 
part due to the influence of popular writers like Margaret Mead, the topic travelled beyond 
its initial context to other disciplines (among them the history of science through Thomas 
Kuhn) and into mass culture. The rise of postwar cultural relativism seized upon Whorf’s 
notion that each language embodies a unique cultural perspective, which made sense as 
part of a growing rationale to appreciate (or at least tolerate) diversity. What was lost in 
these re-articulations, though, was a sense of the social and material conditions that a 
language needs to thrive. Attention to these conditions was characteristic of, and indeed 
inextricable from, the project of salvage linguistics and its practices of fieldwork and 
archiving. How might practitioners of linguistics today “salvage” this commitment to the 
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materiality of language but re-orient its political force from the extractive agenda of its 
forebears? 
As Donna Haraway (2016) writes: “It matters what stories we tell to tell other 
stories with; it matters what concepts we think to think other concepts with” (118). My 
dissertation has re-traced these scars of knowledge not to revel in their kairosity but to 
demonstrate how linguists have inhabited spatial dimensions, identity categories, and 
temporal orientations—and to suggest how they might otherwise. To trouble these modes 
of being and becoming, I conclude by suggesting an “intra-linear” style of linguistic inquiry. 
Drawing from the conceptual work of my previous chapters, the intra-linear names a nexus 
of concerns about the ways that linguists render languages and their speakers, even (or 
perhaps especially) when trying to keep their distance. Unlike the interlinear method of 
translation, a four-tiered technique for the extraction of linguistic and cultural data, an 
intra-linear approach takes seriously the consequences of colonial regimes and the 
complicity of the sciences therein. Rather than becoming linguists at the expense of these 
communities, they could become-with them, abdicating the intimate distance of their 
formalisms for the messiness of co-production or, following Kim TallBear (2013), “co-
constitution.”222 An intra-linear linguistics would develop its categories of analysis in 
participation with local communities, conscious of their contingency, and together they 
would learn to care for language in its indeterminate ontology, responsive and responsible 
to its fragile materiality. Linguistics was and will always be far from perfect, but a 
recognition of its failures could generate the opportunity to do good in the present.  
                                                          
222 In her analysis of Native American DNA, Kim TallBear (2013) employs Sheila Jasanoff’s term co-
production to discuss the mutual constitution of natural and social orders. She re-names it “co-constitution” 
to avoid the “overly constructionist tone” of the former (23). 
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❖ Future Research. 
Here, at last, I set out to demarcate the failures that took hold in my own knowledge-
making project which, nonetheless, chart a course for future research opportunities. 
Horizontally, I would like to address the greater work of the vast institutionalized 
projects I encountered: namely, the Anthropological Division of the Geological Survey of 
Canada and the Committee on Research in Native American Languages. My first chapter 
explored only one of the four Boasian subfields that Sapir was responsible for managing; 
my third chapter focused on a narrow, if decisive, subset of researchers involved in the 
documentation of Indigenous languages. By attending more comprehensively to these 
initiatives, I could better relate linguistics to the history of anthropology. Alternatively, I 
could situate linguistics in relation to other human and social sciences of the times, 
especially on the subjects of sound recording and expert listening. Sapir began learning 
psychoanalysis before leaving Ottawa for the University of Chicago, where he befriended 
Harry Stack Sullivan and other psychologists. What influence did the psy-disciplines and 
these Chicago years have on Sapir’s model of objectivity that he might have also imparted 
onto his students? 
Vertically, I might think about the genealogy of the language-as-a-living-entity 
metaphor and the ways it has manifested in linguistic models and methodologies, 
intentionally or inadvertently. Looking backward from the 1930s, I could examine the 
interchange between linguistics and natural history in the nineteenth century. Looking 
ahead, I could track how linguistic models premised on this metaphoric transfer interacted 
with informational theories of life that permeated the cybernetics discourses of the mid-
twentieth century. These routes could show how the language of linguistics has been 
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informed by breakthroughs in the life sciences, or how that metaphoric language has in 
turn informed lay and scientific understandings of community and kinship.  
Perpendicularly, I could build on my reception history of Whorf’s linguistic relativity 
hypothesis. My chapter focused on audiences that were his contemporaries, like the 
Institute of General Semantics. However, perhaps the real story begins not with Whorf but 
with Harry Hoijer’s 1953 Chicago conference on “Language in Culture” that re-introduced 
his ideas into a new context and currency, to which I alluded above. How might our 
understanding of the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis change through a comparison of 
these two historically situated moments? Furthermore, how has the hypothesis itself taken 
on a life of its own and influenced other popular and scientific works irrespective of 
Whorf’s initial conception or Hoijer’s re-framing? 
Intra-linearly, with the cooperation of linguists and Indigenous partners, I could 
consider the data histories of archived languages and the partial recuperations that now 
characterize their analog afterlives. This data has been taken up and re-materialized in 
(non)governmental organizations, new scientific practices, and local communities; it has 
been re-presented in discourses of language endangerment and their discontents. How 
does the situation now compare to the one prognosticated by the collectors and archivists 
of nearly a century ago? How do contemporaries interact with the modes of trained 
judgement embedded in the contents of these archives? Additionally, I might consider the 
phenomenon of present-day digital “language museums” and the role of language curators 
therein. How are new media transforming languages and linguistic sovereignty? And has 
linguistics finally found its place in museum display culture? 
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